A necessary condition for being able to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method is to solve the following problems:

(a) We must explicitly present and argue for a theory of meaning that allows us to draw conclusions from mystical sentences about the experience in question. No such theory exists today. Stace has not applied his referential theory to mystical language, still less argued that a referential theory is the one to be selected in preference to other alternatives.

(b) We must show that mystical sentences are actually used for describing mystical experiences. The reasons Stace provides are untenable. None of the mystical sentences that Stace cites functions descriptively. But arguments put forward by Troy Organ and Stace in his intermediate period against the logical possibility of mystical sentences functioning descriptively are also untenable.

(c) We must provide a satisfactory explanation of what the mystics mean by saying that the experience is ineffable. Nine different explanations have been suggested. None of them is unobjectionable. The reasons that Stace puts forward in support of his explanation that the mystical experience is not really ineffable are untenable. In none of the mystical utterances that Stace cites does the mystic use the word "ineffable" in the way Stace recommends. None of the nine explanations can, however, be dismissed definitively. Closer examination of the mystical utterances that Stace uses, from twenty‑eight mystics, shows that different mystics, or even the same mystics, use the expression "ineffable", in different ways in different linguistic contexts. It is also possible to find utterances in which the sentences function descriptively with regard to the non-content‑related properties of the experience, while the content of the experience is logically ineffable. I have found no support for the idea that the ineffability of the experience renders its identification logically impossible.

The conclusion of my investigation is that there are no logical reasons why identification should be impossible. On the other hand, there is no theory in existence today that has shown that it is possible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method.

Introduction
Notes

1. The Meaning of Mystical Words and Sentences
1. 1. The Referential Theory and Its Application to Mystical Language
1.1.1. Characteristic Properties of a Referential Theory
1.1.2. The Referential Theory of Walter T Stace
1.1.3. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Language Based on Stace's View in His Early Period
1.1.4. Implications for the Problem of Identification
1.1.5. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Language Based on Stace's View in His Intermediate Period
1.1.6. Implications for the Problem of Identification
1.1.7. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Language Based on Stace's View in His Later Period
1.1.8. Implications for the Problem of Identification
1.1.9. Criticism of the Referential Theory
1.1.10. The Theory of Use and Its Application to Mystical Language
1.2.1. Characteristic Properties of a Theory of Use
1.2.2. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Private Language
1.2.3. A Suggestion for Applying the Theory of Use to Mystical Language
1.2.4. Implications for the Problem of Identification
1.2.5. Criticism of the Theory of Use
1.3. Short Summary and Concluding Remarks
Notes

2. The Semantic Functions of Mystical Sentences
2.1.1 Descriptive or Symbolic Function: Stace's Later Theory
2.1.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
2.1.3. Criticism of Stace's Theory
2.2.1. Evocative Function: Walter T Stace's Theory from his Intermediate Period
2.2.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
2.2.3. Criticism of Stace's Theory
2.3. 1. Inspirational, Evocative or Expressive Function: Troy Organ's Theory
2.3.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
2.3.3. Criticism of Organ's Theory
2.4. Short Summary and Conclusions
Notes

3. The Ineffability of Mystical Experience
3.1.1. Psychological Ineffability: The Theory of Stace in his Later Period
3.1.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.1.3. Criticism of Stace's Theory
3.2.1. Ninian Smart's Multiple Explanation
3.2.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.2.3. Criticism of Smart's Theory
3.3.1. Conceptual Ineffability: the Theory of Paul Henle
3.3.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.3.3. Criticism of Henle's Theory
3.4.1. The Theory of Non‑Experiential Ineffability
3.4.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.4.3. Criticism of the Theory of Non‑Experiential Ineffability
3.5.1. The Theory of Emotion
3.5.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.5.3. Criticism of the Theory of Emotion
3.6.1.Jerome D Frank's Neurophysiological Explanation
3.6.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.6.3. Criticism of Frank's Theory
3.7.1. Richard Gale's Pedagogical Explanation
3.7.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.7.3. Criticism of Gale's Theory
3.8.1. The Psychoanalytical Explanation Put Forward by Raymond Prince and Charles Savage
3.8.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.8.3. Criticism of Prince and Savage's Theory
3.9.1. Logical Ineffability: A Theory Presented by Richard Hubert Jones and Walter T Stace in his Intermediate Period
3.9.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification
3.9.3. Criticism of the Theory of Jones/Stace in his Intermediate Period
3.10. Short Summary and Final Discussion
Notes

