The Problem

As we have seen, both Stace and Organ claim that there exists a logical relationship between the semantic functions of some mystical sentence, on the one hand, and the ineffability of the mystical experiencem on the other. If the mystical experience is ineffable in the senses put forward by Jones/Stace in his intermediate period, it is neither logically nor actually possible that mystical sentences function descriptively in this specific linguistic context. Consequently, it is also impossible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method on the basis of these utterances. If the expression “ineffable” should be interpreted according to Ninian Smart, sense (iv), Henle´s theory, the theory of non-experienatial ineffability, the theory of emotion or the theories of Gale, Frank or the colleagues Princw and Savage, it is logically possible for mystical sentences to function descriptively, true enough, but it is impossible to identify mystical experiences by a scientific method. If, on the other hand, the expression “ineffable” should be interpreted according to Stace in his later period or according to Smaert´s theory, senses (i), (ii) and (iii), then it becomes logically possible for mystical experiences to function descriptively and to identify mystical experiences with regard to the problem of function using a scientific method. Through the later meanings of the expression “ineffable”, it has also been shown that the mystical experience is not ineffable in a sense that would prevent scientific identification.

In Chapter 3 I was unable to find any decisive argument against the loigical possibility of Stace´s theory from his later period or Smart´s theory, senses (i), (ii) and (iii), even though they may be strongly criticized. This does not mean, however, that the expression “ineffable” should be used in the way Stace/Smart suggest. Stace must therefore show that the mystic actually uses the expression “ineffable” in the way he recommends to enable identification in respect of the phenomenon of ineffability.

The same argument can be put forward concerning the semantic functions of mystical sentences. I have not found any support for mystical sentences not being logically able to function descriptively. But it still remains for Stace to show that mystical sentences actually do function descriptively so as to be able to claim that the identification of mystical experiences with regard to the problem of function is logically and scientifically possible.

Stace in his later period has cited utterances by 28 mystics from various traditions and times in support of his theory. My task is to analyse the mystical utterances Stace selected and also his interpretation of them, in order to discover whether it is possible to claim, on the basis of these utterances, that there are mystical sentences that function descriptively and that mystical experiences are not ineffable/or are ineffable in Smart's view, senses (i), (ii) and (iii). By answering these questions I shall be able to decide whether Stace has shown that it is possible to identify mystical experiences with regard to the problem of function and ineffability using a scientific method.


Method

It is my opinion that to be able to understand and interpret mystical words/ sentences, it is necessary to study both their linguistic and non‑linguistic context. I shall give a short account of what this comprises below. Some of these rules are to be found in a manual on methods for interpreting texts but, as we shall see, Stace has broken several of these fundamental principles, which is the reason why I have chosen to formulate them explicitly.

A study of the non‑linguistic mystical context comprises, amongst other things, the following:

(a) The historical period in which the mystic lived. Here I am thinking of economic, political and cultural conditions, institutions, rules, customs and usage; the rules for social behaviour that the mystic was influenced by etc.

(b) The religion/world view that the mystic advocated, especially the form it took during the period in which the mystic lived; doctrines, values, myths, rites, social organization and mystical writings. <l>

(c) The mystic's life, his social origins and family relationships, his intellectual and emotional development, his ideas, opinions and personality.

(d) The problems that the mystic had to cope with. A study of these often provides a guide when we try to interpret certain mystical terms.

(e) The original situation in which the text was communicated. A study of the intended receiver often provides valuable clues to the interpretation of mystical texts.

(f) The mystic's purpose in writing the work in question. This does not mean that I recommend an intentional interpretation of mystical texts. <2> But to know what the mystic's intentions were, as far as this may be ascertained, can provide us with valuable information about how the mystic actually uses his language.

A study of the mystical linguistic context includes, among other things, the following:

(g) The authenticity of the work, that is, first, if the mystic is the real author, secondly, if the manuscript in question is genuine or not.

(h) The problem of translations. Stace only works with texts translated into English. It is, however, very risky to use a translation as a basis when the task is to identify the mystical experiences of the author. A translator is usually bound by his own system of concepts, as a concept in one language is often not identical in content or scope to corresponding concepts in another language. In addition, translations are often faulty. Finally, each translation involves an interpretation of the text.

(i) Checking to see that sources are correctly given and that parts of the text that are relevant to the analysis have not been excluded. This may appear too elementary to mention, but, as we shall see, Stace has broken this rule on several occasions.

(j) The genre of the mystical texts. Carl A Keller and Peter Moore have paid attention to this aspect. Keller divides mystical literature into eight, what he calls literary "genres" and has also investigated whether it is possible to find descriptions of mystical experiences in them. The eight genres are briefly as follows: <3>

(A) Aphorisms in verse or prose form. Aphorisms tell us what the world or life is like and what life should be like and their purpose is didactic. As aphorisms repeat traditional ideas, are often poetic, speculative and normative, Keller maintains that is very difficult to decide, on the basis of such, whether the author has had mystical experiences of his own and, if so, what the characteristics of these were. <4>

(B) Biographies of mystics. Biographies often contain legendary material. They express the hopes, expectations and ambitions of the society in question and are often not historical documents. Thus, Keller says, it is often very difficult to decide whether the mystic referred to has really said what is attributed to him, for example, about the character of mystical experiences. <5>

(C) Reports of visions. Keller has divided these into three sub‑groups.

(Cl) Accounts of mystics visions. Belong to the biographical genre above.

(C2) Manual on methods of how to attain visions.

(C3) Reports of visions written by the mystics themselves.

According to Keller, manuals on methods contain descriptions of objects that the mystic should experience on the mystical way. Special attention is paid to the interpretation of these objects in traditional doctrinal terms. It is therefore difficult to find descriptions of mystical experiences that are free of theological conceptions in these works.

On the other hand, Keller is open to the idea that studying reports of visions may provide researchers with new and interesting material. The few investigations that have been conducted in the field imply, however, that visions are projections of the myths and conceptions of the religion in question. So here, too, it is difficult to decide what the mystic actually experienced, Keller argues. <6>

(D) Commentaries on classic religious works. The mystic presents his view of traditional religious conceptions. The terms used for these interpretations are entirely doctrinal. It is very difficult to decide what experience, if any, lies behind the interpretation. <7>

(E) Dialogues between teacher and pupil. The purpose of the dialogue is to get the novice to adopt the teacher's views on theoretical issues. According to Keller, the dialogue is only indirectly related to what the teacher has experienced. It is therefore difficult to determine the teacher's experiences by studying dialogues. <8>

(F) Instructions on the mystical way in the form of, for instance, sermons or theoretical commentaries. Emphasis is laid on getting the pupil to adopt a certain religious idea. says Keller. Here the teacher does not primarily refer to his own experiences. <9>

(G) Prayers in verse or prose form. A prayer is directed towards a deity and expressed in traditional theological language. It is difficult to determine whether the prayer is based on personal mystical experiences or is an expression of a desire or longing for such. <10>

(H) Religious poetry or fiction. According to Keller, it is very difficult to decide what mystical experiences the author may have had, as we do not know what is a genuine description of mystical experiences of his own or what is fictional. < 11 >

Keller concludes that we cannot find the kind of relation to mystical experiences in any of the eight genres that would enable us to reach any decisions about the character of the experiences on the basis of the texts. <12>

Peter Moore has divided mystical works in a different way to Keller. He distinguishes between three types:

(I) Autobiographical reports of mystical experiences.

(II) Systematizations of mystical experiences into various types or stages on the mystical way. The author himself does not need to have had all these experiences to be able to deal with them systematically.

(III) Theological or liturgical works that treat religious ontological objects but in which the relation to these objects is not discussed in terms of mystical experiences.

A specific mystical text can, according to Moore, contain material from more than one group. He says that only the first two groups are relevant to the analysis of mystical experiences. <13>

If we accept Keller's view of the relation between mystical texts and mystical experiences, it is very difficult to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method. If we accept Moore's theory, on the other hand, the door is open to the possibility of identification. Contrary to Keller, Moore claims that it is possible to find descriptions of mystical experiences in what he calls autobiographical reports, the nearest equivalent to this being Keller's reports of visions. Moore's second group, commentaries on mystical experiences, corresponds essentially to Keller's manuals on methods. Here Moore is more open than Keller to the idea that this source can be used for identification. Theological commentaries, Moore's third group and corresponding essentially to Keller's commentaries on classic religious works, cannot be used for identifying a mystical experience. Keller and Moore are in agreement here.

