The Problem

To defend the claim that it is possible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method it is not sufficient to solve the problem of meaning and function. Stace also has to explain the mystic's talk of the ineffability of the mystical experience. If the concept of ineffability mean that the mystical experience is, for example, logically ineffable, then mystical words cannot describe mystical experiences, thus excluding the possibility of identification either logically or by a scientific method. To allow identification Stace has to show that the mystics do not mean that the mystical experience is ineffable, or that it is not ineffable in a sense that would exclude the possibility of identification by a scientific method.

The explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability put forward by Stace in his later years is a psychological one. The mystical experience is not really ineffable, but the mystic believes that it is because he has confused the ineffability of the experience with its paradoxically. As the mystical experience is not really ineffable, this paves the way for identifying mystical experiences by a scientific method.

There is another reason why we ought to study the phenomenon of ineffability. As we saw in the previous chapter, all three of the function theories presented assumed that there is a logical relationship between the view of the phenomenon of ineffability, on the one hand, and the view of the logical possibility of mystical sentences functioning descriptively, on the other. To be able to evaluate the three function theories it is therefore important that we should explain what is meant by the statement that the mystical experience is ineffable.

Material and Analytical Apparatus

One of the tasks in this chapter is to classify the explanations of the phenomenon of ineffability in my material. Several other classifications have been suggested earlier. <l> My classification will only include theories that are relevant to the main problem. This means, among other things, that I limit myself to dealing only with those theories that discuss the ineffability of the mystical experience and not of the ineffability of, for example, the mystical ontological object.

The theories in my material have been classified in the following way: <2>

(a) The mystical experience is not ineffable. Talk of its ineffability is due to the mystic confusing the ineffability of the mystical experience with its paradoxicality. Representative: Stace in his later period. I shall call this explanation "the theory of psychological ineffability". The theory has been criticized by Douglas Ralph Berdie, Quinten Lance Corbenic, J Moussaieff Masson and T C Masson, Bimal Krishna Matilal, William J Wainwright, William E Kennick, Jack C Carloye, Peter Moore and Leo Robertson.

(b) The mystical word "ineffability" is used by the mystic to express (i) that the experience is very intense, or (ii) that the mystical experience is contentless, or (iii) that all experiences are in a sense ineffable or (iv) that it is necessary for the receiver to be in a specific situation in order to understand the mystical sentences. This theory is represented by Ninian Smart and will be called "Smart's multiple explanation".

(c) The mystical experience is only ineffable in relation to the system of concepts that the mystic has had access to. In the future the mystic may be able to construct concepts that will enable the experience to be described. Representatives: Paul Henle and Galen Pletcher. I shall call this explanation "the theory of conceptual ineffability". The theory has been criticized by V C Aldrich and Richard Hubert Jones.

(d) The mystical experience is ineffable to the non‑mystic because the non-mystic has not had any mystical experience and therefore does not know what the mystical words refer to. Representatives: William James, C J Ducasse and Edgar Sheffield Brightman. I shall call this theory "the theory of non‑experiential ineffability". The theory has been criticized by Stace in his later period.

(e) Mystical experiences are characterized by very subtle feelings and are therefore ineffable. As far as I know this theory has no representative <3>, but it has been elucidated by Stace in his later period. The theory was then criticized by him, too, and has also been criticized by B Matilal, and will be called "the emotion theory".

(f) The mystical experience is ineffable because the mystic mainly uses the right half of the brain during the experience, the half in which the linguistic function is not normally found. Representative: Jerome D Frank. The theory will be called "Frank's neurophysiological explanation".

(g) The mystic has chosen not to conceptualize the mystical experience because he is afraid that the words can become a substitute for the experience itself. Richard Gale has suggested this solution, and it will be called "Gale's pedagogical explanation".

(h) The mystical experience is ineffable because mystical experiences are comparable to preverbal regressive experiences of breast‑feeding. Raymond Prince and Charles Savage have put forward this psychoanalytically‑inspired explanation. The theory has been criticized by Nils Björn Kvastad, and will be called "Prince and Savage's psychoanalytical explanation".

(i) The mystical experience is logically ineffable because it is non‑dualistic in character, in contrast to language, which is dualistic by nature. Walter T Stace in his intermediate period and Richard Hubert Jones represent this theory, which I shall call "the theory of logical ineffability" The theory has been criticized by Stace in his later period and also by Richard Gale and Walter Arnold Kaufman.

None of the theories that I shall present deal with the problem of identification. One of my tasks is therefore to clarify the implications for the main problem of accepting one or other of these theories. After giving an account of each theory in the material and subjecting it to a critical analysis, I shall conclude my presentation with a discussion of what theory may be considered as preferable and the implications for the problem of semantic function and the identification problem.

3. 1. 1. Psychological Ineffability: the Theory of Stace in his Later Period

(i) The mystical experience is ineffable while it is in progress because it is characterized by undifferentiated unity.

Stace takes as his starting‑point the question of whether the mystic, with his talk of ineffability, means that the experience is ineffable while it is in progress or whether ineffability applies only after the experience is over. According to Stace, the mystical experience is logically ineffable during the time the mystic is exposed to it because it is characterized by undifferentiated unity. To be able to form concepts, at least two entities must exist because the formation of concepts is based on distinguishing one entity from another. As no entities can be distinguished from another in a mystical experience, the experience cannot be conceptualized. The experience is therefore logically ineffable. <4>

As we shall see, Stace has not altered his position from that of the intermediate period as far as this question is concerned. But he gives another reason. Instead of saying that the experience is characterized by unity in a symbolic sense, Stace now talks of it being characterized by unity in a literal sense.

(ii) The mystical experience is not ineffable after it is over as sensory perception is not characterized by undifferentiated unity.

According to Stace in his later period, it is possible to talk about the mystical experience after it is over. The mystic then finds himself in the ordinary state of consciousness and is able to contrast this with the mystical one. The mystical experience is then one among many and can therefore be conceptualized. The mystic describes the mystical experience in terms of "unity", "void", etc. Stace claims that the mystic, despite his talk of ineffability, is actually using some mystical sentences in a descriptive manner, something that I have already reported in the previous chapter. <5> Stace asserts the mystic must therefore be mistaken when he says that the mystical experience is ineffable.

Stace's explanation of how this occurs is as follows:
(iii) The mystic believes that the mystical experience is ineffable because it is chararacterized as being paradoxical. <6>

To explain the relationship between mystical paradoxes and utterances concerning ineffability, Stace sets out from an analysis of the concept of "understanding". According to him, this concept may have three aspects: (a) the act of distinguishing one entity from another, (b) the act of finding similarities between separate entities and (c) logical rules that govern (a) and (b).

By (a) he means that consciousness distinguishes entities from each other, for instance, by characterizing one entity as red, another as blue. This procedure is fundamental to forming concepts.

But the act of distinguishing one entity from other entities is not a sufficient condition for the formation of concepts. We form, for example, the concept of redness by discovering that there are a number of entities that are similar to each other. Aspect (b) is therefore a necessary condition for forming concepts.

The acts of distinguishing entities from each other and of finding similarities between them take place, says Stace, in accordance with the "laws" of logic for instance, the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle.

Stace claims that (a)‑(c) are not only logical, but also actual, distinctions. <7> It is therefore possible that concepts may be formed without regard to the laws of logic. Stace now asserts that this is exactly what happens with the mystic. The mystical experience is characterized by having the properties of x and non‑x simultaneously. So the mystical experience does not follow the law of contradiction and is consequently expressed as a paradox. As mystical sentences function descriptively and are correct descriptions of the mystical experience, the proposition that the experience is characterized by the properties of x and non‑x is a true one. In comparison with sensory perception, the mystical experience is a paradoxical experience. <8>

Stace is aware that certain philosophers would not agree that the sentence "A is B and A is not B" is a proposition, but that the sentence is meaningless. Stace refutes this point of view. He argues that these philosophers have confused the question of the meaning of a sentence with the question of its truth. The laws of logic concern the question of truth and not that of meaning. The law of contradiction states that if two propositions are logically contradictory, they cannot be true at the same time. One of the sentences must be true and the other false. The sentence "A is B and A is not B" is therefore not meaningless but false. A sentence that is false cannot be meaningless. Moreover, if both the sentences "A is B" and "A is not B" are meaningful, the connective "and"' between them does not, according to Stace, make the compound sentence meaningless. <9>

When the mystic attempts to describe the mystical experience, what Stace calls a "mystical paradox" occurs. <10> Examples of such paradoxes are: the proposition that God is both identical and not identical with the world, what is known as the "pantheistic" paradox; that Unity both has and does not have properties, is personal and non‑personal and is both static and dynamic, what is known as the "plenum‑vacuum paradox"; the paradox that the mystic's ego has dissolved and yet remains and the paradox in the extrovertive mystical experience that the objects of perception are seen as both multiple and one, as both identical and distinct from one another. < 11 > An example of the latter is to be found, says Stace, in the passage from Meister Eckhart quoted earlier: <2>

All that a man has here externally in multiplicity is intrinsically One. Here all blades of grass, wood, and stone, all things are One. This is the deepest depth. <0>

The argument supporting the claim that mystical experiences are really characterized by paradoxicality is, according to Stace, that the paradoxes cannot be solved. In his view, the theories that claim to solve the paradoxes are difficult to defend. Consequently, there is only one possible interpretation of the mystical paradox, namely, that the mystical experiences are paradoxical in character. <14>

The relationship between the mystical paradoxes and the mystics talk of ineffability may now be expressed as follows. A mystic that wishes to speak about the mystical experiences is then in the non‑mystic, ordinary state of consciousness. He discovers then that what he expresses appears to be paradoxical. He then has to choose to deny one of the following propositions:

1. The laws of logic are applicable to all experiences.

2. Linguistic expressions can describe all types of experiences.

According to Stace, the mystic chooses to deny 2. That is why the mystical experience is said to be ineffable. But Stace claims that the mystic makes a mistake here. Instead, the mystic should deny proposition number 1, that is that the laws of logic are applicable to all experiences. Mystical words do describe the mystical experience that is paradoxical in character correctly. In other words, the mystic has drawn the erroneous conclusion that the occurrence of mystical paradoxes implies that the mystical experience is ineffable. <15>

(iv) Mystics appear to be confused when they talk of the mystical experience.

Thesis (iv) supports thesis (iii) according to Stace. The mystic is not aware of the mistake he is making, but he feels that something is wrong. <16> Stace mentions a number of mystical utterances in which he believes we can discern that the mystics are confused when describing their own experiences.


3.1.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

The explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability that Stace supplies in his later years implies that mystical experiences are not ineffable in the real sense. It is therefore possible to use a scientific method to identify properties of mystical experiences, with regard to the phenomenon of ineffability, by studying mystical utterances.