4. Analysis of Selected Mystical Texts and Conclusion
4.1. The Result of the Analysis
4.2. An Examination of Stace's Interpretations of Certain Specific Mystical Texts
4.2. 1. Texts that are Impossible/Have not been Possible to Analyze
4.2.2. Texts in Which the Mystical Sentences do not Function Descriptively
4.2.3. Texts in Which Sentences do not Function Descriptively If the Utterances About Ineffability are Considered
4.2.4. Texts in Which the Sentences Function Descriptively but Only with Regard to Non‑Content‑Related Properties
4.3. Final Evaluation of All the Theories of Function and Ineffability
4.4. Implications for the Problem of Identification
4.5. Implications for Other Problems within Research into Mysticism
Notes

Bibliography

The Problem

The problem that I am going to investigate is whether it is possible, by a scientific method, to identify what is usually designated within this field of research as a "mystical" experience.

I am of the opinion that, if we are to be able to defend the possibility of stating the properties of a mystical experience using a scientific method, a necessary condition is to present arguments in favour of a theory of language that solves the following problems in a satisfactory manner:

(a) The problem of meaning. We have to clarify the relationship between mystical words/sentences and what they express, i.e. investigate whether there is any relationship between mystical expression, on the one hand, and mystical experiences, on the other, so that by means of the mystical expression we can reach some conclusion about the properties of the experience in question. If a relationship of this kind cannot be found, then it is logically impossible, and thereby impossible using a scientific method, to identify a mystical experience.

(b) The problem of function. We have to investigate the semantic functions of mystical language so as to discover whether the mystical sentences function descriptively, i.e. are actually used to describe properties of mystical experiences. If the mystical sentences do not function descriptively, then it is logically impossible, and thereby impossible using a scientific method, to identify a mystical experience.

(c) The problem of ineffability. Mystics have often claimed that their experiences are ineffable. What does the mystic mean by the expression "ineffable"? If the mystics mean that the experiences are, for example, absolutely ineffable, then it is logically impossible, and thereby impossible using a scientific method, to identify a mystical experience.

It is not sufficient to solve the three subordinate problems in the way outlined above. We also have to demonstrate that the theory in question is the one we should prefer to rival theories.

As far as I know, Walter T Stace is the only philosopher who has tried to solve these problems. Stace does not discuss the problem of identification explicitly, but his view of mystical language and the method he uses to interpret mystical texts imply that identification by a scientific method is possible. I shall therefore have his theory as a starting‑point when discussing the main problem. Stace's solution to the three subordinate problems is briefly as follows:

(i) The meaning of mystical words is to refer to the mystical experience, that is to say, mystical words are names of properties of the mystical experience. It is thus possible to identify a mystical experience using a scientific method by analysing the mystical words/sentences. Thus Stace adopts what is known as a referential theory of meaning to explain the meaning of mystical words/sentences.

(ii) An investigation of how mystical sentences actually function shows that there are mystical sentences that have the same characteristics as descriptive ones. Mystical sentences are used to describe properties of mystical experiences. As there are mystical sentences that function descriptively, it is possible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method.

(iii) Mystical experiences are not ineffable. As mystical experiences, in contrast to non‑mystical ordinary experiences, do not follow the laws of logic, the mystic according to Stace becomes confused when attempting to describe his experience. The mystic believes that the mystical experience is ineffable. As the mystical experience is not ineffable in the strict sense, we need not question the result of the investigation of the semantic function of mystical sentences, i.e. that mystical sentences are used to describe properties of the mystical experience. It is therefore possible to identify mystical experiences using a scientific method.


Walter T Stace

Stace was born in London in 1886. In 1908 he graduated from Trinity College, Dublin and between 1910 and 1932 he was employed in the British Civil Service in Ceylon. From 1932 to 1955 he taught philosophy at Princeton University. Stace died in 1967.

Stace has written a long series of books and articles on mysticism. It appears to me that his view of the relationship between mystical experiences, on the one hand, and mystical language, on the other, changed over the years, in the way described below.

In the earlier period, represented by the article "Metaphysics and Meaning" (1935), Stace, to be sure, accepts a type of referential theory of meaning, but claims nevertheless that it is impossible to identify a mystical experience.