Keller and Moore thus agree that in certain groups/genres it is impossible to identify a mystical experience, even though they naturally do not speak in terms of identification. I have accepted this result. But so as not to close the door completely to the possibility of identifying a mystical experience, I wish to remain open to the possibility of finding utterances by mystics in autobiographies, dialogues and manuals on methods that will enable identification. Analysis of the texts in question must show if this is the case. <14>

(k) The conceptual framework that the mystic is acquainted with. We know that the meaning of many terms has changed over the years. It is therefore important to know what the terms meant at the time the mystic lived.

(1) Conceptual innovations. Most of the mystics that Stace deals with are innovators of mystical concepts. It is therefore important to try and discover what these new concepts stand for, so as not to be led into drawing false conclusions, for example, because the term is identical with another usual term.

(m) Other works written by the mystics concerned, as well as of and about the works from which the quotations are derived. Sometimes a mystical sentence/ word may be interpreted more easily and adequately by comparison with other utterances by the mystic in question.

In addition to studies of the linguistic and non‑linguistic context, there are, in my opinion, other important factors to consider when approaching the mystical texts. These factors are as follows:

(n) Most mystics and researchers today are agreed that there are several stages that a mystic goes through on his way to the mystical experience. Within the Christian tradition a rough distinction is made between the stage of purification and the stage of illumination, both of which are stages on the mystical way, and the final stage, often called "unio mystica". <15> In yoga a distinction is made between different stages of samadhi < 16>, within Theravada Buddhism between four stages of jhanas <17>, and in Kabbala mysticism between different stages of ecstasy, etc. <18>. Even Stace distinguishes between two stages, extrovertive and introvertive mystical experiences. But. as we shall see, Stace has not paid attention to the fact that the distinction between different mystical stages affects the interpretation of the mystical sentences. I believe that the mystic's proposition about different stages may be of importance to the evaluation of the semantic functions of mystical sentences. What stage is the mystic talking about when we claim that the language here is functioning in an X way? Is it not possible that mystical sentences can function in one way to express a certain stage and in another to express, or perhaps even describe, another stage? What stage is the mystic talking about when he propounds a linguistic theory, for instance, that the sentences should be interpreted X or not X? Isn't it possible that the mystic wants to point out to us that one stage can be expressed in sentences with X but not with Y function, while another stage can be expressed with the help of sentences that have both X and Y function, and so on?

The uses of the word "ineffable" should, in my view, also be linked up with the question of different mystical stages. What stage is the mystic talking about when he says that the mystical experience is ineffable? Isn't it possible that certain stages can be ineffable, while others are not? Cannot certain stages be ineffable in one sense, while others are in another sense? <19>

One objection that can be made against the talk of different mystical stages is that it presupposes that I interpret certain mystical sentences in advance as functioning descriptively, as I am able to determine these stages. But the stages we shall meet are not based on psychological but on philosophical distinctions. I have not, therefore, made any assumptions concerning what will be shown.

(o) In my view it is important to distinguish between two types of descriptions of mystical experiences. The mystic may, on the one hand, describe what he has experienced. I shall call this reporting the content‑related properties of the mystical experience. Examples of this kind of property in Stace are undifferentiated unity and bliss. But the mystic may also describe the experience without our getting to know what he has actually experienced, that is, without our finding out what content the experience had. One of several ways of stating what I shall call the non‑content‑related properties of the mystical experience is by depicting what the mystical experience was not like in negative terms. We get to know something about the experience in this way, but irrespective of the number of negative expressions, we cannot decide what the mystic has, in fact, experienced, that is, the properties of the content of the experience. Another way of stating a non‑content‑related property is to express a property of relationship using positive terms. This property is often related to perception, for example, an alteration in the experience of time and space. From these properties we know that the mystical experience is not like sensory perception, but we do not know what the mystic has actually experienced. A third way is to state a property of disposition, for example, that the mystical experience results in the mystic being able to behave in a certain way. A fourth way, finally, is to state a property of category in positive terms, but without the mystic telling us about the content of the experience. Examples of such properties in Stace are ineffability and paradoxicality. That an experience is characterized by ineffability does not imply that we have identified what the mystic has actually experienced. The same applies to the property of paradoxicality, as long as we do not specify in what sense the experience is paradoxical. If, as Stace believes, paradoxicality means that, for instance, the experience of the ego both exists and does not exist, we have stated a content‑related property, namely that. the mystic was aware of his ego during the experience.

I believe that the distinction between content‑related properties and those that are not is a fruitful one for determining the semantic functions of mystical sentences and for explaining the phenomenon of ineffability. A mystic may use mystical sentences to report either its content‑related properties or its non-contented‑related ones. As we shall see, some of the mystics utterances about ineffability may be interpreted as if the mystical experience were not ineffable with regard to its non‑contented‑related properties but as if it were ineffable with regard to its content‑related ones.

We can also relate the distinction between content‑ and non‑content‑related properties to the idea of different stages on the mystical way described above. The mystic perhaps believes that it is possible to describe both types of properties of the mystical experience at a certain stage, only non‑contentrelated ones at another and neither type of property at a third, and so on.

(p) Finally, I shall also mention that I shall use the method that I briefly described at the end of Chapter 3. A theory that claims to be able to determine the semantic functions of mystical sentences in an adequate way should first study how the mystic actually uses language in a specific linguistic context, secondly, investigate whether the mystic in question explicitly formulates or implicitly assumes a linguistic theory, for instance, that the experience is in some way ineffable, that mystical words refer to mystical experiences, or that the sentences should be interpreted in a specific way. As my problem concerns the identification of mystical experiences, it is not necessary, in all cases, to analyse possible propositions about ineffability. If I find that the mystical sentences do not function descriptively, any explanation of the mystics use of the word "ineffable" will be superfluous. The determination of the function of the sentences has already shown that the mystic does not use the language to describe properties of the experience.

Before I report the results of my investigation, I should like briefly to discuss the way in which Stace tries to identify a mystical experience. Stace uses certain quotations, particularly those of present‑day mystics , to elucidate mystical utterances from historical sources. He believes that mystics in earlier times were poor observers of their own experiences, a proposition that has been criticized, as we have seen (see 3.1.3). Stace is of the opinion that these classical mystics had similar experiences to those of later mystics whose orientation was more psychological. This is evident when you compare the different descriptions, says Stace. However. first of all, it is very risky to compare two descriptions that are not very similar to each other. I can, for example, describe my sensual impressions of a stool by saying that the experience is characterized by flatness, brownness, littleness and roundness. Another person might use the expressions brownness and flatness to characterize the content of his experience but be looking at a penny. In this case . it is obvious that the contents of the experiences are different. It is therefore wrong to claim that the experience of the other person has the same characteristics as my own. The other person has not necessarily described his experience incompletely, as Stace assumes that classical mystics have done.

Secondly, to be able to compare two experiences with each other it is necessary to identify both of them first.

Thirdly, even if Stace's method is justifiable, he has used it incorrectly. To be able to compare two descriptions of experiences with each other. they have to be descriptions. But, as we shall see, few mystical utterances function descriptively. To compare, for instance, a text by a mystic from modern times, who uses language descriptively, with one by a historical mystic, who uses language instructively, is to compare two different things. It is therefore hazardous to maintain that the experiences of both mystics are characterized by the properties x1-Xn.

Besides the conceptual apparatus that I have used earlier, I shall also use the following terms:

(a) "mystical stage". This expression implies that there are several types of mystical experiences. I have only defined one of them. But I do not think that it is necessary to give an exact definition of what distinguishes the various stages from each other. As we shall see, to be able to carry out an analysis of the texts concerned it is sufficient to know that, according to the mystics and most researchers, there are several types of mystical experience.

(b) "theophilosophical" function. This term signifies that the mystic uses mystical sentences to put forward and/or discuss religious/philosophical doctrines. Thus the mystic does not use a sentence with a theophilosophical function to describe mystical experiences. So we cannot use sentences of this type for identifying mystical experiences.

(e) "analogical" function. A mystic uses a sentence analogously if he is speaking of the properties of the mystical experiences in terms of similarity. A sentence that functions analogously provides us with certain information about the mystical experience, but it is naturally impossible to identify mystical experiences with the help of sentences that only function analogously.