3.1.3. Criticism of Stace's Theory

(a) Stace's theory is based on the assumption that mystical sentences contain paradoxes. If one can show that mystics do not express themselves paradoxically while still claiming that the mystical experience is ineffable, then Stace's theory is very problematical. Moreover, if it is possible to show that the paradoxes can be solved, that is, that they are pseudo‑paradoxes, Stace's theory would be weakened even more. Douglas Ralph Berdie has tried to show all this.

Berdie has analysed the utterances in the Chandagya Upanishad and of Plotinus, Meister Eckhart and St. John of the Cross, material that was also used by Stace. The result of Berdie's investigation is as follows. In the Chandagya Upanishad, there are paradoxes but no mention of ineffability. <17> In Plotinus and Eckhart Berdie found both paradoxes and utterances about ineffability. <18> Some researchers argue, however, that Eckhart does not express himself paradoxically. When Eckhart, for example, writes that "in God exists neither this nor that <19>, C F Kelley thinks that "this" and "that" refer to separate entities, something that cannot characterize God, as God is "all‑possibility and all‑inclusive". Therefore, Eckart does not express himself paradoxically. <20>

Nils Björn Kvastad thinks that a mystical experience of anything personal according to Eckhart should be classified as an experience of God, while an experience of an impersonal character should be classified as an experience of the Godhead. An experience of fullness should be classified in the same way as an experience of God and one of a void as an experience of the Godhead.

Similarly, says Kvastad, Eckhart stated that God was dynamic, the Godhead static. As the predicates that are regarded as contradictory belong to different aspects of the mystical experience, the paradox disappears according to Kvastad.<2l>

Finally, as far as St John of the Cross is concerned, Berdie has found utterances about ineffability but no paradoxes. <22> Moreover, St John of the Cross is aware that other mystics have used paradoxes and tries to explain them in various ways, Berdie says. <23>

Berdie came to the conclusion that only one mystic in the material, Plotinus, has both expressed himself paradoxically and claimed that the mystical experience is ineffable. Stace's theory thus meets with serious difficulties.

Philip C Almond's and Ninian Smart's investigations of the vacuuumplenum paradox support Berdie's result. In Theravada Buddhism, Jainistic mysticism and Sankhya/Yoga, this paradox is absent. <24> Sankara has, according to Almond, solved the paradox by introducing a distinction between saguna and nirguna Brahman, Mahayana Buddhism by the doctrine of trikaya <25> and the Eastern church by the distinction between God's essence, on the one hand, and His uncreated energy penetrating the creation, on the other. <26>

(b) Berdie has also criticized Stace's claim that mystics feel confused about the descriptions they give of their experiences. There is nothing that indicates that this is the case, says Berdie. Eckhart even claims that the paradoxes do not worry him at all:

Things impossible in nature may be usual or natural in a realm above nature. <27>

However, it is not evident from this quotation or from its linguistic context that Eckhart is talking about mystical paradoxes. Not to be able to find something in creation is not the same as its being paradoxical in character.

Berdie asserts that mystical paradoxes should not be interpreted literally. According to him, this is supported by the fact that the mystic considers the mystical experience to be ineffable. <28> Moreover, St. John of the Cross attempt at solving mystical paradoxes implies that they should not be interpreted literally. Also, the author of the classical work "Cloud of Unknowing" (about 1370) writes:

Be careful that you do not interpret the spiritual things I am saying in literal terms. <29>

Berdie concludes that the connection that Stace thought he saw between paradoxicality and ineffability finds no support in the mystical texts. <30>

(c) According to Quinten Lance Corbenic, the mystical utterances that Stace cites in support of his theory show that the problem does not lie in the fact that the mystical experience is paradoxical in character, but in the fact that the mystics are more likely to claim that they are unique and are completely unlike ordinary, non‑mystical experiences. Stace himself has admitted that the mystical experience cannot be understood in terms of ordinary non‑mystical experience, but has not, says Corbenic, realized what the consequences of such a viewpoint are. When the mystic attempts to describe the experience with the help of the concepts and categories that we use to describe ordinary, nonmystical experiences, problems arise. So the mystic says that the experience is ineffable. <3l> Corbenic says that it is evident that this explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability is more fruitful than that of Stace from, among other things, the quotation that Stace gives of the Buddhist D T Suzuki, who writes about "lokauttara", the transcendent reality, in the following way:

... when language is forced to be used for things of this world jokauttara, it becomes warped and assumes all kinds of crookedness: oxymora, paradoxes, contradictions, contortions, absurdities, oddities, ambiguities, and irrationalities. Language itself is not to be blamed for it. It is we ourselves who, ignorant of its proper functions, try to apply it to that for which it was never intended. <32>

What Suzuki comments on in this passage, says Corbenic, is not that the experience is paradoxical in character, as Stace claims, but that it cannot be described with the concepts of normal language, which is quite another thing. <33> According to Corbenic, the same argument can be applied to Stace's

interpretation of an utterance from the Upanishads. In it Brahman is talked of as without qualities, called "nirguna Brahman". Nirguna Brahman is descri bed as "neti, neti", which translated into English is "not this, not that". If the experience is paradoxical in character, the words "this, but not this", for example, should be used instead. Corbenic therefore prefers to interpret the proposition "not this, not that" as meaning that the mystic claims that the concepts we use to describe non‑mystical experiences cannot be employed for describing introvertive mystical experiences. <34> It is very likely, Corbenic concludes, that if the mystic tries to describe a mystical experience with the help of the concepts of ordinary language, paradoxes will occur. Mystical paradoxes are not descriptions of properties of mystical experiences. <35>

(e) Stace has based his arguments on discussion of the paradoxes in the introvertive mystical experience. According to Corbenic, however, a genuine paradox occurs not in the introvertive but in the extrovertive mystical experience. In the extrovertive mystical experience the introvertive state of consciousness is integrated with a non‑mystical, ordinary one. Two systems of concepts, one for each type of experience, are therefore used to describe this type of mystical experience. Hence, what seems to be a paradox arises. The world is seen both as unity and as multiplicity. The two systems of concepts cannot overlap. What is a true proposition in one need not be so in the other. What the mystics require, therefore, is another linguistic model to assist them in their descriptions, Corbenic maintains. <36>

Stace attempts to show that that the introvertive mystical experience is also paradoxical. He interprets the mystical expressions "undifferentiated unity", “void”, “nothing”, etc. as literal descriptions of mystical experiences. We have already seen that Corbenic does not interpret these mystical expressions in the same way and need not repeat that discussion here (see 2.1.3). The question is, however, whether Stace can find any mystical expressions that logically contradict the positive expressions presented above. Here Stace suggests the positive mystical expressions “fading away” and "melting away", which according to him symbolically express that the ego ceases to exist as a separate ego. Corbenic interprets these expressions differently, as we know (2.1.3). The expressions in question describe experiences during stages preliminary to the mystical experience and not the mystical experience itself. Nor can Stace assume that the ego dissolves completely, as his ontological theory of "identity in difference" would then be inconsistent.

Stace's other examples are the mystical expressions "divine" and "bliss". We have seen Corbenic's different interpretation of these, too (2.1.3). These words do not describe experiences but function as expressions of feelings. Corbenic draws the conclusion that Stace has not shown that the introvertive mystical expressions are characterized by the property of paradoxicality. <P>

As I mentioned in Chapter 2 (see 2.1.3), it is possible that Corbenic's interpretations of the four mystical expressions above are preferable. But Corbenic has not proved that this is the case by referring, for example, to mystical texts.

(f) Corbenic claims that Stace has not shown that the introvertive mystical experience and the non‑mystical, ordinary experience are experiences of the same "world". It is true that Stace says that the introvertive mystical experience has a "transubjective" cognitive status, that is that it is not subjective. But it is not objective either according to Stace. Corbenic argues that if the nonsubjective "world" that is manifested in the introvertive mystical experience is not identical with the "world" that is manifested in the objective, non‑mystical experience, no paradox can arise. <38>

One of the suggestions for solving mystical paradoxes rejected by Stace is “The Theory of Double Location”. <39> For his criticism to be tenable, Corbenic has to show that Stace's argument against this theory is untenable. Corbenic has not done this.

(g) William J Wainwright claims that Stace's arguments against the laws of logic being applicable to the mystical experience of unity is untenable, for two reasons:

(A) According to Wainwright's interpretation of Stace a proposition is true in every possible world if, and only if, this possible world contains at least two entities. <40> But the mystic has no access to a world that is not our own, says Wainwright, only to an underlying reality for our world. <41 > As monism as a theory of reality is dismissed by Stace <42>, propositions about "the One" are propositions about entities in our own world. The laws of logic thus appear to be applicable to propositions about "the One", argues Wainwright. <43>

(B) According to Wainwright, there are many mystical propositions that seem to be contradictory and deal with experiences consisting of at least two entities. Here he mentions the examples "God and the world are distinct and identical" and “Each distinct item in the world is One”. It should be possible to apply the laws of logic to these propositions, which then become false of necessity. Stace understood this but did not succeed. says Wainwright, in showing how to avoid the conclusion that these propositions are false of necessity. Stace's arguments are, according to Wainwright, as follows:
(B1) If the laws of logic can be applied to the proposition s and s is contradictory, then s is false of necessity.
(B2) The laws of logic can be applied to propositions expressing something about experiences consisting of at least two entities.
(B3) The two mystical propositions quoted express something about experiences consisting of at least two entities.
(B4) The mystical propositions are contradictory, from which follows that
(B5) The mystical propositions are false.
Stace seems to claim, says Wainwright, that (B3) is false, that is that mystical propositions do not express anything about more than one entity. <44>
(B6) When one reflects on (B1‑B4) one is in the ordinary, non‑mystical, state of consciousness.
(B7) Propositions (B1‑B4) appear to be true to the ordinary consciousness.
(B8) To the mystical consciousness one or more of the propositions (B1‑B4) appear as false or neither true nor false.

Even if (B6) and (B7) are true, it does not follow from these that (B1), (B2), (B3) or (B4) is false, Wainwright asserts. However, as far as (B1) and (B2) are concerned, Stace does not say this either. When the mystic does not have a mystical experience, he accepts the laws of logic. Thus the mystic accepts (B1) and (B2).