His view during the intermediate period is to be found in "Naturalism and Religion" (1949), "Time and Eternity" (1952), "Religion and the Modern Mind" (1952) in "Oriental Conceptions of Detachment and Enlightenment" (1952) and "Mysticism and Human Reason' (1955). Stace then claimed that the mystical experience is absolutely ineffable, and that mystical words do not refer to the mystical experience. So during this period, too, the possibility of identification is denied, but for other reasons.

The following works were produced during his later period: "Mysticism and Philosophy" (1960), "The Teachings of the Mystics" (1960), "The Mystical Form of Western Spirituality" (1962), "The Psychology of Mysticisrn" (1967) <l> and "The Philosophy of Mysticism" (1967). <2> Stace still retains his referential theory, but changes his conception of the semantic functions of mystical sentences and his view of the phenomenon of ineffability. He claims that mystical sentences function descriptively, and that the mystical experience is not ineffable, thereby implying that it is possible to identify a mystical experience using a scientific method.

Stace is undoubtedly the philosopher that has had the greatest influence on research on mysticism within the field of philosophy. Many philosophers have adopted his definition of the concept of mystical experience. A large number of dissertations have been devoted to his theories about the status of mystical experiences in connection with the theory of knowledge and with ontology.


Reasons for Undertaking the Investigation

One of the reasons for starting an investigation of the possibility of identifying the mystical experience was already mentioned in the previous section. It is not self‑evident that identification is logically possible. My problem is, however, of great relevance to other problems within research into mysticism. Within the theory of knowledge, for instance, the mystical experience is often used as a criterion of knowledge. This presupposes that identification of the experience is logically possible. To justify the claims of mystical knowledge, studies of the possibility of identifying a mystical experience can therefore be of fundamental importance.

The same applies to the ontological question, that is, whether the object that mystics claim to gain knowledge of in the mystical experience, often named "God", "Brahman", "The One" etc., exists in reality, and if the mystical experiences can provide us with knowledge of the nature of that reality. Theories that, for example, attempt to prove the reasonableness of God's existence by referring to the fact that mystical experiences have certain characteristic properties, besides being an experience of God, lose much of their strength if it is logically impossible to identify the mystical experience.

The much debated question of the relationship between the mystic's experience, on the one hand, and his interpretations of the experience, on the other, is also logically dependent on the possibility of identification. If the experience cannot be identified, it is impossible to determine this relationship and to decide what theory is preferable.

Another problem concerns mysticism and ethics. There are some who claim that mystical experiences give rise to a specific view of what is right and wrong, good and evil, etc. To the extent that these theories are based on the properties of the mystical experience, my investigation is also of relevance to this field of research.

The problem of identification also concerns questions of definition and areas connected with them. Here I am chiefly thinking of the definitions that are based on properties of the mystical experience, comparisons between different experiences within mysticism/drug mysticism, and classifications of mystical experiences. We cannot, for instance, compare two experiences that we have not been able to identify.

The main problem may also be relevant to non‑behaviouristic explanative psychology. To explain the origin of a mystical experience, the psychologist has to be able to identify that experience.

Finally, no researcher has investigated the problem of identification previously. Noone, as far as I know, has even recognised it as a problem. That the problem is worth studying has, however, already been made clear. The problem is of fundamental importance within research into mysticism, not only to philosophers of religion, but also to anthropologists, and historians, phenomenologists and psychologists of religion.


The Current State of Research

Unfortunately, no previous research exists in this problem area. By approaching the main problem by way of three subordinate problems, however, my investigation will enter problem areas that are already known. As I shall present the theories dealing with each problem in specific chapters, I shall not go into further details here.


Material

The material consists of theories on mystical experiences put forward by philosophers within the analytical tradition. I have limited myself to treating the theories within semantics, logics, the theory of knowledge, etc., that concern "mystical" questions and that are relevant to the question of whether it is possible to identify a mystical experience using a scientific method.

Aim

The aim of my investigation is:
(a) to give an account of, clarify and classify Stace's later theory and alternatives to it in the material.
(b) to critically examine Stace's later theory and the alternatives.
(c) to argue for the theory that I consider to be preferable, on the basis on the result in (b).
(d) to evaluate Stace's solution to the problem of identification on the basis of the result in (c).