(d) "figurative" function. A mystic uses a sentence figuratively if he is speaking about the mystical experiences in an indirect manner and the sentences are not translatable into literal language. Of course, there is no possibility of identifying a mystical experience if mystical sentences function figuratively

4. 1. The Result of the Analysis

As far as the result of my analysis is concerned, the 28 mystics that Stace cites may be divided into the following three groups:

(1) There are 17 mystics in this group, that is, more than half of Stace's material. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to determine the semantic functions of mystical sentences or the meaning of the word "ineffable" by analysing these texts. The reasons for this are:

(a) The quotations are derived from works that have not been shown to have been written by the mystic in question or have even been written by several perhaps unknown authors. This applies to the quotations from the Mandukya Upanishad, from Ramakrishna, Buddha, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, Lao‑Tzu, Abu Yazid, Plotinus, Heinrich Suso and Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki.

(b) The utterance has not been translated into a language that can be comprehended either by me or Stace. This applies to the quotation from Al‑Junayd.

(c) The source has only been available to Stace and not to me. This applies to the quotation from the pseudonym NM.

(d) The experience that is described has not been a mystical one according to Stace. This applies to the quotations from Jakob Böhme, Richard Maurice Bucke, Margaret Prescott Montague and John Masefield.

(e) The works from which the quotations are derived have been works of fiction. Here we find the quotations from Mahmud Shabistari and Thomas Stearns Eliot.

(II) This group includes mystics who, according to my analysis, do not use the mystical sentences concerned descriptively. This applies to the quotations from Aurobindo Ghose, Levi Yitzschak from Berditchev, Abraham Abulafia, Meister Eckhart, Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross. In these quotations the mystical sentences function theophilosophically or instructively.

(III) In the third group we find the mystical utterances in which the sentences appear to function descriptively but where an analysis of how the mystic uses the word "ineffable" shows that they mystical sentences function analogously/figuratively, but not descriptively. This applies to utterances from Alfred Tennyson, John Addington Symonds, Martin Buber and Arthur Koestler.

(IV) In the last group the utterances in question contain sentences that function descriptively but only with regard to non‑content‑related properties. This applies to utterances from Jan van Ruysbroeck.

I shall now give an account of the analyses that I have made of the texts concerned. These analyses may perhaps tire the reader, but as I claim that Stace has in no instance succeeded in showing that mystical sentences function descriptively, it is necessary to show that this is the case by giving a complete account of how I have reached this conclusion.

After presenting the analyses I shall make a final evaluation of all the function and ineffability theories and discuss the implications for the main problem. Finally, I shall give a short account of what the consequences of the result of my investigation will be for several other fields within research into mysticism.

4.2. An Examination of Stace's Interpretations of Certain Specific Mystical Texts

As we have seen, to understand and interpret mystical words/sentences, it is necessary in my view to, among other things, take their linguistic and non-linguistic context into consideration. A presentation of each mystic, the tradition surrounding him, his personality, theology, etc. would require considerably more space than I have at my disposal. As my readers will mainly consist of researchers into mysticism, I have therefore assumed that the reader is generally acquainted with these mystics. Thus, the factors that we should know to be able to answers the questions in the analysis will be presented only briefly.


4.2. 1. Texts That are Impossible/Have not Been Possible to Analyse

(a) The quotations have been derived from works that have not been shown to be written by the mystic concerned or have been written by several, even unknown, authors. This applies to the Mandukya Upanishad, and works of Ramakrishna, Buddha, The Tibetan Book of the Dead, Lao‑Tzu, Abil Yazid, Plotinus, Heinrich Suso and Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki.

The Upanishads were written by several authors over a long period of time. We do not know who these authors were. <20 In common with most Vedic texts, they have probably been passed down from father to son in a long oral tradition before they were written down. <21 > There are several versions of some of the Upanishads, as the oral tradition was in the charge of more than one family. <22> The MandukyaUpanishad, from which Stace cites <23>, is a Mantra Upanishad and written in verse. <24> It is obvious that today it is impossible to establish what a mystic who may have created a Upanishad really experienced. He did not write the Upanishad himself, it is written in verse and is therefore of doubtful use in trying to identify mystical experiences. We do not know how the possible mystic would have used the language or what he would have meant by the word "ineffable". I therefore think it is a risky undertaking to use quotations from the Mandukya Upanishad for identifying mystical experiences.

None of the utterances that are ascribed to Gadadhar Chatterji (1836‑1886) (Ramakrishna) have been written or dictated by him but have been penned by, among others, Mahendranath Gupta and Swami Saradananda, both disciples of Ramakrishna. It is therefore impossible to determine how Ramakrishna would have described his mystical experiences, if he thought it was possible at all. As already indicated, great difficulties arise when using second‑hand sources for identifying mystical experiences. <25>

Till date no material that has been written by Siddhartha Gautama ("Buddha") (ca 563 ‑ 483 BC) himself, or that has been dictated by him, has come to the knowledge of the researchers. Stace himself is aware of this <26> but has failed to draw the natural conclusion. <27> As certain utterances ascribed to Buddha are, according to Stace, similar to some in the Mandukya Upanishad, Stace concludes that Buddha had had basically the same experience. Here, however, Stace is comparing two second‑hand sources, possibly written down by non‑mystics, and the conclusion is therefore speculative. As mentioned before, it is a risky undertaking to analyse second‑hand sources in order to identify mystical experiences. <28>

We do not know now what person or persons originally wrote Bardo Thödol (The Tibetan Book of the Dead). The contents of the book have probably been passed down orally and written down at a later stage. Today there a number of different versions of the work in question. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the original author of Bardo Thödol wrote in the capacity of a mystic or just wished to expound a doctrine of what happens after death. <29> It is clear from this that we cannot determine how the author would have used the language or his possible views on the phenomenon of ineffability. I therefore conclude that it is very difficult to identify any mystical experience on the basis of Stace's quotations from Bardo Thödol. <30>

Most history researchers today are agreed that the person who is called Lao-Tzu (Lao‑Tsi) has never existed but is legendary. The work Tao‑te‑ching, which is traditionally ascribed to Lao‑Tzu, is a compilation of the works of many unknown writers over several epochs. Stace is also aware of this <3l> but, as in the case of Buddha, has not drawn the natural conclusions as far as the possibility of identifying a mystical experience is concerned. Stace states, however, in The Teachings of the Mystics that the quotation from Lao‑Tzu does not describe a mystical experience but represents, if anything, methods for achieving mystical experiences or, alternatively, that the quotation represents a doctrinal interpretation. But Stace claims that the author/authors must have had mystical experiences to be able to write Tao‑te‑ching. <32> This may be so, but Stace has not shown that this was the case.

No authentic writings of Abu Yazid Tayfur B'‑Isa B Suruishan Al‑Bistami (? ‑874/877/878) remain. <33> As in the case of Buddha, Ramakrishna and LaoTzu, the utterances have been ascribed to him. To attempt at the present time to identify Abu Yazid's mystical experiences on the basis of the quotation <34> from the work ascribed to him is therefore, in my opinion, very difficult. We know nothing about his views on the question of ineffability. Nor do we know what semantic functions his sentences may have had.

Much of what we know of Plotinus (205‑270) stems from Porphyrus, one of his pupils. Porphyrus edited Plotinus lecture notes and divided these into six books of nine chapters each, hence the name The Enneads. It was a difficult undertaking as Plotinus language was hard to understand. The fact that Plotinus sight failed towards the end of his life did not make the work easier, of course, as he was unable to correct Porphyrus manuscript. <35> Furthermore, Porphyrus admits that he made certain additions. Unfortunately, he does not say where. <36> So today we do not know what is written by Plotinus and what is an addition by Porphyrus. This also applies to the quotations that Stace uses. But the problem is even more complex. The three quotations that Stace selected cannot be used to identify Plotinus experience. Stace took the first quotation from Rudolf Otto's classic work Mysticism East and West (1932). <37> According to Otto, the passage comes from Ennead Number 5, Chapter 8 in Stephen Mackenna's translation. I have studied all the editions of Mackenna's translation without finding the passage in question.

Stace's second quotation is from a letter that Plotinus wrote to Flaccus. <38> But, as Berdie has pointed out, the letter is not genuine. <39>

The last quotation comes, according to Stace, from Ennead Number 6, Chapter 9, Section 11. <40> But this source was found to be incorrect. Nor is it William Ralph Inge's or Arthur Hillary Armstrong's translation, either of which Stace has used in other connections. <4l>

My examination of Stace's analysis of Plotinus utterances leads me to conclude that it is difficult to know whether Plotinus has written the utterances concerned, and that Stace has omitted to refer to verifiable sources or has used a source that was inauthentic. It is therefore very difficult, on the basis of the utterances used by Stace, to investigate the linguistic context and to determine how Plotinus would have used the mystical language or his views on the phenomenon of ineffability.