Wainwright claims that (B1) is false, as the mystical experience is characterized by unity, from which follows that no proposition about mystical experiences can be true or false or neither true nor false, as then the mystic cannot be in the unity state of consciousness. <45>

Wainwright also discusses some objections that Stace could conceivably make. Stace writes that the mystic sees "through the space‑time world to the unity, the One, which lies behind and beyond it ... (and which) is identical with the One of the introvertive experience". (Staces's italics)<46> The mystical proposition "Each item in the world is one" would therefore refer to a unity component in the extrovertive mystical experience. In this case (B3) would be false. According to Wainwright, this argument founders on the fact that one of the mystical utterances that Stace uses unequivocably speaks of several entities, namely: "sticks and stones, blades of grass". By rephrasing the mystical proposition "the world is and is not identical with God" as "the world is and is not distinct from God", we see that the latter is a description of an experience that includes multiplicity. So even here the mystical proposition is contradictory and false. <47>

Wainwright has misunderstood Stace here, however. Stace does not claim that mystics do not experience multiplicity in the extrovertive mystical experience. What Stace does claim is that multiplicity is experienced as both multiplicity and unity, where the latter element is the one that is specifically mystical. Experience of the world of multiplicity follows the laws of logic, while experience of unity does not. Stace writes:

..we must distinguish the sensuous physical part of the extrovertive mystic's experience from the unity which is the only mystical part of it, and which is undifferentiated and therefore nonlogical. <M>

To summarize, Stace has not shown that the laws of logic cannot be applied to propositions about mystical experiences of unity, or that mystical propositions can be contradictory and true at the same time, Wainwright argues. Contradictory propositions are of necessity false. Mystical propositions do not appear to be an exception to this rule, he concludes. <49>

(j) William E Kennick claims that the fact that mystical paradoxes are genuine and true does not necessarily imply that there are experiences that do not follow the rules of logic. The reason is that if it is true that the rules of logic cannot be applied to mystical experiences, the mystics utterances do not contain genuine paradoxes, as genuine paradoxes are logical paradoxes, and logic could not be applied to mystical experiences. If, on the other hand, the mystical paradoxes are genuine paradoxes, they are of necessity false, and we cannot therefore show that the mystical experiences do not follow the laws of logic. <50>

(k) Jack C Carloye has criticized Stace's view of the meaning of contradictory sentences. According to Carloye, the fact that a contradictory sentence is of necessity false does not depend on our ability to decide whether it refers to something real or not, but depends on the meaning of the sentence. By means of our semantic rules, we interpret the meaning of a proposition by deciding under what conditions the proposition is true. To deny a proposition by negating it is to limit the semantic interpretation we can make of it. A proposition in the form of "not S" cannot have a fact as a condition for truth that is compatible with the condition for truth that applies for "S". If "S" is true, "not S" must of necessity be false. To interpret "not S" in such a way that it would be possible for "not S" to be true when "S" is true would make "not S" meaningless, as the expression "not" would have lost its meaning. <5l> Our capacity to decide whether a sentence is true or not has thus nothing to do with whether a contradictory sentence is false or not. If a contradictory sentence is meaningful, then it is of necessity false. <52>

Stace is also mistaken if he assumes that contradictory sentences are false because the world does not resemble the description given in the sentence. Irrespective of what the world looks like, says Carloye, a contradictory sentence is either false, if it is used correctly, or meaningless, if it is used incorrectly. Contradictory sentences do not describe the world at all.

Carloye concludes that, irrespective, of whether we interpret the mystical paradoxes as meaningless or of necessity false, they cannot describe a mystical experience. <53>

(1) Bimal Krishna Matilal claims that the fact that most mystics attempt to put their mystical experiences into words, and that mystics thus follow the laws of logic, argues against Stace's proposition that the mystical experiences are paradoxical. Here Matilal mentions mystics such as Meister Eckhart, Samkara and the Buddhist school Madhyamika. According to Matilal, the last of these uses a logical method to show that ordinary, non‑mystical, experiences cannot provide us with knowledge of reality without our getting involved in contradictions. In this way, Madhyamika wishes to point out the ultimate transcendant Reality. <54>

(m) As we shall see in the next chapter, Peter Moore asserts that mystical writings may be divided into three categories, (I) autobiographies, (II) classifications of mystical experiences, not necessarily based on the author's own experiences and (III) theological treatises unconnected with mystical experiences. <55>

Moore claims that an investigation of mystical writings shows that paradoxes are quite common in theological treatises, are significantly less common in classifications of mystical experiences and hardly occur at all in autobiographies. This means that the fewer descriptive sentences there are in a text, the greater the chance of finding paradoxes. This implies, says Moore, that sentences containing paradoxes probably cannot function descriptively, not even if the paradox occurs in texts that seem to describe mystical experiences. In addition, paradoxes can probably be explained with the help of the same type of theory used to explain paradoxes in non‑mystical texts. Moore concludes that if sentences containing paradoxes function descriptively, we should also have heard more about the paradoxes in autobiographies than we have actually done. <56>

Unfortunately, Moore has not specified in detail what mystical and mystical texts he has investigated. Nor has he shown, by referring to mystical texts, that the number of paradoxes varies with the type of material. Finally, he has not specified how the paradoxes should be solved.

(n) Hitherto, I have only criticized theories that have explicitly criticized Stace. I shall also mention some alternative explanations of mystical paradoxes. <57>

Frederick J Streng claims that, as the ultimate reality in most non‑Buddhist religions is, from the point of view of definition, regarded as transcending the world and is beyond all description, paradoxes arise when the mystic attempts to describe the mystical experience. The mystical experience is characterized by undifferentiated unity, while language contains concepts whose task is to divide and classify. Linguistic concepts are also governed by the laws of logic.

Streng thus accepts an explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability in terms of what I have called "the theory of logical ineffability". His explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability then controls his view of mystical paradoxes. <58> Streng has not shown, however, that the concept of ineffability should be interpreted in terms of logical ineffability.

Kvastad has suggested two alternative theories that could explain mystical paradoxes. <59> The first is that the mystic uses one or both of the components of a paradox symbolically. The paradox would thus cease to exist. <60>

Unfortunately. Kvastad has not produced any support for his theory by referring to specific mystical texts.

The second alternative theory states that paradoxes are included in a method of arousing mystical experiences in the novice. Kvastad mentions koans in Zen Buddhism in this connection. The koan paradox, which is actually not strictly contradictory, makes the novice confused and makes it easier for him to have mystical experiences. <6l>

Kvastad has also discussed the necessity of accepting the law of contradiction. The result of not accepting it is that it would be impossible to define the concept of mystical experience in terms of properties. At the same time, the properties that are ascribed to the experience must be denied, from which follows that a definition cannot be given. <62>

This is as far as criticism of Stace's view of mystical paradoxes goes. <63> In Chapter 4 I shall return to a closer analysis of the mystical utterances that Stace presents in support of the idea that mystical language contains paradoxes and that mystical sentences containing paradoxes function descriptively.

My next task is to give an account of other criticism of the theory of psychological ineffability.

(o) Matilal does not believe that the distinction between whether the mystical experience is ineffable during or after the experience is a fruitful one. He thinks that the mystical experience can only be called ineffable in a trivial sense during the course of the experience, that is, that the mystic is silent in the same way as a man becomes speechless with love. <64>

Berdie says, however, that Stace's distinction and the reason he puts forward for making it are supported by the utterances of mystics. Plotinus writes:

At the movement of touch there is no power whatever to make any affirmation; there is no leisure; reasoning upon the vision is for afterwards. <65>

When you see The Good, see it entire; later you may think of it and identify with The Good whatever you can remember. <66>

Meister Eckhart explains:
.... a man must himself be One, seeking unity both in himself and in the One, experiencing it as the One, which means that he must see God and God only. And then he must 'return', which is to say, he must have knowledge of God and be conscious of his knowledge. <67>

Finally, St. John of the Cross says that experience of bliss… comes to pass in a greater degree than it is possible for the soul to describe at the time when this flame (living flame of love) uprises in it. <68>

(p) Leo Robertson does not agree with Stace when the latter claims that mystics are poor logicians, philosophers and analysts. Plotinus, Dionysius, Areopagite, St Augustine, Sankara, Meister Eckhart, Jakob Boehme, Nicolas of Cusa or St John of the Cross ‑ none of these can be regarded as poor philosophers, says Robertson. It is not likely, therefore, that mystics would have difficulties with language without knowing it. On the contrary, Robertson asserts, many of them, including Plotinus, explain what is meant by the concept of ineffability. According to Plotinus, the mystical experience is logically ineffable because the mystical ontological object transcends the intellect.

Robertson also criticizes the proposition that the mystical experience is ineffable only while the experience is taking place. It is difficult to explain how the memory, when the mystical experience is over, can trace multiplicity and distinctions in an experience that Stace himself has characterized as one of undifferentiated unity, transcending all distinctions and relations. <69>

To sum up: the examinations carried out by Almond, Berdie, Kvastad and Smart has shown that many mystical texts do not contain paradoxes, that any paradoxes that exist could be pseudo‑paradoxes, and that there are mystics who do not express themselves paradoxically but who still speak of the ineffability of the experience. Carloye, Kennick and Wainwright claim that contradictory mystical sentences must of necessity be false. Kennick has even pointed out that if mystical experiences are regarded as not following the laws of logic, then descriptions of them can hardly be illogical but alogical. Moore believes that mystical paradoxes mainly occur in writings that do not describe mystical experiences. But his ideas are so far only hypothetical.

Streng claims that the ultimate reality in non‑Buddhist religions is defined as transcending the world of phenomena, and that language does not describe experiences of this reality, as this reality is characterized by unity, while language is based on distinctions. Streng has not shown, however, that the concept of ineffability should be interpreted in terms of logical ineffability, which his arguments presuppose. Kvastad suggests two ways of solving paradoxes. The first one implies that one or both components of a paradox consist of symbols. Kvastad has not mentioned any support for this theory, however. The other suggestion is that paradoxes are included in a method of arousing mystical experiences in the novice. The latter alternative is supported by Matilal's arguments. According to Matilal, paradoxes are used in, for example, the Madhyamika school for teaching purposes and do not represent descriptions of mystical experiences. Matilal also claims that many mystics put their mystical experiences in words, which indicates that these experiences are not paradoxical.

Corbenic asserts that mystical experiences are quite different from nonmystical ones in character. The mystical experience cannot be understood in terms of ordinary experiences. Stace has admitted this, says Corbenic. Consequently, it is unlikely that the paradoxes are literal descriptions of mystical experiences. Corbenic rejects the support Stace has presented in the form of utterances from Suzuki and from the Upanishads. Nor do paradoxes occur in the introvertive mystical experience, according to Corbenic, but in the extro vertive one. Corbenic's criticism is, however, based on another interpretation of the semantic functions of mystical sentences, an interpretation for which he has not indicated any support.

Stace believes that it is possible to conclude from the mystics utterances that they felt confused when they tried to describe their experiences. Berdie's investigations have, however, shown that this is not the case. Nor is it a fruitful exercise to distinguish between what happens during and after the experience, according to Matilal and Robertson. The latter has also commented that many mystics, in spite of Stace's maintaining the opposite, have been good analysts. It is therefore unlikely that they have had difficulties with language without their knowing it. Also, many of them explain why the mystical experience is ineffable. Finally, Robertson finds it hard to understand how, after a mystical experience, the memory can trace multiplicity and distinctions in an experi ence that Stace characterizes as having the property of undifferentiated unity.