Method

The aim of my investigation will be achieved by methods that are normal within what is usually called "analytical" philosophy, and they include the following:

(a) An interpretation of central sentences in the material. I shall use the following methods of interpretation:

1 .That sentence S1 is a contextual interpretation of sentence S, is the same as that S1 expresses the same proposition/means the same as S, does in the linguistic context K, and that S, renders any theory the sender may have maximally consistent. <3>


Comments

Same proposition and means the same. The expressions "same proposition" and "means the same" mean that it is impossible for a person to accept what S2 expresses and at the same time repudiate what S1 expresses.

Maximally consistent. I assume that philosophers attempt to present their theories in a manner that is as logically consistent as possible. Where two interpretations are possible, I shall therefore choose the one that is most consistent.

11. In some cases of interpretation I am forced to state what the author means more precisely. The author has perhaps expressed himself unclearly or vaguely, or used ambiguous terms. I then express the interpretation I choose more clearly by making the sentence in question less vague and/or ambiguous. Thus:

That S1 is a precization of S, is the same as that S1 expresses the same proposition/means the same as S does in K, and that S1 renders any theory the sender may have maximally consistent and less vague/ambiguous.

111. I shall also make use of what I call implicative interpretation. This means that I suggest an interpretation of a sentence or a text that is not explicitly supported by the text but which I believe is the logical consequence of the author's utterance. Thus:

That S1 is an implicative interpretation is the same as that S1 is a proposition that is a logical consequence of that which is expressed in K and that S1 renders the sender's theory maximally consistent.

(b) An investigation of the logical relationships between central sentences in the material and a clarification of the implicit theoretical prerequisites of the theories, when these are relevant to the problem under discussion.

(c) An investigation of the validity of the arguments in the material and what theories may be considered preferable. A valid argument is one that is true/probable and relevant. A relevant argument is one that, alone or with other true/probable propositions inductively or deductively leads to the thesis that the argument should support.

To be able to determine which or what of the rival theories that in the present state of research are to be preferred, I shall first and foremost make use of the following criteria:

(a) Clarity. The central theses of the theory have to be unambiguous and precise.
(b) Relevance. The theory has to describe/explain the phenomenon it aims to describe/explain.
(c) Consistency. The theory should be free from logical contradictions.
(d) Certainty. The theory should be based on as small a number of unproved assumptions as possible.
(e). Completeness. In its description/explanation a theory should comprise as many phenomena as possible within its specific area.


Analytical Apparatus

Hitherto I have used terms such as "mystic", "mystical experience", "identify", etc. without explicitly stating their meaning in detail. Now that I am about to discuss the meaning, function, etc. of mystical sentences and the possibility of identifying mystical experiences, I need to define certain central concepts.

The reason for defining the concepts mystic, mystical experience, etc. is that, unfortunately, there is no common apparatus of concepts within research into mysticism. Despite this, philosophers often discuss, for instance, the mystical language or mystical knowledge without stating what is meant by the expressions "mystic" and "mystical experience". To the extent that philosophers do provide definitions, these vary from one philosopher to another. Problems can therefore arise when I wish to compare different theories, which is another reason why I need a common point of departure. A number of stipulative definitions follow below:

(a) "mystical experience". As mentioned earlier, the possibility of defining a mystical experience logically presupposes the possibility of identifying the same. At the same time, however, we have to know something about the type of experience that I say should be identified. I have therefore tried to delimit what a mystical experience is by stating its relationship with ordinary perception, in the following way:

mystical experience = def an experience characterized by the following properties:

lack of
I. sensory perception
II. sense of space
III. sense of time
IV. relationship between subject and object
V. thoughts.

Few philosophers would regard my definition as sufficiently precise, but it is in my view sufficiently delimiting for the purpose of my investigation. I have not found anything either that would indicate that the majority of the philosophers that I examine would not agree with me that the above definition points, if incompletely, to one type of mystical experience.

Included in the concept of mystical experience is that the experience has some specific content‑related properties. I have, however, chosen not to specify these, as a comparison of different theories would then be more difficult to carry out. Different philosophers have specified different content‑related properties. Moreover, as far as the purpose of my study is concerned, I do not consider it necessary to specify these properties. In the theories presented, no distinction is made between the mystical experience as such and its content. I shall, however, return to this question in Chapter 4, as this distinction is important to the discussion of the main problem.