Stace's quotation of Heinrich Suso (1295/1300‑1366) comes from Suso's autobiography The Life of a Servant. <42> If we disregard the fact that the views of researchers diverge as to the authenticity of this work <43>, it is difficult to identify Suso's mystical experience because we do not know exactly what in Life has been written by Suso himself. The Life consists of accounts of Suso's life and excerpts from his letters. But Suso has not written down all this himself but it has been done by his friend Elsbeth Stagel. Later Suso edited and added certain comments on Stagel's manuscript. <44> It is impossible for a layman to decide what has really been written by Suso and what is Stagel's account of conversations with and letters from Suso. As far as I know, no attempts have yet been made to distinguish between the two authors. Stace has not shown that the passages he cites have been written by Suso himself. To claim then, as Stace does, that we can identify Suso's mystical experience by means of this second‑hand source is therefore rash.

Stace asserts that it is possible to identify a mystical experience via utterances by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki (1870‑1966). <45> It is true that Stace admits, in The Teachings of the Mystics, that Suzuki's utterances ought, if anything, to be classified as "great mystical writings" and not as descriptions of mystical experiences <46>, but in Mysticism and Philosophy, Stace actually uses utterances of Suzuki to identify a mystical experience. Suzuki's writings should, however, be regarded as second‑hand sources. He does not write directly about his own experiences (Stace had arrived at this conclusion earlier) but attempts, as an academic philosopher, to systematize Zen teachings and techniques. This applies to all but one of the utterances that Stace quotes. <47> There it does seem that Suzuki is actually talking about his own experiences. The utterance is derived from an anthology compiled by William Barrett. <M> But the passage is not included in any of the works Barrett claims to have consulted. I do not know where he has found the utterance. Furthermore, it is evident from the linguistic context that Suzuki does not express anything about his own experiences. On the basis of what has been said above, I am forced to conclude that Stace has not shown that he can use Suzuki's utterances to identify a mystical experience.

(b) The utterances are written in a language that is foreign both to me and to Stace, preventing determination of both the semantic function and the views on the phenomenon of ineffability. This includes an utterance from Abu'l-Qasim Al‑Junayd ibn Muhammed ibn al‑Junayd al‑khazzaz al Qawariri (?‑ca 910). Stace has taken the quotation from Al‑Junayd from Margaret Smith's classic Readings From the Mystics of Islam (1950). <49> However, Smith has, in turn, taken the quotation in question out of Abu Nasr ´Abdullah ibn 'Ari as‑Sarraj at‑Tus‑i's Kitab al luma 'fi at‑Tasawwuf, pages 29‑59. <50> Smith has reduced the original 30 pages to only 30 lines. It is obvious that it is very difficult for Stace and for myself to decide what semantic function the sentences in the passage have without having access to the linguistic context. Unfortunately, as far as I know, the work of As‑Sarraj has not been translated into any language that is comprehensible to me or to Stace. Thus, it is impossible to determine the semantic functions of the sentences or to clarify Al‑Junayd's views, if any, on the phenomenon of ineffability on the basis of the quotation concerned. Stace should also have drawn this conclusion. <5l>

(c) The source has been available to Stace but not to me. Here we find utterances under the pseudonym NM, which stands for one of Stace's colleagues. Stace asked NM to describe a mystical experience that he had had in connection with taking mescaline. It was reported both verbally and in writing. <52> Unfortunately, Stace has not given the reference to either the verbal or written report. He has only given an account of parts of the written report. He admits this himself. It is thus very difficult for me to check the quotations, investigate the linguistic context or discuss Stace's interpretation of NM's utterances. Furthermore, Stace has identified the properties that were most important to him by means of direct discussion with NM. Owing to the abovementioned difficulties, I believe it is very difficult to identify NM's mystical experience from the passages cited by Stace.

(d) The experience that the mystic describes is not a mystical one according to Stace. This applies to quotations from Jakob Böhme, Richard Maurice Bucke, Margerat Prescott Montague and John Masefield.

Jakob Böhme (1575‑1624)

Stace's quotation from Böhme is to be found in the work The Aurora (Morgonr6the im Aufgang):

In this light my spirit saw through all things and into all creatures and I recognized God in grass and plants. <53>

Stace maintains that the sentence functions descriptively. <54> Böhme is describing an extrovertive mystical experience. He perceives the world of phenomena and, simultaneously, God in the world of phenomena.

Howard Brinton's version of Böhme's utterance, which Stace has based his comments on, is, however, a condensation of Böhme's text. Brinton has also cited Böhme incorrectly. Böhme writes the following, in which Stace's quotation is to be found between the two words that are italicized:

12. But the greatness of the triumphing that was in the spirit I cannot express, either in speaking or writing; neither can it be compared to anything, but to that wherein the life is generated in the midst of death, and it is like the resurrection from the dead.

13. In this light my spirit suddenly saw through all, and in and by all the creatures, even in herbs and grass it knew God, who he is, and how he is, and what his will is: And suddenly in that light my will was set on by a mighty impulse, to describe the being of God. <55>

But is it really reasonable to interpret the expression "saw", as Stace does, that is, as referring to perception instead of as standing for a vision or an intuitive insight? After commenting on how difficult it is to describe the parts of something that is not divisible, Böhme writes:

Nor must thou think that I have climbed up aloft into heaven, and beheld it with my carnal or fleshly eyes. <56>

When Böhme talks about what God is, he writes:

In my faculties or powers I am as blind a man as ever was, and am able to do nothing; but in the spirit of God my innate spirit seeth through ALL, though not always with long stay or continuance; <57>

In another work, Vom Dreifachen Leben des Menchen, Böhme writes:

Christus spricht: Ich bin das Licht der Welt, wer mir nachfolget, der wird das Licht des ewigen Lebens haben. Joh. 8:12. Er weiset uns nicht zu den Heuchlern, Mardern und Zänckern, sondern nur zu sich; in seinem Licht sollen wir sehen, nach den inwendigen Augen, so sehen wir Ihn, dann Er ist das Licht. <58>

In my opinion, these quotations are sufficient to enable us to conclude that Böhme did not use perception during the mystical experience. My interpretation is supported by Brinton, Underhill and Martensen. Brinton writes:

This Divine Life is known internally through mystic union with it (Verstand), not through outward rational knowledge. <59>

Stace uses a quotation from Underhill that is supposed to show that Böhme's experience was perceptual. Stace cites:

He believed that it was only a fancy, and in order to banish it from his mind he went out upon the green. But here he remarked that he gazed into the very heart of things, the very herbs and grass, and that actual nature harmonized with what he had seen. <60>

If we disregard the fact that this is not a quotation from Underhill herself but from Martensen's book about Böhme, it is interesting to note that Stace has cited both Martensen and Underhill incorrectly. Martensen writes, namely, in the last sentence “harmonized with what he had inwardly seed”. <6l>

Stace has excluded visions from the class of mystical experiences. <62> As the conclusion drawn from my analysis is that Böhme's experience cannot be classified either as an introvertive or an extrovertive mystical experience, but is probably a vision. Böhme's experience is not a mystical one in Stace's view. Consequently, he has not shown that he can use Böhme's utterance to identify a mystical experience.