It is obvious that there are great difficulties involved in Stace's theory. Let us therefore see whether the alternative theories available to us are preferable

3.2.1 Ninian Smart's Multiple Explanation

Smart has presented his view on the ineffability of mystical experiences mainly in four works: "Reasons and Faiths " (1957), "Being and the Bible" (1956), "Understanding Religious Experience" (1978) and "The Purification of Con sciousness and the Negative Path" (1983). Smart deals with different areas of use for the mystical word "ineffable" in different works. My contextual inter pretation of Smart is that we should pay attention to all these areas of use to be able to claim that we have analysed the phenomenon of ineffability in an adequate and complete way.

The four areas of use that Smart mentions of are as follows:

(i) Smart argues that during the mystical experience there is a very great feeling of bliss. <70> The word "ineffable" expresses the magnitude of this feeling. Here Smart draws a parallel with experience of pain. When someone says "The pain is indescribable", he does not mean that the pain is indescriba ble in principle, but that certain pain is so intense that we call it "ineffable" in order to express this intensity. At the same time, the word "ineffable" expresses something else as well. Words cannot describe such intense pain completely adequately. It is not enough to say "The pain is very, very, very bad". Repeating words that reinforce an expression is insufficient. But by using such words of reinforcement we express something that cannot be described adequately. A mystical sentence may contain the word "ineffable" as a word of reinforcement, and the sentence function, to use my terminology, expressively. <7l>

(ii) When the mystic says that the bliss is ineffable, he does not mean that it is difficult to describe. For a description of the mystical experience to be possible, there must be what Smart calls a "mental picture" to describe. But the mystic asserts that the mystical experience is characterized neither by mental pictures, sensory perception nor thinking. <72> St Theresa writes:

The soul neither sees, hears nor understands while she is united to God. <U>

Smart concludes that the word "ineffable" may indicate that there is nothing to describe, as the experience has no content. <74>

(iii) All experiences are ineffable in the sense that there is always something more to say about them. An experience has an infinite number of aspects. Smart suggests that this is what mystics may mean when they say that the mystical experience is ineffable. <75>

(iv) The word "ineffable" expresses the idea that apart form normal understanding of language the receiver must have a specific disposition to be able to understand mystical words and sentences. The effect of the Holy Spirit is an example of such a disposition. <76>


3.2.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

If we should find that, in a specific linguistic context, the word "ineffability" can/should be interpreted according to alternative (i), then identification, as far as the phenomenon of ineffability is concerned, is possible using a scientific method. The sentence in which the expression "ineffable" is included functions expressively, not literally, in this context. Consequently, the mystical experience is not said to be ineffable. If alternative (ii) is preferable, identification by a scientific method is also possible because the words here are describing properties of experiences. Identification is, however, limited to properties that do not describe the content of the experience. Alternative (iii) enables scientific identification even if this cannot claim to be complete. If, on the other hand, we find that alternative (iv) is preferable, the logical possibility of

identification is not excluded, but using a scientific method is. Anyone researching into mystical experiences has to be a mystic to be able to understand mystical texts. To be sure, he knows what characterizes the mystical experience, but he cannot formulate a description in scientific language as it is hard to maintain that all those researching into mystical experience need to be mystics, a requirement that I have discussed previously. I am therefore forced to conclude that this alternative does not allow identification. <77>


3.2.3. Criticism of Smart's Theory

(a) Gary E Kessler and Norman Prigge also argue that the mystical experience is ineffable because it has no content. They find support for their view in the results of earlier researchers and in the utterances of the mystics themselves. The concept of undifferentiated unity put forward by Stace in his later period implies that, in a mystical experience, the mystic transcends the relationship between subject and object. Kessler and Prigge argue that if the subject‑object relationship has been transcended, then it is likely that the experience is without content. They also find the "empty" mystical experience in R C Zaehner's classification of mystical experiences in what they call "soul mysticism". The mystic says that he has achieved an experience of pure consciousness, often expressed in terms of self or the realisation that Atman is identical with Brahman. Buddhists often speak of nothingness, and the theistic mystic Eckhart <78> writes:

In this barren Godhead, activity has ceased and therefore the soul will be most perfect when it is thrown into the desert of the Godhead, where both activity and forms are no more, so that it is sunk and lost in this desert where its identity is destroyed... <79>

Finally, Agenanda Bharati, mystic and researcher into mystical experiences, says that

…there is zero content of a cognitive sort in the experience. <80>

Kessler and Prigge therefore draw the conclusion that the mystical experience is ineffable because there is no content to describe. The fact that the mystical experience is ineffable does not affect the properties of the experience. So, according to Kessler and Prigge, it is possible to describe it as having no object, no content, as being ineffable, etc. <8l>

I do not believe that either Smart or Kessler and Prigge have shown that the mystical experience has no content. True, the question of non‑content depends on how they define the concept of content. Unfortunately, neither Smart nor Kessler and Prigge have given any definition of this kind. It does not follow, however, from the fact that thoughts or "mental pictures" are missing or that the experience is not a perceptual one that the experience has no content. Nor does it follow from the fact that the mystic experiences undifferentiated unity that the subject‑object relationship has been transcended. As we have seen previously (see 2.1.3), Stace in later' years did not regard the mystical experience as being absolutely without content. Consciousness can contain other elements besides objects of perception/thoughts/mental pictures, etc.; it can obtain, for example, feelings or, as Wainwright suggests, Reality, One or what we usually call the "non‑reflecting ego". The latter is not an object in an experience, but certainly a content. Monists often say that they meet the "real ego" in the mystical experience, and Wainwright thinks that this expression could be a description of this type of self‑experience. <82>

D T Suzuki dismisses the idea that the mystical Buddhist word "nothingness" stands for the emptiness of the experience:
The satori cannot be a phantasm, empty and contentless, and lacking in real value, while it must be the simplest possible experience perhaps because it is the very foundation of all experiences. <83>

Bharati does not believe that the mystical experience contains any "cognitive" element. The expression "cognitive" is ambiguous, but I interpret Bharati contextually to mean that the concept does not imply the absence of emotions. In that case, Bharati would claim that the mystical experience is void of cognitive, but not of emotional, content.

Smart and Kessler & Prigge were partly able to defend themselves by referring to their cognitive theories, which are of the same reductionist type as that of Stace in his later period. According to this theory, names for God and words such as "atman" are then not included in descriptions of mystical experiences but represent intellectual additions. But, as I mentioned in section 1.1.9., this kind of cognitive theory is beset with great difficulties. When mystics speak in terms of God, for example, these terms are often related to the experience. <84> The mystical experience is therefore not usually without content.

Another argument against the mystical experience being contentless is that both Smart and the colleagues Kessler and Prigge assume that there is an element of bliss in the experience. <85> To be sure, Smart argues that the mystical word "bliss" functions as an expression of an emotion, not a description <86>, but how can we know that the experience is characterized by bliss if the word is not also used literally? Therefore, the mystical experience cannot be contentless.

One way to weaken a theory is to give an example of a phenomenon that the theory claims to explain but obviously does not explain. Allow me to quote an utterance made by the mystic J A Symonds:
One reason why I disliked this kind of trance was that I could not describe it to myself. I cannot even now find words to render it intelligible. <87>

It is obvious that Symonds experience had a content. Otherwise he would hardly have been irritated at not being able to describe it. He simply would have said that there was nothing to describe. Neither the theory of Smart nor that of Kessler and Prigge can be applied to Symonds utterance, hence they are incomplete. Nor is it possible to try and explain Symonds utterance by referring to other meanings of Smart's concept of ineffability. Here Symonds does not use the expression "ineffable" as a word of reinforcement. It is also evident from the utterance that Symonds is confused about the ineffability of this experience in particular, not about the ineffability of all experiences. The fourth meaning, that the receiver is required to have a specific disposition to be able to understand his utterance, cannot be applied either. It is Symonds himself that cannot describe the experience. The four meanings of the word "ineffable" that Smart discusses therefore do not cover all mystical utterances adequately.

Despite its faults, the theory of Kessler and Prigge has shown the importance of distinguishing between properties associated with content and those that are not. In Chapter 4 we shall become aware that this distinction, which in my material is only put forward by Kessler and Prigge, is of importance to the discussion of both the phenomenon of ineffability and the problem of identification.

(b) As far as alternative (iii) is concerned, it may be pointed out that the mystics speak of the mystical experience as being ineffable. They do not claim that all types of experiences are ineffable, which implies that there is something special about the mystical experience, something that is not included in other experiences. It is thus not fruitful to explain the ineffability of the mystical experience by referring to a general theory on the ineffability of all experiences. <88>

(c) As regards alternative (iv), it can be said that the theory is interesting but unproven. Smart has not mentioned any support for the theory by, for example, referring to specific mystical texts.

(d) Smart has, in my opinion, explicitly indicated the importance of not regarding the concept of ineffability as univocal but as one that can be used in different ways in different linguistic contexts. This an advantage of the theory. Hence, various explanations of the phenomenon of ineffability need not logically exclude one another. As we shall see later, this view is of great significance to the understanding of the phenomenon of ineffability and to the discussion of the problem of identification.

To sum up: neither Smart nor Kessler and Prigge have shown that the mystical experience is contentless. It is not likely that mystical experiences are ineffable just because all experiences are in a sense ineffable, as the mystics appear to believe that there is something specific about the ineffability of mystical experiences. Nor has Smart mentioned any support for the idea that the word "ineffability" is used as a word of reinforcement or that the receiver must possess a specific disposition to be able to understand mystical words/ sentences. Objections can therefore be raised against each of the four meanings of the word "ineffability" that Smart deals with. Nor can the theory explain all mystical utterances about ineffability and is therefore incomplete. On the other hand, the theory is useful in that it shows the importance of the principle that the word "ineffability" may be used in different ways in different linguistic contexts

3.3.1. Conceptual Ineffability: the Theory of Paul Henle <89>

Henle's explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability means that the mystic cannot make use of words to describe the mystical experience because the conceptual apparatus to which he has had access is too limited. To clarify what he means, Henle uses a brilliant analogy that I shall briefly describe below.

We may imagine that there was a "primitive" tribe that had developed linguistic characters for numbers, addition and subtraction. They also had a rudimentary knowledge of algebra, but used geometrical figures instead of, the letters that we use. While we, for example, write "a" or "b", they used the characters " A " and "L". Addition was indicated by a plus sign over the operation itself. ,a" + "b" was symbolized by L+. This way of symbolizing addition means that it is not possible to distinguish "a + b = b + a" from "a + b = ‑a + V as E] = E], which expressed the law of identity. <90> The "orthodox" within mathematics and almost all other people only accepted the law of identity and a law for addition, which we need not go into here. However, there were a few individuals that maintained that there were other laws of addition. When requested to formulate these laws, they often responded by writing E = E They were naturally accused of simply expressing the law of identity, but they claimed that there were occasions when the formula was not a tautology. Of course, most people thought that they were only talking nonsense. <9l>

But a time came when even the law of identity was attacked. Usually the process of addition consisted in the calculator placing a twig in a clay pot, two twigs in the next pot, three in the third, etc. and using the contents of the clay pots as a basis for his calculations. <92> Subtraction was done by taking twigs from one clay pot and putting them in another. By using a third set of clay pots it was possible to count with minus numbers.