(b) "mystic" = def a person who is regarded as having had a mystical experience <4>
(c) "mystical text" = def a text written/dictated by a mystic
(d) "mystical language" = def the language that mystical texts consist of about to discuss the meaning, function, etc. of mystical sentences and the possibility of identifying mystical experiences
(e) "mystical words/concepts/sentences/utterances" = def words/concepts/ sentences/utterances to be found in mystical language
(f) "context". I shall distinguish between two types of contexts, linguistic and non‑linguistic. By linguistic context is meant not only the section or chapter in which the mystical utterance is to be found, but the complete apparatus of concepts that the mystic in question has made use of in all his works. With the concept non‑linguistic context I refer to biographical data, cultural, social, economic conditions etc.
(g) "possible to study by a scientific method". The question "What is scientific method?" has been debated for hundreds of years. It is naturally not my task to provide an exhaustive answer to this question here. It is sufficient for the purpose of my investigation to point out one prerequisite that I think all sciences are based on, namely communicability. By communicability is meant here not only that it should be possible for the researcher at least to communicate the results of his research to other researchers within the same paradigm. I refer primarily to the communicability of the phenomenon. To be able to study the phenomenon scientifically, it is necessary to be able to describe it in a language. The expression "possible to study by a scientific method" therefore refers primarily to the possibility of such a description of the phenomenon.
(h) "identify" = def to determine the properties of an entity with the help of an apparatus of concepts. As my problem concerns the identification of mystical experiences, I refer here to the determination of the properties of a mystical experience by means of a scientific method. The possibility of determining the properties of an experience with the help of, for instance, intuition, therefore, does not fit in with my definition of "to identify".<5>

In the preamble to each chapter I shall supplement my analytical apparatus with concepts specific to that and succeeding chapters.


A Review of the Chapters

The main problem, as mentioned previously, will be approached by dividing it into three subordinate ones: the problem of the meaning of mystical words/sentences, the problem of function and the problem of ineffability. These three problems will be treated chapter by chapter in this order. Finally, in chapter 4 I

shall test all the theories on the basis of an analysis of certain selected mystical texts and against the background of the results in chapters 1‑3. I shall follow the same pattern in the first three chapters. I shall begin by presenting the problem, the material and the apparatus of concepts that I shall employ. Then I shall give an account of the theories that deal with the problem in question. The first of the theories presented will be that of the later Stace. The consequences of accepting Stace's theory as far as the question of

identifi cation is concerned are made clear, after which Stace's theory is examined. First of all I discuss any support that may exist for the theory, then I examine the supporting arguments included in the theory and explicitly stated by Stace. The analysis is concluded with other criticism of the theory. This is followed by a presentation of the alternative theories that are available to us. The proce dure here is identical with that used for dealing with Stace's theory. At the end of each chapter I sum up the results of the analysis and discuss the implications for the question of identification.

Notes

1. Stace has not stated when this article was written but he has told us he held a lecture based on this article in 1961. The article was first published in 1967. See 1967a, p viii.

2. Stace has implicitly stated that this article was written in 1960 in Stace 1967 a, pp vii‑viii.

3. My definition of "contextual interpretation" excludes any form of intentional interpretation, i.e. an interpretation that aims at finding out what the author had in mind when writing his work. To be able to discover the author's intentions we have to know a great deal about his opinions, frame of concepts, frame of reference, character, interests and the social, economic and cultural conditions under which he lived. But even if we know all this we cannot claim to be able to interpret the utterance of the author "intentionally" for the following reasons: I. It is possible that the author had intentions that he was not aware of himself. II. It may be difficult for the author to formulate his intentions, especially if much time has elapsed since the work was written. III. Even if the author is able to give an account of his intentions, he could be wrong. Maybe the author has reasons for not stating his intentions. The main problem in trying to interpret a text intentionally is that we have no criteria that enables us to decide whether we have succeeding in finding out the author's intentions or not.

4. In this study I will use the expression "he" and not "he/she". This does not imply that I have discriminated against female mystics.

5. It could be limiting only to treat theories that discuss the possibility of identifying a mystical experience by analysing mystical texts. The reason is that I have found no better method. It has been suggested that the researcher could identify the properties of mystical experiences through psychological criteria or through mystical experiences of his own. However, to avoid breaking the rule of communication mentioned above, the scientist must, sooner or later, formulate the mystical experience in language. After all, words are the means by which we can communicate our experiences to others, at least if we claim to be scientists. See Thorsen 1983, p 185 note 20 and also Staal 1975, p 103.