Richard Maurice Bucke (1837‑1902)

Stace cites Bucke:

I had spent the evening in a great city, with two friends reading and discussing poetry and philosophy... I had a long drive home in a hansom cab to my lodging. My mind ... was calm and peaceful ... All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame‑coloured cloud. For an instant 1 thought of fire ... somewhere ... in that great city; in the next I knew that the fire was in myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exaltation, of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among other things I did not merely come to believe but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter. but is, on the contrary, a living Presence. I became conscious in myself of eternal life... I saw that the cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation of the world ... is ... love... The vision lasted a few seconds and was gone, but the memory of it and the sense of reality it left has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed was true ... That conviction ... has never been lost. <63>

Stace maintains that the mystical sentences function descriptively. Bucke has experienced that everything in the universe is living. The universe does not consist of a multiplicity of living beings but of a single living Presence. The latter implies unity, according to Stace, that everything is felt to be One. At the same time Bucke experiences. through ordinary perception, the unity in each thing. Stace also claims that the experience is ineffable. <64>

In his now classic work Cosmic Consciousness, Bucke has described the mystical experience in detail. Some of its properties are as follows:

(a) Experience of a pink or flame‑coloured light. This light is only an inner light and does not correspond to light outside the mystic's consciousness. <65>

(b) Experience of and intellectual insight into the life and order of the cosmos. That everything in the cosmos is living, is infinite and is love. <66> The mystic not only knows this intuitively but sees it before him in a vision. <67>

(c) Experience of joy and happiness <68>, of moral uplift <69>, and of being immortal, etc. <70>

As is evident from these properties, the experience has the character of a vision. Bucke sees what he is describing in front of him. His arguments do not imply that perception functioned normally during the mystical experience. On the contrary, he asserts that the experience was characterized by an inward vision. In a commentary on a mystic called "CP", Bucke writes:

Here again is a distinct and absolute mark proving the writer to have had the Cosmic Sense. No merely self conscious man knows of God as he knows of mundane matters of fact. Every Cosmic Conscious man does so. He knows by actual inward vision just as he knows (by self consciousness) that he is a distinct entity. <7l>

When Bucke speaks of Jesus, he writes:

The expression: "He saw the heavens rent asunder," describes well enough the oncoming of the Cosmic Sense, which is (as has been said) instantaneous, sudden, and much as if a veil were with one sharp jerk torn from the eye of the mind, letting the sight pierce through. <72>

Consequently, as Bucke's experience is an example of a vision, it cannot be classified as a mystical experience according to Stace's definition. Therefore, Stace has not shown that he can use Bucke's utterances to identify a mystical experience.

Margaret Prescott Montague (1878‑1955)

Stace admits that the utterance by the authoress Montague does not indicate that she has had a complete mystical experience, but only a hint of one. <U>

Stace cites Montague:

Entirely unexpectedly (for I have never dreamed of such a thing) my eyes were opened and for the first time in my life I caught a glimpse of the ecstatic beauty of reality ... its unspeakable joy, beauty, and importance.... I saw no new thing but I saw all the usual things in a miraculous new light ‑ in what I believe is their true light .... I saw ... how wildly beautiful and joyous, beyond any words of mine to describe, is the whole of life. Every human being moving across that porch, every sparrow that flew, every branch tossing in the wind was caught in and was part of the whole mad ecstasy of loveliness, of joy, of importance, of intoxication of life.... I saw the actual loveliness which was always there.... My heart melted out of me in a rapture of love and delight.... Once out of all the grey days of my life I have looked into the heart of reality; I have witnessed the truth. (Montague's italics) <74>

Stace maintains that Montague is describing how she experienced bliss, and that what she experienced did not have the character of a hallucination but of something real. The experience was also ineffable and had the character of transformed perception. <75> Stace admits, however, that Montague does not mention either unity, that everything is living or the divine element, properties typical of an extrovertive experience. Stace therefore concludes that the experience is closer to an aesthetic than a mystical one owing to its emphasis on beauty and joy. <76>

Montague does not, in fact, mention any of the properties that I have used in my definition of the concept of mystical experience, and which Stace had implicity accepted. The experience is characterized neither by absence of thoughts, absence of perception nor lack of the sense of space, time and ego. It does not seem likely that experiencing great joy and simultaneously feeling it to be something real is sufficient for concluding that it is a mystical experience. The same may be said about the experience being ineffable. There are many types of experiences that are regarded as being ineffable in some way. Many experiences could in that case be classified as mystical without being so. Moreover, Montague's experience is characterized by extreme joy, something that Stace claims is not a mystical phenomenon. <77>

I therefore conclude that Stace has not shown that Montague's experience may be regarded as an incomplete mystical experience. Thus, it is very difficult to identify a mystical experience on the basis of the passage cited using a scientific method.

Finally, with regard to John Masefield (1878‑1967), who according to Stace is not an example of a typical mystic, Stace himself has admitted that the experience is visionary in character, hence that it is not a mystical experience according to his own definition. <78>

(e) The works from which the quotations in question have been taken have been works of fiction. It is therefore very difficult to determine what is a description of a personal mystical experience and what is imaginary. Here may be found utterances from Mahmud Shabistari and Thomas Stearns Eliot.

Stace's quotation from Sad‑ud‑Din Mahmud Shabistari (ca 1287‑ca 1320) has been taken from Smith's Readings from the Mystics of Islam. <79> Here Smith has translated parts of the poem Gulshan‑i‑Raz (The Rosegarden of Mystery). <80> As the work is fiction, it is very difficult to identify a mystical experience with its help. <8l> The same argument may be put forward concerning Stace's quotation of Thomas Stearns Eliot (1888‑1965). <82> We do not know what in his poetry is imaginary or what may possibly not be.

4.2.2. Texts in Which the Mystical Sentences do not Function Descriptively

The utterances in these quotations cannot in my view function descriptively. Instead, their function is theophilosophical or instructive. This group of texts includes utterances from Aurobindo Ghose, R Levi Yitzchack from Berditchev, Abraham Abulafia, Meister Eckhart, Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross.

Aurobindo (Orobindo) Ghose (1872‑1950)

Aurobindo's philosophy in The Life Divine, from which Stace took his quotations, means briefly, according to K R Srinivasa Iyengar, that Aurobindo claims that man may participate in‑what he calls "the divine life". But, unlike earlier Indian philosophers, the goal for Aurobindo is not to break the bonds of reincarnation and to achieve personal immortality. He emphasizes that life may be lived close to God, here and now. This ought to be our goal and this goal can be already achieved in this life. <83> This goal should not be reached only on a personal plane but also for mankind as a whole. <84>

Aurobindo discusses different conceptions of reality. The materialist emphasizes material things at the expense of spiritual ones, the ascetic spiritual things at the expense of material ones. <85> But neither the materialist nor the ascetic can lead mankind towards a harmonious life. According to Aurobindo, reality is by nature both mind and matter and also transcends both these aspects without ceasing, to be one. <86> The Life Divine, which is a metaphysical treatise <87>, is a 1000‑page development of these fundamental ideas. <88>.

Matter and Mind are aspects of the same reality, which develops and has developed according to the hierarchical scheme Matter, Life, Psyche, Mind, Supermind, Bliss, Consciousness‑Force and Existence. The last‑mentioned is the ultimate reality, which Aurobindo also calls "Pure Existence". The ultimate reality is "Will and Force", "blissful Existence" and "Sadchidananda". The world and its multiplicity and its suffering have been created and are created by means of the descent of reality through the various stages. <89> The process of stepping upward and downward takes place simultaneously. <90> All elements in the different stages exist at the same time. Matter cannot exist without Mind and Mind without Matter. <9l>

At present man has reached awareness of the stage Mind. <92> But man can reach the stage Supermind, which provides knowledge of reality as it is. Here the multiplicity of the world disappears, duality is transformed into a manifestation from out of the Ultimate. Mankind realizes that everything is the

Dance of Shiva, who is creating out of himself throughout eternity. <93> The other part of Life Divine deals with how man and mankind can raise themselves to a higher level of consciousness. <94> As Stace only takes his quotations from the first four chapters, I shall not give an account of this part of Aurobindo's philosophy.

Stace is aware that Aurobindo primarily deals with philosophical questions, but he has omitted, as we shall see, to draw the natural conclusions from this as far as the possibility of identifying a mystical experience is concerned. <95> Stace maintains that Aurobindo describes mystical experiences in two utterances. The first quotation is taken from Chapter 1V, which is entitled "Reality Omnipresent". Aurobindo speaks here of the two aspects of reality, Matter and Mind, and how these may be combined in man's consciousness. The section between the words that are italicized indicates the part that Stace used:

Man, too, becomes perfect only when he has found within himself that absolute calm and passivity of the Brahman and supports by it with the same divine tolerance and the same divine bliss a free and inexhaustible activity. Those who have thus possessed the Calm within can perceive always welling out from its silence the perennial supply of the energies that work in the universe. It is not therefore, the truth of the Silence to say that it is in its nature a rejection of the cosmic activity. The apparent incompatibility of the two states is an error of the limited Mind which, accustomed to trenchant oppositions of affirmation and denial and passing suddenly from one pole to the other, is unable to conceive of a comprehensive consciousness vast and strong enough to include both in a simultaneous embrace. <96>

Stace comments on the above passage as follows:

This, as it seems to me, is as nearly an expression of a pure uninterpreted experience evidently the experience of Aurobindo himself, although he does not use the first person singular ‑ as one can find. <97>

I should like to deny, as we shall see later, the idea that Aurobindo's utterance is a description of an uninterpreted experience. My opinion is supported by Masson and Masson, who write:

One can only conclude that something about this pitiful sentence of Aurobindo rang an affective chord in Stace himself, for there is certainly nothing in it that could possibly make anybody cite it as an example of direct experience. What is "the energies which work in the universe" if not a particularly grandiose form of interpretation? <98>

Stace believes that Aurobindo's sentences function symbolically, and that the Symbols can be translated into a language that functions literally. According to Stace, the mystical words "calm" and "silence" are symbols for rest and inactivity, two properties of the mystical experience. <99>

But Stace commits an error here because he has not paid attention to what Aurobindo actually writes. <100> Aurobindo writes the word “Calm” with a capital C, while Stace uses a small c when discussing it. One can then be led to believe that calm does not stand for an ontological entity. Stace has used an edition that is not identical with the original. <100> But it is also clear from the sentence that precedes Stace's quotation that the word "Calm" is an ontological term. Aurobindo writes there "that absolute calm and passivity of the Brahman". There the mystical word "calm" is a description of a characteristic of Brahman. To refer to this characteristic of Brahman, Aurobindo uses the word calm with a capital C in the next sentence. The word “Calm” cannot therefore be interpreted as a symbol of a property of a mystical experience. If the word in question should be used both philosophically and psychologically, Stace must show that this is the case. But he has not done so.