A young genius thought he had discovered a general law for minus numbers.

By using the symbol E for "b ‑ a" he claimed that E is not equal to E, i.e. "b ‑ a" is not identical with "a ‑ b". The young man was accused of violating the law of identity and was executed. <93>

To sum up: in this primitive language, it is impossible to formulate certain propositions without this resulting in a tautology or a contradiction. Hence, that which is to be expressed is ineffable in relation to this specific language. <94>

This is a difference, however, between the primitive mathematical language and our own much more developed language. Henle therefore tries to show that even our language can be inadequate for expressing a phenomenon. When a new phenomenon appears, for example, through human inventions or discoveries, we often describe this phenomenon by analogy to a fact that is already known. When a name was required for the thing covering the motor in a car, the choice fell on the concept of hood, which is analogous to the original meaning of the concept.

But, Henle goes on, not all phenomena can be described with the help of analogy. We cannot describe everything completely with the help of, for example, the concept hood. In relation to the concept hood, the content of the sentence "There are some coins lying on the table" is ineffable. In other words, our linguistic symbols limit what can be expressed. <95>

Henle believes that it is possible that the mystics talk of the ineffability of mystical experiences may be interpreted to mean that the experience is impossible to describe, by analogy or otherwise, with the help of those concepts that exist in the language the mystic has access to. Henle has no direct way of confirming his theory but says there is what he calls "indirect support". If the theory were adequate, it would be possible for mystical language to contain paradoxes and tautologies. Every researcher knows that this is the case, says Henle. An example of the former is provided by Exodus: "I am that 1 am". According to Henle, Jacob Bottomley's words "Oh God ... What shall I speak of thee, when speaking of thee I speak nothing but contradiction" show how aware the mystic is of the fact that mystical sentences contain paradoxes. <96>

According to Henle then, it is possible that the mystical experience is characterized by properties that cannot be described with the help of the concepts that the mystics have had access to up till now. However, as long as the system of concepts in the languages in question is not altered or expanded, we shall never be able to confirm Henle's theory. Henle himself is aware of this. In the same way as the primitive language mentioned above was regarded as "primitive" in comparison with our own language, it is necessary to compare our language with a language that contains other concepts to be able to decide whether there are "candidates for a proposition" <97> in our language that could express propositions that in relation to our language are ineffable.


3.3.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

As the theory claims that it is possible to describe mystical experiences if other concepts than have been available hitherto are formed, it is logically possible, if we accept Henle's theory, to identify a mystical experience. On the other hand, it is not possible to identify mystical experiences by a scientific method until the mystics have formed these new concepts. Henle's theory allows us to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method, but not in the present state of research.


3.3.3. Criticism of Henle's Theory

(a) Galen Pletcher, who is a‑ representative of this theory too, has tried to support it by referring to the utterances of certain mystics. Pletcher cites Plotinus, who writes the following about the mystic:

…we ought not even to say that he will see, but he will be that which he sees, if indeed it is possible any longer to distinguish seer and seen, and not boldly to affirm that the two are one. In this state the seer does not see or distinguish or imagine two things; he becomes another, he ceases to be himself and to belong to himself ... Therefore this vision is hard to describe. For how can one describe, as other than oneself, that which, when one saw it, seemed to be one with oneself? (Pletcher's italics) <99>

According to Pletcher, what Plotinus is saying here is that the concept of experience presupposes a distinction between subject and object. An experience in which subject and object cannot be distinguished cannot be expressed in our system of concepts. <100>

I agree that here Plotinus is saying that the mystical experience is such that it cannot be described in our language. But Plotinus does not write that the reason for this lies in the fact that the language he had access to was conceptually limited. A representative of the theory of logical ineffability could therefore also use this quotation of Plotinus in support of his theory. Plotinus does not say whether the reason for ineffability is logical or conceptual.

Pletcher also cites Aldous Huxley. who after describing his mystical experience of a chair in terms of identity, writes:
To formulate and express the contents of this reduced awareness, man has invented and endlessly elaborated those symbol‑systems and implicit philosophies which we call languages. Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he has been born ‑ the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives access to the accumulated records of other people's experience, the victim in so far as it confirms in him the belief that reduced awareness is the only awareness and as it bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for data, his words for actual things. <101>

According to Pletcher, Huxley's utterance also provides support for Henle's theory. < 102> But I find this difficult to understand. Neither in the quotation nor in its linguistic context does Huxley speak of ineffability but of the tendency of language to hinder us from being open for mystical experiences, which is something different. Huxley's utterance cannot, therefore, support Henle's theory.

Douglas Ralph Berdie also believes that he has found support for the theory of conceptual ineffability in mystical texts. He cites Nicholas Cusanus, who says that God is the actualization of all possibility, but that... we have no common medium by which to attain to the relationship, since the possibility is infinite and indeterminate, whereas the actuality is finite and determined ... (Therefore) He is above our concept. <l03>

I do not understand how this passage can be cited in support of the theory of conceptual ineffability. Cusanus says that God cannot be described conceptually. He does not say that the mystical experience cannot be. It becomes even more obvious if one reads the whole passage from which the quotation is taken that Cusanus is speaking of God here and not about mystical experiences. For the quotation to provide any support for Henle's theory, Cusanus also needs to claim that it is the present linguistic system that is inadequate. But Cusanus does not do this.

(b) V C Aldrich claims that, if Henle is right, the history of mysticism would be full of attempts to form new concepts that can describe the mystical experience. But this is not the case, says Aldrich.

Henle has answered this criticism and argues that innovations do not arise of necessity. What is required is that "inspiration" wells up and the mystic feels a need to describe his experiences. He does not believe that any insight into semantic issues occurs during the course of the mystical experience. <104>

Richard Hubert Jones supports Aldrich's criticism. The mystics do not attempt to form new concepts. If we disregard minor attempts, such as the expression "one with the mystical" and the development of a new meaning of the mystical word "one", new mystical concepts are notably absent. Not even such great philosophers as Eckhart, Plotinus and Sankara had any ambition to form new concepts, says Jones. <105> An additional argument that Jones states is that the propositions about the ineffability of the mystical experience have not ceased despite these attempt to introduce new concepts. <106>

(c) Mystical language does not only include tautologies and paradoxes. It also contains apparently positive words, such as "infinite", "peaceful", "eternal", etc. The theory does not explain how these mystical words should be interpreted if they are not interpreted positively.

Moreover, it is possible that mystical paradoxes can be solved. something that we saw in connection with Stace's later theory. I have not been able to check or to analyse the linguistic context of the mystical sentences that Henle thinks support his theory as he has not stated the source. However, Henle has not shown that the passages cited should be considered as mystical sentences.

To sum up, it may be said that Henle's, Pletcher's and Berdie's support of the theory is untenable. I cannot find any support for the theory in the passages that are cited. A problem that the theory does not explain is that mystics have not generally attempted to form new concepts but have used ones from the religious tradition they belong to or from profane language. Nor does the theory explain the occurrence of apparently positive expressions in mystical language. It is also doubtful whether any genuine mystical paradoxes exist.

3.4.1. The Theory of Non‑experiential Ineffability

This theory has been put forward by William James, C J Ducasse and Edgar Sheffield Brightman and is based on the requirement that to be able to understand linguistic expressions that describe experiences we should have had these types of experiences ourselves. Just as it is impossible to get a blind man to understand, for example, what red looks like, or a deaf man to hear what a piece of music sounds like, it is impossible to communicate the mystical experience to the "spiritually blind", non‑mystic, as he has had no mystical experiences of his own and cannot therefore understand what the mystical words refer to. Thus, the mystical experience is ineffable. <107>


3.4.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

It is impossible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method if we accept the theory of non‑experiential ineffability. Even if the researcher is a mystic himself, he cannot study the experience according to a scientific method. To be sure, he knows what characterizes the mystical experience, but he cannot formulate a description in scientific language, as it is hard to maintain that all those researching into mystical experience need to be mystics, a requirement that I have discussed previously. <108>


3.4.3. Criticism of the Theory of Non‑experiential Ineffability

Stace, in his later period, has criticized the theory as follows:

(a) The result of accepting the theory is that all experiences, perceptual or mystical, are ineffable if one has not experienced that which the concept stands for. But, according to the mystics, the property of being ineffable is something that is unique to the mystical experience, something that does not encompass other experiences. Thus, the theory does not explain why the mystical experience is ineffable. <109>

(b) A person who can see has no difficulty in understanding and expressing propositions of the type “X is red” to a blind person. It is the blind man who has difficulty in understanding the concept of redness. As far as the ineffability of the mystical experience is concerned, however, the problem is that the mystic himself, that is the person who has had the experience, is unable to describe it. The theory therefore does not explain what it is meant to explain, says Stace. In support of the above argument, Stace cites the mystic John Addington Symonds, a quotation that we have met before: <110>

One reason why I disliked this kind of trance was that I could not describe it to myself. 1 cannot even now find words to render it intelligible. < 111 >

The theory of non‑experiential ineffability cannot explain Symond's talk of the ineffability of the mystical experience. However, I think there are some other utterances from mystics to which the theory can be applied. The following utterance from Teresa of Avila is one example:

This state of prayer ...Anyone who has had experience of this kind of prayer will understand quite well what 1 am saying if, after reading this, she considers it carefully, and thinks out its meaning: otherwise it will be Greek to her. <112>

3.5.1. The Theory of Emotion

This theory is not represented by anyone, as far as I know, but it has been elucidated and discussed by Stace in his later period.

The theory is based on the fact that feelings are always difficult to describe. In comparison with thoughts, for example, they are vaguer and more indeterminable. Thus, all feelings are, to a certain extent, ineffable, but the degree of ineffability depends on how deep and subtle the feelings are. The theory of emotion claims that the mystical experience is difficult to describe because the experiences, that is the feelings, are so subtle. The experience is therefore said to be ineffable. <113>

3.5.2. Implications for the Problem ofIdentification

The theory of emotion does not claim that it is logically impossible to describe mystical experiences. But according to my contextual interpretation of Stace's presentation of the theory, the mystics have not yet succeeded in finding words to describe the mystical feelings adequately. Consequently, the theory of emotion is similar to the theory of conceptual ineffability. As it is possible that mystics will be able to find words that describe mystical words adequately at some future date, it is possible, if we accept the theory of emotion, to identify a mystical experience, with regard to the phenomenon of ineffability, using a scientific method. But identification cannot be carried out in the present state of research.

3.5.3. Criticism of the Theory of Emotion

(a) Stace in his later period criticizes the theory of emotion and claims that the mystical experience is not characterized by being only emotional or that its emotional aspect is of great importance. Stace mentions both Eckhart and Buddha, whose mystical experiences are, according to him, characterized by calm and serenity rather than by strong feelings. < 114> Eckhart, for example, relates the following:

Satisfaction through feeling might mean that God sends us as comfort ecstasies and delights. But the friends of God are not spoiled by these gifts. Those are only a matter of emotion, but reasonable satisfaction is a purely spiritual process in which the highest summit of the soul remains unmoved by ecstasy, is not drowned in delight, but rather towers majestically above them. Man only finds himself in a state of spiritual satisfaction when these emotional storms of our physical nature can no longer shake the summit of the soul. <115>

Both Buddha and Eckhart asserted, however, that the mystical experience is ineffable, says Stace. < 1 16>

Bimal Krishna Matilal has criticized Stace and claims that it is doubtful whether Buddha regarded the mystical experience as ineffable. Besides, nirvana is not a mystical experience but an insight into the nature of reality. The mystical experience is not regarded as ineffable in Mahayana Buddhism either. Ineffability applies only to the mystical ontological object. <117>

(b) Stace's other argument against the theory of emotion is that the entire mystical tradition has been against it. Instead, the tradition supports the idea that it is the nature of the mystical experience, and not only the feelings that accompany the experience, that makes the experience ineffable. To support his argument Stace refers to all the research that he has done, the conclusions of which he has presented in, for example, Mysticism and Philosophy. < 118>

(c) Matilal has criticized the theory of emotion and argues that if the mystic claims that the mystical experience is very valuable but ineffable, he is being inconsistent. How can the mystic know whether the experience is valuable if it is ineffable? It as if a jeweller, to use Matilal's own example, should value a specific jewel without being able to explain why he valued the jewel in that way. <119>

Matilal's argument is untenable. The theory of emotion takes as its starting point the fact that mystical experiences are characterized by feelings. To claim that an experience is valuable, however, is not a question of describing a feeling but of expressing an opinion as to its worth. Consequently, Matilal's argument is not applicable to the theory of emotion. Perhaps Matilal means that mystical experiences are not only characterized by feelings, but also by being valuable. But he has not stated it in this way.

However, even if the mystic should regard the experience as valuable, which is likely, it does not necessarily follow that he should be able to describe it. We can be sure of what an experience is like without being able to describe it. Our language perhaps does not supply the concepts needed for describing the experience. We can also regard the experience as valuable without being able to point out what makes it so.

Moreover, this talk of value is not a description of the experience, at least not according to my contextual interpretation of Matilal. The realization that the experience is valuable is something that comes to the mystic after the experience is past. Thus, the experience can still be ineffable

3.6.1. Jerome D Frank's Neurophysiological Explanation

This, as yet very briefly formulated, theory claims that the mystical experience is said to be ineffable because during its course the mystic primarily uses the right half of the brain, which is not often used for linguistic activities. < 120> 1 assume that Frank is here referring to the investigations that have been performed by brain researchers such as Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen and Michael Gazzaniga. In these the conclusion has been reached that the left half of the brain has specialized in analytical, logical thinking, conception of time, etc. while the right half has specialized in a holistic way of functioning, in spatial relations, pictures, recognition of faces, etc. What is interesting is that the ability to speak and linguistic activities in general are concentrated in the left half of the brain. <12l> If the mystic primarily uses the right half of the brain during the mystical experience, he may find it difficult to describe his experiences. <122>

3.6.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

Frank does not claim that it would be logically impossible to use the right half of the brain to describe mystical experiences. But mystics have not yet succeeded in doing this, according to my contextual interpretation of Frank. The experience is therefore ineffable. Even if it were possible, then, if we accept Frank's theory, to identify properties of mystical experiences by a scientific method it is impossible in the present state of research.

3.6.3. Criticism of Frank's Theory

Support may be found for the theory if it can be shown that mystics do in fact primarily make use of the right half of the brain. The only investigation I know of in which persons who could conceivably have mystical experiences were studied with the help of an EEG was done by Mark Westcott at the University of Durham, England. However, his study of TM‑meditators showed that meditation brought about a balance between the two halves of the brain rather than that the right half dominated in activity. <123> Moreover, there are lefthanded persons whose linguistic ability is concentrated in the right half of the brain. Neither can it be claimed that it is impossible for the right half of the brain to train its ability to deal with language. <124> This has in fact been shown, for instance, in studies of persons in whom the left half of the brain has been seriously damaged. < 125 > It would be strange, then, if the mystic who has had mystical experiences for some twenty, thirty years should not have trained his ability to deal with language via the right half of the brain. Consequently, I do not think that Frank's theory is generally applicable. It may possibly relate to the early stages of the mystical way. It is up to future neurophysiological research to show this.

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3.7.1. Richard Gale's Pedagogical Explanation

Gale's suggestion for a solution implies that the mystical experience is so valuable that he is afraid that words may become a substitute for the experience itself. Gale draws a parallel with the fear of a composer that a concert programme may become a substitute for the experience of the music itself. Both the mystic and the composer wish, therefore, to point out that the direct experience is the most important one. So they choose not to conceptualize the experience and say it is ineffable. <126>

3.7.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

According to this theory it is not logically impossible for the mystic to describe his experience to others. But the mystic chooses not to describe it, which is why it is impossible to identify properties of mystical experiences by a scientific method if we accept Gale' theory.

3.7.3. Criticism of Gale's Theory

No one doubts that the mystical experience is valuable to the mystic. But it is doubtful whether there is any connection between the value of the experience and utterances about ineffability. Why does the mystic attempt to describe the mystical experience, as Gale says he does, if mystical words may become a substitute for the experience itself? Is it not more likely that the mystic would in that case refrain from describing the experience and say instead: Try it yourself! Then the mystical sentences would function evocatively or instructively, not descriptively. Gale asserts, however, that mystical sentences function descriptively:

... mystics as a matter of fact do manage to conceptualize their mystical experiences when they are outside them. By applying concepts such as "the undifferentiated unity", “the dissolution of the personal ego”, "non‑temporal and non‑spatial", "the sense of peace and sacredness", etc. to their experiences they succeed in distinguishing mystical from nonmystical experiences. (Gale's italics) <127>

Three pages further on Gale writes:
Both men are telling us by their refusal to conceptualize their experience that it is the direct experience itself which counts ... (my italics) <128>

It is a puzzle to me how Gale can claim that mystical sentences function descriptively and at the same time assert that the composer and the mystic refuse to describe their experiences.

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3.8.1. The Psychoanalytical Explanation Put Forward by Raymond Prince and Charles Savage

A psychoanalytical explanation, as yet only in its preliminary stages, has been put forward by Raymond Prince and Charles Savage. They claim that the mystical experience has the following characteristics: (a) that the mystic withdraws from the "world" in order to attain mystical experiences, (b) that the experience is ineffable, (c) that the experience is regarded as supplying knowledge, (d) that the mystic experiences ecstasy and (e) that the ego is experienced as dissolving and the mystic has the feeling that he is fusing with all. < 129>

Prince and Savage claim that the mystical experience is regressive. During the mystical experience the mystic returns to an earlier mode of functioning, in this case to the level of a two‑year‑old or younger. <130>

Using the concept of regression as their starting‑point, Prince and Savage explain the mystical experience in the following manner. To withdraw from the world is a norm way of giving rise to regressive experiences. Prince and Savage point here is how, among other things, schizophrenia is developed and to investigations sensory deprivation. <l31> As far as the ineffability of the experience concerned, the experience is preverbal, and it is therefore impossible to conceptualize it. Prince and Savage cite Jakob Boehme: <132>

... Who can express it? Or why and what do I write, whose tongue does but stammer like a child which learning to speak? With what shall I compare it? Or to what shall I liken it? Shall I compare it with the love of this world? No, that is but a mere dark valley to it. <l33>

The above quotation cannot be used in support of their theory, as it cannot be found in the source that Prince and Savage refer to. In addition, the work in question is a compilation of utterances from several works by Boehme, without any specification being given of which works and where in these works this passages may be found. The source cannot therefore be verified.

Prince and Savage explain the mystic's feeling of gaining knowledge during the mystical experience by referring to early experiences of breast‑feeding which is characterized by immediacy and reality. < 134> They explain the bliss of the experience by referring to the bliss felt during breast‑feeding. Here Prince and Savage cite Jakob Boehme, Richard St Victor and Francis de Sales. <135> Finally, the experience of the dissolution of the ego and fusion with all is explained by pointing to the fact that the young child does not feel any distinction between itself and the world around it. <136> Prince and Savage also mention that neurophysiological investigations have shown that when yogis find themselves in samadhi they cannot be disturbed by external sensory stimulation, a phenomenon that is also typical of infants in certain specific situations. < 137>


3.8.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

As the mystical experience is characterized as being preverbal, it is impossible to describe the properties of mystical experiences. Thus, it is impossible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method if we adopt Prince and .Savage's theory.


3.8.3. Criticism of Prince and Savage's Theory

(a) Nils Bj6rn Kvastad has criticized Prince and Savage's theory. He does not mean that all mystical experiences are preceded by dissociating oneself from the "world". This does not apply, for example, to modern mystics. Perhaps Kvastad is referring here to what are known as the spontaneous mystics, that is mystics who, without practising any method or without any interest in mystical experiences, suddenly have one. One such mystic is Richard Maurice Bucke, whom we shall meet in the next chapter.

Kvastad also believes that we can question whether dissociating oneself from the "world" always precedes regressive experiences. This does not, for example, apply to elderly people in their "second childhood", people who often play with children or people that drink and make merry, all of whom are types of people who often have regressive experiences. <138> Here, however, Kvastad himself has answered his own criticism. If mystical experiences are not always preceded by dissociation from the "world", they may still be regressive, as not all regressive experiences are preceded by dissociation from the "world".

As far as the ineffability of the experience is concerned, Kvastad claims that the experience would have been ineffable to the mystic if he had had mystical experiences permanently and had never returned to an ordinary mode of functioning. But the mystic does return and he can therefore describe the experience. There is no reason why he should not be able to describe the memory of the experience, even if he has experienced something belonging to a preverbal stage. <139> Kvastad assumes here that all experiences can be conceptualized. But if the culture in which the mystic lives does not supply the concepts with which to express these preverbal experiences, the experience will still be ineffable. The psychoanalytical explanation has in this case been combined with the theory of conceptual ineffability. But we can also consider combining it with the theory of logical ineffability. The experience will then be ineffable because it goes beyond the subject‑object relationship, etc.