Consequently, the mystical word "silence" cannot be interpreted as a psychological concept either. The concept of silence refers to the ontological entity Calm and expresses the passive aspect of reality. This is also evident from the sentence that follows Stace's quotation. "Silence" is given there with a capital S. So the mystical word "silence"‑ is not used as a symbol of a property of a mystical experience.

Stace also interprets the mystical expression “energies which work” symbolically. According to Stace, it stands for:
... that self‑differentiation of the empty undifferentiated unity which is the creation of the world. And this is not merely a metaphysical theory but something directly experienced by these men. (Stace is also referring to Meister Eckhart in this connection.) <102>

Stace claims, in other words, that the mystical sentences function symbolically here. But further on in the same publication Stace maintains the exact opposite:
There is no reason whatever for supposing that this language is symbolic <103>

Stace seems unable to decide. But let us see whether the mystical sentences here could function descriptively. Stace maintains that Aurobindo is describing an experience that is characterized by undifferentiated unity and that this unity is active and out of itself produces the world with its multiplicity. In my opinion it is possible to interpret Aurobindo's utterance to mean that the mystic can experience how Brahman in his passive aspect is combined with Brahman in his dynamic aspect. Aurobindo uses the word "perceive" here, as Stace has correctly pointed out. But Aurobindo does not say anything about the psychological characteristics of this experience. It is not evident from the linguistic context that Aurobindo is describing an experience of undifferentiated unity. Aurobindo writes in a philosophical sense, and the sentences thus function theophilosophically, not descriptively. <104>

Stace's second quotation is taken from Chapter III of The Life Divine and deals with the problem that arises if mind rather than matter is emphasized. Aurobindo writes (and here too, the passage selected by Stace is shown between the words that are italicized):

And then arises the question which first occurred to us, whether this transcendence necessarily also a rejection. What relation has this universe to the Beyond?

For at the gates of the Transcendent stands that mere and perfect Spirit describe Upanishads, luminous, pure, sustaining the world but inactive in it, without sit energy, without flaw of duality, without scar of division, unique, identical, free of appearance of relation and of multiplicity ‑ the pure Self of the Adwaitins, the inactive Brahman, the transcendent Silence. And the mind when it passes those gates sue without intermediate transitions, receives a sense of the unreality of the world and the sole reality of the Silence which is one of the most powerful and convincing experiences of the human mind is capable. < 105 >

In The Teachings of the Mystics Stace has spelt the word “Spirit” correctly, i.e., with a capital S. But in Mysticism and Philosophy, from the same year he spells “spirit” with a small s. This action can lead the reader to believe “Spirit” stands for a psychological concept and not a philosophical one.

In this passage, too, Stace claims that the word "Silence" symbolizes experience of what Stace calls "pure consciousness". <106> The fact that expression "Silence" is spelt with a capital S does not appear to have concerned Stace. Here he goes from theology to psychology. The word “Silence”, stands, as we have seen, for the inactive aspect of Brahman in the Aurobindo philosophy. Stace has not shown how the word can be a symbol for a mystical experience that is characterized by pure consciousness and a void, nor can it be understood from the context. It is clear to me that the mystical sentence function theophilosophically here.

Aurobindo refers in the passage to the relation between atman and Brahman. He hints that an experience of Brahman is possible but does not say anything about the psychological characteristics of this experience. To say that the Transcendent in the form of the Spirit is free from duality is not the same as claiming that the experience of the Transcendent is characterized by undifferentiated unity. Stace has not shown that Aurobindo has used the terms in question in both a psychological and a philosophical sense.

Stace also maintains that Aurobindo describes the mystical experience as being characterized by paradoxicality. The paradox lies in this case in the fact that something that does not exist, the Transcendent, gives rise to everything that exists. <107> But this interpretation is not likely in the light of Aurobindo's philosophy. We have seen that to Aurobindo reality has different aspects. Everything is real, even the transcendent aspect. He even calls the highest stage of reality "Existence". To Aurobindo it is not paradoxical to maintain that the world arises out of the Transcendent. Moreover, Aurobindo is not speaking of experiences here. He is speaking in philosophical terms.

The conclusion to be drawn from my analysis is that Stace has not shown that the philosophical concepts that Aurobindo uses also function as psychological ones. Both Aurobindo's utterances primarily function theophilosophically, not descriptively. The language is very poetic and may even function evocatively as well. This is of no consequence to my problem, however. I have shown that Stace cannot, with the help of these texts, find support for his theory that there are mystical sentences that function descriptively. In other words, Stace has not shown that it is possible to identify a mystical experience by means of Aurobindo's two utterances.

R Levi Yitzschak from Berditchev (1740‑1809)

Stace's quotation from Yitzschak, the Hasidic mystic, comes from Gerschom G Scholem's classic work Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (1941). Levi Yitzschak writes:
There are those who serve God with the human intellect, and others whose gaze is fixed on Nothing... He who is granted this supreme experience loses the reality of his intellect, but when he returns from such contemplation to the intellect, he finds it full of divine and inflowing splendor. <108>

Stace maintains that this utterance allows us to identify Yitzschak's mystical experience as characterized by an undifferentiated void. This is, according to Stace, the meaning of the word "Nothing", which stands for absence of empirical content. <109>

Unfortunately, it has been impossible for me to study the work in which the passage is included. It is namely in Hebrew. As far as I know, Yitzschak's work has not been published in any language that is comprehensible to me or to Stace. But I have received help from an authority in the field, the expert on Jewish religion and Kabbala, Stephen T Katz. Katz has, namely, explicitly criticized Stace's interpretation of the quotation concerned.

Katz begins by describing how the Jewish mystic has developed religious conceptions from childhood with the help of pictures, symbols, creeds, rituals, etc. The Jew has to learn that God, compared with everything else, is characterized by being radically different. It is not possible to know anything about God. The word "Nothing" in the above quotation is, according to Katz, a translation of the Hebrew "Ayin", which in kabbala stands for Eyn Sof, God as he is in himself before his first manifestation as the first Sefirah Keter. <110> No man can have contact with God at this level. "Ayin" has, according to a twelfth‑century text,

..more being than any other being in the world, but since it is simple, and all other simple things are complex when compared with its simplicity, so in comparison it is called 'nothing ('Ayin'). <111>

Katz thinks that the reason why Stace has interpreted the word "Nothing" as denoting a mystical experience characterized by undifferentiated unity is that he has not taken the context of the word in question into consideration. <112>

The goal of the Jewish mystic, called "devekuth", is not union with or being absorbed in God but more, as Katz puts it, "... a loving intimacy, a clinging to God". The mystic is aware of the great gap that exists between man and God. <113>

I conclude from Katz's arguments that the mystical sentences in the quotation in question do not function descriptively but primarily theophilosophically. Stace has not shown that we can find descriptions of properties of a mystical experience in Levi Yitschack's utterance.

Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia (1240‑1291)

The quotation from Abulafia is also taken from Scholem's Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism:

All the inner forces and the hidden souls in man are distributed and differentiated in the bodies. It is, however, in the nature of all of them that when their knots are untied they return to their origin, which is one without any duality and which comprises the multiplicity. <114>

Stace maintains that the mystical sentences function here in a way that is partially symbolic. The mystical expression "their knots are untied" stands for the release of the soul from its bounds, a release that is a prerequisite for the soul returning to its origin, what Stace calls "the Infinite One". Stace cites Scholem, who clarifies Abulafia's utterance in the following way:

... there are certain barriers which separate the personal existence of the soul from the stream of cosmic life... There is a dam which keeps the soul confined ... and protects it against the divine stream .. which flows all around it. <115>

What is it that limits the soul? Stace asks and answers with the help of Scholem:
The answer is that sensible forms and images produce finite consciousness. And these disappear in introvertive experience. <116>

My contextual interpretation of Stace is that he maintains that Abulafia uses the sentences descriptively and that he describes a mystical experience as characterized by absence of perception and images.

One of the requirements for being able to interpret a mystical utterance is that we should have access to the linguistic context. Unfortunately, I do not have this here. I have no command of Hebrew, and nor does Stace. < 117 > But Scholem, who has devoted a whole chapter to Abulafia in Major Trends, has come to my aid. It is evident from Scholem's presentation that the work in which the passage in question is included deals with methods for achieving mystical experiences. Abulafia developed what he called "Hokhmath ha‑Tseruf", "science of combination of letters", which briefly means that the mystic contemplates the specific letters of the Hebrew alphabet and their form, which have no meaning in themselves. A kabbalistic doctrine exists in the background here; this says that everything in creation is an expression of and partakes in God's Name. Certain letters in Hebrew express God's "pure" thoughts and are therefore excellent objects for contemplation. These objects can make the mind transcend, which cannot happen if the mystic contemplates objects of perception or abstract thoughts. In other words, even the intellect should be transcended. < 118>

Even though I have not had access to the linguistic context, I believe that it is more likely that, in the quotation concerned, Abulafia is speaking of methods of achieving mystical experiences rather than, as Stace claims, describing his own mystical experiences. The sentences function instructively, in other words, but they function theophilosophically as well. Abulafia speaks of returning to one's origin, that is, God, who is unity without duality. However, whether the sentences function instructively and/or theophilosophically has no bearing on my problem. Stace has not shown that they function descriptively, and it is more likely that they function non‑descriptively. Thus, Stace has not show that it is possible to identify Abulafia's mystical experience by a scientific method on the basis of the passages cited.

Meister Johannes Eckhart von Hochheirn (ca 1260‑1327/1328)

According to Edmund Colledge and James M Clark, Meister Eckhart's conception of God and views on mystical experiences may be summed up briefly as follows. God is pure being, absolute being, the ultimate reality. Eckhart distinguishes between God of the Trinity and God beyond God, called "the Godhead". The former comprises three persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, while the latter is undifferentiated. < 119> God is Absolute Unity <120> and creates the world out of a single uniform principle by means of the three persons. < 121 > God is eternal and His actions are also eternal. The acts of creation are therefore one and undifferentiated. The Father's begetting of the Son and the Holy Ghost's proceeding from the Father and the Son take place unceasingly and in an eternal now. < 122> Through or in Seelenfünklein, one of the capacities or parts of the soul, the mystical unity between the soul and God is reached. God exists in the soul through mercy, for which reason the birth of the Son also takes place in the soul as the Son is begotten by the Father in eternity. Eckhart says that Christ is born in the soul of man in this mystical stage. Christ is born in us, suffers in us, is crucified, dies and is buried in us, and it is in us He rises again. <123> In the last stage on the mystical way, breaking through to the divine source, the soul becomes one with the Godhead, a unity that is completely without distinctions. <124>

It is evident from the above presentation that Eckhart has developed a specific Christian theology. The language in his work therefore primarily functions theophilosophically. <125>

Stace has cited several utterances in which he claims to be able to identify Eckhart's mystical experiences. Before I analyse these utterances I just want to mention that I have limited myself to analysing only the utterances for which Stace has given an exact verifiable source. <126>

Stace cites the sermon "Good hinders the best":

In this way the soul enters into the unity of the Holy Trinity, but it may become even more blessed by going further, to the barren Godhead, of which the Trinity is a revelation. In this barren Godhead activity has ceased and therefore the soul will be most perfect when it is thrown into the desert of the Godhead, where both activity and forms are no more, so that it is sunk and lost in this desert where its identity is destroyed... <127>

According to Stace, these sentences function descriptively. Eckhart is describing that he experienced unity without distinctions. Stace translates the symbols barren and desert into the literally meant expressions "empty", "void" and "without any distinctions". In the experience there are no forms, that is, entities that are characterized by limitations. No activity takes place as activity presupposes distinctions. Nothing can move in a total void as there is nothing that can move. Finally, the experience is characterized by dissolution of the ego, expressed by the phrase "it is sunk and lost in this desert where its identity is destroyed". <128>

As we have seen, Eckhart uses the concept of unity primarily in a philosophical way. The Godhead is unity; the Godhead has no form; there is no activity in the Godhead. This is evident from the quotation above. But Eckhart does not say that the mystical experience is psychologically characterized by nonactivity, unity or formlessness. Eckhart is speaking, it is true, of the soul's union with the Godhead, but he does not claim that the mystical experience is characterized by undifferentiated unity. Eckhart is speaking metaphysically, not psychologically. This is, I think, clear from the linguistic context.

There is yet another argument for regarding Stace's interpretation as unlikely. How can Eckhart experience undifferentiated unity when he experiences God? At least God exists then as an element of the experience. Stace's cognition theory allows, to be sure, that Eckhart's talk of God could represent a doctrinal interpretation and not describe a property of an experience. But a little later in the same sermon Eckhart says the following:

Next the soul receives from the Godhead the eternal wisdom of the Father ‑ knowledge and understanding of all things. <129>

It is evident from this, in my view, that the mystic gains knowledge of everything, and that this can hardly be an experience characterized by undifferentiated unity. Stace could perhaps defend himself by saying that the experience is paradoxical. It is both an experience of a void and a positive experience. But this paradox has been constructed by Stace himself and has no basis in the text. If we assume that the mystic does not experience undifferentiated unity, the paradox is solved.

Nor do the symbolic expressions "barren" and "desert" stand for properties of a mystical experience in my view. Eckhart writes “barren Godhead” and "desert of the Godhead". The symbols thus stand for the emptiness of the Godhead, if these expression should be interpreted to mean emptiness at all, and do not describe a mystical experience symbolically.

Stace's interpretation of Eckhart's utterance as a description of the dissolution of the ego is, in my opinion, also improbable. Eckhart is speaking from a philosophical point of view. When the soul reaches the Godhead, it must of course lose it identity completely as the Godhead is characterized by complete unity. There is nothing in the linguistic context that indicates that Eckhart is speaking in psychological terms.

In The Teachings Stace gives a quotation from the same sermon in support of his claim that Eckhart asserts that the experience is not characterized by the subject‑object relationship:

... we are not wholly blessed, even though we are looking at divine truth; for while we are still looking at it, we are not in it. As long as a man has an object under consideration, he is not one with it. Where there is nothing but One, nothing but One is to be seen. Therefore, no man can see God except he be blind, nor know him except through ignorance, nor understand him except through folly. <130>

According to my interpretation, however, the sentences in the passage function instructively and not descriptively. For the soul to achieve unity with the Godhead, all that is created has to be transcended. This is clear from the passage that comes directly after Stace's quotation:

To this point, St. Augustine says: "No soul may come to God except it come to him apart from creature things and seek him without any image." That, too, is what Christ meant when he said: "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye and then thou shalt see clearly to cast the mote out of thy brother's eye!" This suggests that creatures are to be compared to beams in the soul's eye and that they hinder union with God because they are creaturely. Therefore, because even the soul is a creature, even it must first be cast out. Indeed, it must cast out even the saints and angels and even our blessed Lady, because these are all creatures!

The soul should be independent and should not want anything and then it would attain godly stature by reason of likeness. <13l>

Eckhart does not say here that the experience is characterized psychologically by transcendence of the subject‑object relationship, but that if the ego wishes to attain union with God then it should not consider created objects. Consequently, Eckhart is describing the way to mystical experiences and not their properties.

Stace claims that Eckhart has on several occasions described the mystical experience as being beyond time and space. Stace cites:

It ranks so high that it communes with God face to face as he is. (It) ... is unconscious of yesterday or the day before and of tomorrow and the day after, for in eternity there is yesterday, nor any tomorrow, but only Now. <l32>

It is improbable that Eckhart would characterize the experience as beyond time and space here in the light of what has been said earlier. The Apex of the soul is, philosophically speaking, beyond time and already one with the Godhead. Eckhart does not say anything about the experience of God. That the talk of time and space is philosophical and not psychological is even more obvious from the next passage:

Nothing hinders the soul's knowledge of God as much as time and space, for time and space are fragments, whereas God is one. And therefore if the soul is to know God, it must know Him above time and outside space. <133>

For the mystic to gain knowledge of God, he must go beyond time and space as the Godhead is beyond time and space. There is nothing in the text to support the view that Eckhart is describing properties of a mystical experience here.