Kvastad also criticizes the idea that experiences of breast‑feeding are felt as a revelation of truths. Nothing can be found to support such a theory. No one seems to remember these experiences, nor can we ask them who have them either. It may also be questioned whether experiences of breast‑feeding provide the same type of intuitive insight as the knowledge of reality that mystics claim to have. < 140>

Prince and Savage's explanation of mystical ecstasy is problematic, Kvastad continues. True, certain mystics speak of their experiences as analogous with the experience of breast‑feeding, for example, Francis de Sales, St Teresa and St John of the Cross, but how can the mystic know that the experiences are similar? They cannot, of course, remember their experiences of breast‑feeding. It is therefore difficult to claim that the experiences are alike.

Kvastad concludes that Prince and Savage have not shown that the four characteristics can be linked up with regressive experiences, except where the experience of the dissolution of the ego and fusion with everything is concerned. Moreover, Kvastad says that one implication of their view is that animals have mystical experiences, too, as their experiences of breast‑feeding can hardly be distinguished from man's. <14l>

(b) Kvastad also presents a counter‑argument to the theory. He bases this on what is known as the Isakower phenomenon. This phenomenon occurs in the hypnogogic state, that is when a person is just about to fall asleep. He can then experience something heavy and dark coming towards him and feel a large lump in his mouth. He also experiences the dissolution of his ego and fusion with all. Finally, he can feel somewhat dizzy and perhaps hear a buzzing noise. According to Kvastad, this experience cannot be classified as a mystical one. Isakower interpreted it as a hallucinatory revival of the experience of breastfeeding. If this interpretation is correct, Prince and Savage's theory would be undermined, as it would then be difficult to claim that mystical experience and experiences of breast‑feeding are identical. <142>

But Kvastad's argument is not convincing. An investigation by Fenwick et a has shown that the experiences of TM‑ meditators may be classified as hypnogogic experiences. < 143 > Mystical experiences could then be regressive experiences.

Kvastad is also of the opinion that the difficulty in equating mystical and regressive experiences is also evident from an utterance of the psychologist and mystic, W Pinard, who writes as follows about an experience he had had during an illness:

One night when I was at my worst and in despair, I bethought myself of practicing spontaneous imagery ... Within a few minutes 1 saw a beautiful orange‑crimson glow which seemingly comprised the whole universe. Gradually but unmistakably this stupendous vision took on the form of a mother's breast ... The feeling of oneness, consolation and ultimate warmth was indescribable. I fell into a deep sleep almost at once and woke up the next day well on the way to recovery. I can accept this experience as a regression to early infancy, but, wonderful as it was, it in no way resembled the glory, the significance, the ecstasy and the dynamic power of classical (mystical) experience. (Kvastad's addition) < 144>

According to Kvastad, Pinard's utterance shows that it can be difficult equate regressive experiences of breast‑feeding with mystical experiences <145>

(b) The theory presupposes that the mystical experience is characterized by the dissolution of the ego, fusion with all and ecstasy. But how do Prince and Savage know that this is the case if the mystical experience is ineffable, that is if the experience is preverbal and thus cannot be conceptualized? Either the experience has these characteristics, from which follows that the experience is effable, or the experience is ineffable because it is preverbal, from which follows that it cannot have the characteristics in question. Prince and Savage cannot claim both without being inconsistent.

Moreover, if the mystical experience is ineffable in the way Prince and Savage mean, they cannot base their theory on the fact that the two characteristics mentioned can be connected with regression.

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3.9. 1. Logical Ineffability: A Theory Presented by Richard Hubert Jones and Walter T Stace in his Intermediate Period <146>

In principle, Jones and Stace put forward the same arguments. There are certain differences between them, however, and I have therefore chosen to present both theories.

(i) Non‑mystical, ordinary reality is experienced and interpreted with the help of the sense organs and intellect.
(ii) Language is dualistic in character.

In his intermediate period Stace claims, as we have seen earlier, that reality can be divided into what he calls the "natural" and the "divine order". When man functions in the natural order, he uses his sense organs and intellect. A prerequisite for being able to use the analytical ability of the intellect is that the subject‑object relationship is maintained, that is that there is a subject that is trying to understand an object. <147>

The formation of concepts in the ordinary, non‑mystical state of consciousness occurs, logically speaking, in three stages. In the first stage the consciousness distinguishes one entity from another. In the second the relationship between these entities is investigated. In the third stage the definition of concepts takes place, that is the entities are classified. <148>

According to Richard Hubert Jones, a referential theory is characterized by the idea that language splits up our conception of reality into segments by forming concepts that are based on contrast and comparison between entities. The sentence "This is X" necessarily implies that we cannot at the same time claim "This is not X". In a specific culture language distinguishes experiences on the basis of what is regarded as most important, most convenient, or necessary for survival. Different languages therefore have different systems of concepts, says Jones. <149>

(iii) The mystical experience is non‑dualistic in character.

Stace claims that during the mystical experience the mystic becomes aware that the relationship between subject and object is transcended. The mystics experience a relationless, undifferentiated unity. During the experience neither the sense organs nor the intellect are used, but what Stace calls, as we have seen earlier, "intuition". <150>

Jones also says that, according to the mystics, the mystical experience is characterized by being what they call "undifferentiated", interpreted by Jones to mean that it is not an object or does not contain an object. The duality between subject and object has been transcended. Jones cites the Upanishads: <15l>

... where knowledge is of a dual nature (implying a subject which knows and an object which is known), there, indeed, one hears, sees, smells, tastes and also touches, the self knows everything. Where knowledge, being devoid of effect, cause or action, unspeakable, incomparable, indescribable, what is that? It is impossible to say. <152>

The differences between Stace and Jones as far as (i)‑(iii) are concerned are that Stace has adopted a specific view of reality while Jones has not reached a decision on the ontological question. Jones only states that we split up our experience of reality into segments. Nor does Jones express any opinion on how the mystic acquires knowledge during the mystical experience, while Stace here speaks of "intuition". None of these differences, however, alters the logical structure of the argument.

(iv) Mystical words cannot refer to properties of the mystical experience.

This follows from (ii) and (iii). According to Stace, the intellect cannot comprehend an experience that is beyond the subject‑object relationship:

Thus it is of the very nature of intellect to involve the subject‑object opposition. But in the mystic experience this opposition is transcended. Therefore the intellect is incapable of understanding it. Therefore it is incomprehensible, ineffable. <1.53>

The reason why the intellect cannot be used for understanding the mystical experience is that a concept refers to a property of an entity. But the mystical experience does not have any properties: <154>

But why can no words be found? The reason is that words, except for proper names, stand for concepts; and concepts connote predicates or collections of predicates. Thus to say that God is ineffable is to say that no concepts apply to Him and that He is without qualities. <155>

The consciousness can therefore not distinguish between entities, investigate their relationships or classify them during the mystical experience. <156>

Stace claims that the mystical experience is unique. It would still be ineffable even if we had another sense organ or we should have a mystical experience ourselves. It is the mystics themselves who, in spite of having had mystical experiences, maintain that the experiences are ineffable. Thus the experiences are a mystery even to the mystics. <157>

Jones views on the question of meaning are radically different to Stace's, but the differences between them do not affect the argument concerning the phenomenon of ineffability. Even if Jones is not positive towards a referential theory, he admits that most people, including the mystics, assume that meaning should be analysed in terms of reference. If the mystics had not, implicitly or explicitly, accepted a referential theory, they would not have needed to speak of the ineffability of the mystical experience, says Jones. The mistake that is made is to draw conclusions about the nature of reality from the grammatical form of the terms. In other words, we assume that concepts correctly mirror the nature of reality. We draw conclusions about ontology from grammar. The segments that the concepts point to become real, independent entities. An example is the word "I", which to many stands for a mental entity. Jones also mentions Galileo's discussion of the names of colours and Russell's treatment of the concept of substance. According to Arthur Danto, whom Jones refers to, all metaphysical subjects assume that there is a correlation between reality and language. Danto claims that most people appear to accept the referential theory. <158>

It is Jones view that the mystical experience is ineffable because the mystical experience does not contain any object and because mystics have accepted the referential theory, which is based on the fact that words stand for objects.

Jones cites mystical utterances in support of his argument. Nagarjuna, the Buddhist philosopher, analysed various linguistic concepts to show that it is impossible to correlate the content of a concept with something real. Those who, for example, accept the concept of self‑existence (svabhava) assume that words in a language reflect the nature of reality. Nagarjuna tries to show that neither an entity (bhava) nor an experience of something (dharma) is real (sat), because both lack self‑existence. The way from suffering to enlightenment goes via the insight that concepts and reality are not connected. One property of reality is, according to Nagarjuna, the absence of all conceptual projections (prapanca). Nirvana is attained when one has removed the tendency to project concepts to reality, that is when one no longer experiences reality in a specific way that depends on language containing specific grammatical distinctions. The mystical experience is characterized by the fact that the mystic can use natural language without giving rise to the illusion that words stand for real, separate, independent entities. <159>

This, shows, says Jones, that Nagarjuna is critical of the referential theory. But, according to Jones, Nagarjuna's criticism is based on the same type of theory of meaning. Words and sentences still refer to something, even if this something is not real but relatively stable forms in our experiences, forms that we group and pay attention to. Jones thinks that such a point of view is basically also a way of expressing a referential theory. <160>

Jones claims that we can find the same logical relationship between the view of meaning, on the one hand, and utterances about ineffability, on the other, in Plotinus, Lao Tzu and Sankara. <16l>

(v) The mystical experience is logically ineffable.

This follows from (iv). <162>


3.9.2. Implications for the Problem of Identification

According to this theory, such is the character of the mystical experience that it is logically impossible to identify it, and consequently also using a scientific method.


3.9.3. Criticism of the Theory of Jones/Stace in his Intermediate Period

(a) As we have seen (2.1.1.), an investigation of how mystics actually use mystical words/sentences shows, according to later Stace, that mystical sentences primarily have a descriptive function. As mystical sentences primarly functions descriptively, then the mystical experience cannot be logically ineffable. The reason why Stace reached this conclusion in his later period was, as I have already mentioned (see 2.4) the specific method he used for studying mystical texts, which deviated from the one he used in his intermediate period. The method Stace used in his intermediate period means that Stace accepts the proposition of the mystics about the inneffability and that he interprets the concept of ineffability in terms of logical ineffability and therefore draws the conclusion that mystical sentences cannot function descriptively. However, the rejection of the version of the symbolic theory from his intermediate period (see 2.2.3) means that Stace in later years also rejected the explanation of logical ineffability:

the theory of metaphor … implies absolute inneffability. It implies that all the descriptive words used are metaphors. <163> (Stace´s italics)

I have already put forward the arguments for preferring Stace´s later method and need not repeat them here (see 2.4).