Finally, Stace believes that Eckhart's experience is characterized by paradoxicality. He cites:
... the onefold One has neither a manner nor properties. <134>

Eckhart writes that God has no qualities. But God is also Goodness, Wisdom, Power, Knowledge, etc. Therefore, Stace thinks that a paradox arises. < 135 > Stace cites further:

God acts. The Godhead does not. It has nothing to do and there is nothing going on in it ... The difference between God and the Godhead is the difference between action and nonaction. < 136>

This divine ground is a unified stillness immoveable in itself. Yet from this immobility all things are moved and receive life. <137>

According to Stace, a paradox arises because God in Eckhart's view is both active and inactive. <138> But Eckhart does not say anything in these utterances about the mystical experience being characterized by paradoxicality but is speaking metaphysically. <139>

From my analysis I conclude that Stace has not shown that the mystical expressions in question should be interpreted both in psychological and philosophical terms. The mystical sentences in the passages cited function theophilosophically/instructively, not descriptively, and therefore do not allow identification of Eckhart's mystical experience, either logically or by a scientific method. Stace himself is aware that it can be difficult to identify Eckhart's experience from his utterances as he speaks in metaphysical terms, but Stace has not realized the implications of his discovery. He says that those who have studied Eckhart know that Eckhart is speaking from his own experience. <140> 1 am inclined to agree with Stace here. But it does not follow from the fact that a mystic has had mystical experiences that he is able to communicate this to others in such a way as to enable the identification of the experience.

Teresa de Cepeda Y Ahumada (1515‑1582)

The only utterance of St Teresa of Avila for which Stace has given an exact, verifiable source < 141 > comes from her autobiography, The Life of the Holy Mother Teresa of Jesus. In the chapter which includes the quotation, Teresa is dealing with the final stage of the mystical way, union. Stace claims that Teresa relates that the experience is characterized by being real in contrast to being a hallucination. Thereby, Teresa is supposed to have described a non‑content-related property of a mystical experience and the sentences are taken to function descriptively. Stace cites Teresa:

I can only say that the soul feels close to God and that there abides within it such a certainty that it cannot possibly do other than believe. <142>

I cannot accept Stace's interpretation, however. Teresa does not say anything about the experience being characterized by being real. She does, on the other hand, say that she is certain that it was God's presence that she had experienced, which is something different. It becomes clear from the passage that immediately follows Stace's quotation that the word "certainty" refers to her belief that God was present in the experience and does not refer to the character of reality that the experience had:

I could not cease believing that He was there, for it seemed almost certain that I had been conscious of His very presence. <W>

I therefore conclude that Stace has not shown that the sentence in question contains a description of a property of a mystical experience. Stace has, in other words, not succeeded in identifying a mystical experience by means of this utterance.

Juan de Yepes (1542‑1591)

Stace uses five quotations of St John of the Cross to identify a mystical experience. All five come from the second book, Part 11, of Ascent of Mount Carmel (The Dark Night of the Soul). The first four quotations deal methods for attaining union with God. I have chosen to give only one of' here:

... the soul must be emptied of all these imagined forms, figures and images, and I remain in darkness with respect to these... < 144>

Stace interprets this sentence as being primarily instructive. St John of the Cross is saying that to attain union with God the mystic must empty consciousness of sensations, images, thoughts and acts of will. <145> From this Stace draws the conclusion that if everything that is just apprehended by the consciousness has to disappear, unless the unconscious steps in, the experience attained is characterized by undifferentiated unity. Here Stace is guilty of drawing a wrong conclusion. The fact that St John of the Cross recommends the mystic to get rid of all "empirical content" does necessarily imply that undifferentiated unity will result. Moreover, we know that the experience contains something positive, namely what St John of Cross calls "God". Stace himself has admitted this. Stace's solution, as we have already seen earlier, is that the experience is paradoxical because it is characterized both by undifferentiated unity and by having a positive content. The paradox, however, is one of Stace's own construction and he has not shown that the paradox is borne out by the utterances of the mystics. If we assume that mystics do not experience undifferentiated unity, then the paradox is solved.

In The Teachings of the Mystics, Stace interprets the passage cited differently than in Mysticism and Philosophy. Stace maintains here that the mystical expression "darkness" is a symbol of undifferentiated unity. <146> W Trueman Dicken, who has specialized in Spanish mystics, does not hold the same view as Stace, and I am inclined to agree with him. In the context of t quotation, St John of the Cross speaks of methods for attaining union with God. According to Dicken, he maintains that the mystic must be deprived all worldly desires. First the mystic must be deprived of worldly things, then perception and intellect, as none of these can lead him to God. Here faith must come into being. Thirdly, even God is darkness to us as we cannot understand him as he is while we are still bound to this earthly life. The soul is filled with God at the same rate as it is emptied of things that are not God. According to John of the Cross, the soul must pass through three types of “dark stages” to attain union with God. Dicken says that St John of the Cross hereby wants to point out to his disciples, by means of symbols, the importance of riddin oneself of one's desires and of following Christ, a fundamental idea in Christian theology. <147> Dicken and Stace are thus agreed that the word "darkness" should be interpreted symbolically. However, there is nothing in the text or its context to support the idea that the concept of darkness stands for undifferentiated unity. Dicken's interpretation is therefore preferable. The mystical language, in other words, functions instructively and describes methods to be used at stages on the way to attaining union with God. Consequently, St John of the Cross does not describe properties of the mystical experience.

In the fifth quotation, St John of the Cross describes, according to Stace, the void of the mystical experience: <148>

It feels as though it had been placed into a profound and vast solitude, into an immense and boundless desert .... <149>

An analysis of the linguistic context of the above quotation shows, however, that St John of the Cross does not use the mystical word "desert" as a symbol of a void. In Chapter XVII, from which the passage comes, St John of the Cross is speaking about what it meant by saying that the mystical "wisdom" is "secret". He gives three reasons. Stace's quotation is included in St John's exposition of the third reason, which is that the mystical "wisdom" is described as "secret" because it has the property of hiding the soul within it. The soul understands then the gap that exists between itself and created beings. This is followed by the utterance that Stace cites, that is, that the soul feels as though it had been placed in a profound solitude, in a boundless desert. After Stace's quotation come the words 'inaccessible to any human being". In other words, St John of the Cross is speaking in philosophical terms about the soul feeling as though it were in a complete desert. He does not say that he has experienced a void. Consequently. there is nothing in the text or its context that indicates that the word "desert" here could be translated into the literal statement that the experience was characterized by a void. Furthermore, the same reason put forward against the mystical experience being without content may be put forward here against the proposition that the experience concerns a void (see above).

In support of his interpretation of the word "desert", Stace also states that St John of the Cross uses the word in the same way as Eckhart. < 150> But, as we have already seen, it is difficult to interpret Eckhart's utterance in the way that Stace suggests. Moreover, identification of a mystical experience based on comparisons with the utterances of other mystics is a method that is hard to defend, something that I have already explained in the introduction to this chapter.

There are other arguments, however, for dismissing Stace's interpretation of the quotation in question. In the passage immediately after Stace's quotation, St John of the Cross writes the following about the secrecy of the mystical "wisdom":

...it acts as a guide in leading the soul to the perfections of the union with God <15l>

St John of the Cross does not, in other words, speak about the mystical experience when using the word "desert". He speaks of stages that the mystics goes through on the way there.

Finally, Stace has used a translation that we realize today, and it must have been so in Stace's time as well, is not so close to the original text as that done by E Allison Peers. It is interesting to note that Allison Peers translation of the particular passage is as follows:
.... it considers itself as having been placed in a most profound and vast retreat.. <152

According to this translation, St John of the Cross does not speak at all about experiencing anything but of considering something. This supports the interpretation that the mystical sentence is not used descriptively here but theophilosophically and/or instructively.

From my analysis I therefore conclude that none of the sentences that Stace has cited from the writings of St John of the Cross can be interpreted functioning descriptively. Stace has, in other words, not shown that we can identify a mystical experience with the help of these utterances of St John o the Cross