(b) Stace in his later period asserts that if the mystical experience is logically ineffable, we cannot claim this because nothing can be said about it, not even in a symbolic or metaphorical sense. We cannot even call the experience an “experience” or say that it is “ineffable”. <164>

The criticism is untenable. There are two starting-points for studying a phenomenon. The first implies that we describe the phenomenon by stating its empirical properties. But we can also describe the phenomenon without conceptualizing its properties in the empirical world in an adequate manner. Here we can make use of an explicitly formulated conceptual apparatus with whose help we can study the phenomenon. Sometimes it may be necessary to use the other way to be able to study a specific phenomenon at all. According to my contextual interpretation of Stace, he uses the latter method. Stace uses the concept of experience to be able to speak of the phenomenon at all. The concept is, however, not completely adequate, but he may not have anything better. Stace in his intermediate period writes:

... relies on a use of the word "experience" which is inapplicable to the case in hand. By an experience we ordinarily mean something which is before the mind or present to it. This involves a distinction between the mind and its experience or object. Thus the colour or smell is "there", and 1, who cognize it, am different from it. Moreover one colour is like another, and is unlike a smell. In all such experiences, therefore, the concept comes into play. But the mystic experience is not of this kind. <165>

By using this method, Stace is able to speak of "the experience" as logically ineffable and beyond the subject‑object relationship. These propositions are then being used on a meta‑level.

The theory assumes, however, that the mystics also use the expressions concerned in the same way as Stace. If a mystic uses, for example, the expression "beyond the subject‑object relationship" on an object level, the experience cannot at the same time be claimed as being logically ineffable.

(c) Richard M Gale claims that many mystics have, in fact, described properties of mystical experiences, for instance, in their autobiographies. Not only mystics, but also non‑mystics, appear to understand these mystical words/ sentences. Gale goes on to say that if we were suddenly to have an experience characterized by dissolution of the ego, infinity, undifferentiated unity, serenity and holiness, we should probably exclaim: "Why that Eckhart wasn't Just pulling our leg! There really are such experiences and I just had one!" < 166>

Like Stace in his later period, Gale of course assumes that mystical sentences function descriptively and this "fact" then governs his criticism of Stace. However, Gale has not shown that mystical sentences do function descriptively.

(d) According to Gale, the mystics claim that mystical experiences can be verified if you practise the correct methods, for example, meditation or prayer. But how does one know if one has had a mystical experience if the experience is so unique that it is impossible to describe? asks Gale. <167> Neither Stace nor Jones has discussed this question, but a possible answer is as follows. If mystical words, as Stace and Jones believe, consist in symbols, we may be able to decide if we have had a mystical experience if mystical sentences give rise to some form of non‑ordinary experience, that is if the sentences function evocatively. If this does not happen, then we are not sufficiently sensitive. We can, however, never be entirely certain that we have had a mystical experience, something that Stace and Jones have not asserted either.

(e) Gale argues that it does not follow from the fact that an experience is unique that it cannot be described. An experience of yellow, for example, is just as unique as a mystical experience. We cannot define yellow in more fundamental terms. But we can nevertheless form the concept of yellowness and communicate the experience of yellow to others if they have had similar experiences. <168>

Gale's criticism is not tenable. Many mystics speak about the ineffability of the mystical experience but generally not about the ineffability of non‑mystical experiences. This suggests that there is something that is specific to the mystical experience, something that does not include other types of experience. In addition, understanding of mystical words/sentences is not made easier by a person having his own mystical experiences. The problem is, as we have seen earlier, that it is the mystic who finds it difficult to describe his experience, not only to the non‑mystic but to himself and to other mystics.

(f) Gale questions whether the mystical experience is really characterized by transcendency of the subject‑object relationship. How can the mystic remember that he has had a mystical experience in that case? How can he say that it was his experience? How can he experience that the ego has dissolved? <169>

But even if one can explain how this may occur, Gale continues, it does not follow that the subject‑object relationship cannot be maintained or that the mystical experience is unique. If, for example, the conductor Schnabel is conducting Beethoven's 14th sonata, he cannot at the same time either formulate, consider or "verify" the sentence "Schnabel is concentrating solely on interpreting Beethoven's 14th sonata". The fact that the mystic can neither formulate, consider nor "verify" the sentence "I felt an undifferentiated unity" (my example) during the course of his experience is, according to Gale, no argument in support of the uniqueness of the experience. The differences between the two examples are only practical. Gale claims that the mystical experience is not logically ineffable. <170>

Stace could have answered that while Schnabel does not have any difficulty in repeating the sentence in question after the concert. the mystics cannot say anything about the mystical experience at all because the intellect cannot comprehend experiences based on intuition.

(g) Gale claims that Stace is contradicting himself when he first says that the mystical experience is logically ineffable and then that the mystics describe their experiences in almost exactly the same way. <17l>

(h) Walter Arnold Kaufmann claims that language cannot only be used for describing experiences based on a subject experiencing an object. There are types of experience in which the subject‑object relationship is suspended, but which are describable. Kaufmann mentions emotional experiences here.

Another argument against the theory is that subject‑object experiences also contain an element of immediacy, which is not possible to describe. <172>

Kaufmann's arguments are untenable. In emotional experiences I know that it is I who feels the emotions, that is, that there is a subject. But there is an object, too ‑ the content of the feelings. I have not been able to find any example of an emotional experience in which the relationship between subject and object has been transcended. Unfortunately, Kaufman has not cited any example of his own. According to Stace and Jones there is no relationship between subject and object in the mystical experience. <173>

The other objection is irrelevant. It does not follow from the fact that there are elements in the subject‑object experience that are not describable that the mystical experience cannot be logically ineffable on the grounds that the experience is characterized by the transcendency of the subject‑object relationship.

(i) Finally, I am critical towards Stace's use of ontological assumptions when he explains why intuitive insight cannot be conceptualized. To be able to know the nature of reality, we need criteria to help us to decide whether something is real or not. Stace has not formulated any such criteria. As Peter Koestenbaum has so correctly pointed out, Stace has postulated that existence should be seen from only two different viewpoints. Why not one, or three? < 174> Moreover, Stace puts the cart before the horse. How can we decide whether the mystic experiences something real before we have been able to identify the mystical experience? Furthermore, the mystical experience is, according to Stace, logically ineffable, for which reason its identification is logically impossible.

To sum up: I have refuted parts of Stace's criticism of the theory. The introduction of the distinction between object‑ and metalanguage may prevent the theory from being inconsistent. The question is, however, whether the mystics use the expressions "experience", "ineffability" and 'beyond the subject-object relationship" in the way suggested by the theory. I have also dismissed parts of Gale's criticism. Gale assumes, but has not shown, that mystical sentences function descriptively. Nor has he shown that it is not possible for the mystical experience to be unique. Kaufman's arguments are not tenable either. Emotional experiences are not examples of experiences in which the subject-object relationship is transcended. It does not follow from the fact the subject-object experiences contain elements that are indescribable that mystical experiences cannot be logically ineffable. Finally, I have mentioned the problem of drawing conclusions about the nature of mystical experiences with ontological assumptions as a starting‑point.

3.10. Short Summary and Final Discussion

To be able to claim that it is possible to identify a mystical experience by scientific method Stace has to explain the mystics talk of the ineffability of the experience. If the mystical experience is, for instance, absolutely ineffable, it is logically and consequently scientifically impossible to identify it. In the previous chapter we also saw that ideas about the semantic functions of mystic, sentences were logically connected with the view on ineffability. If the mystical experience is absolutely ineffable, the mystical sentences cannot function descriptively, which implies that it is impossible to identify mystical experiences either logically or by a scientific method.

In this chapter I have given an account of and critically examined nine theories that claim to explain what the mystics mean when they say that the mystical experience is ineffable. Only two of them, that of Stace in his late period and that of Smart, senses (i) ‑ (iii), enable scientific identification of the mystical experience with regard to the problem of ineffability. Other theories, except the one on logical ineffability, do indeed admit that it is logically possible to identify mystical experiences, but it is impossible to identify properties of the mystical experience using a scientific method.

Stace in his later period claims that the mystical experience is ineffable during the course of the experience because it is characterized by undifferentiated unity. After the experience is over, the mystic can, however, contrast the properties of the mystical experience with those of perceptual experiences and can then correctly describe the mystical experience. The fact that the mystic speaks of ineffability is explained by the experience being paradoxical in character. The mystic thus concludes, falsely, that the experience is ineffable because it is paradoxical. According to Stace, it is evident from the utterances of the mystics that the experience is paradoxical. He also finds support for his theory in the fact that the mystic appears to be confused when he tries to describe the mystical experience.

Stace's theory is beset with many problems. Studies of mystical texts conducted by Almond, Berdie, Kvastad and Smart have shown that (a) many mystical texts do not contain paradoxes, (b) any paradoxes that exist could be pseudoparadoxes, (c) there are mystics who do not express themselves in paradoxes but who still assert that the mystical experience is ineffable. Carloye, Kennick and Wainwright also argue that if mystical sentences are contradictory, they are of necessity false. Descriptions of mystical experiences that are not regarded as following the laws of logic are not contradictory either but alogical, as Kennick has pointed out. Moreover, there are suggestions as to how the paradoxes may be solved. Within the Madhyamika school paradoxes are used, according to Matilal, for teaching purposes and not in descriptions of experiences. The fact that mystics attempt to find linguistic expressions for their mystical experiences also indicates, according to Matilal, that the experience is not characterized by paradoxicality. Corbenic has shown that two of the utterances that Stace cites in support of the idea that mystical paradoxes are descriptions of mystical experiences should not be interpreted in the way Stace suggests. Berdie's investigations have also shown that the mystics are not usually confused when describing their mystical experiences. Robertson has commented that many mystics have been good philosophers, for which reason it is unlikely that they should have any difficulty with language without knowing it. Many of them also explain what they mean by the concept of ineffability. Robertson also finds it hard to understand that the mystic, by recalling his experience later, can introduce multiplicity and distinctions into an experience that Stace claims is characterized by undifferentiated unity. The distinction between what takes place during and after the experience is there fore not a fruitful one, something that Matilal also took up.

Ninian Smart asserts that the word "ineffability" may be used in four different ways. First of all it can be used as a word of reinforcement to emphasize the intensity of bliss. Secondly, the mystic can use it to express that there is no content to describe. Thirdly, it is used to imply that words can never describe an experience completely. Finally, it can stand for the requirement that the receiver should have a specific disposition to be able to understand mystical language.

It is possible that the word "ineffability" may be used as a word of reinforce ment in mystical texts. Unfortunately, Smart has not mentioned any support for this by referring to mystical utterances. The same criticism may be directed towards the demand that the receiver should have a certain disposition to be able to understand mystical language. Neither has Smart shown that the mystical experience is without content. The claim that mystical experiences are ineffable because all experiences are to a certain extent ineffable is possible but not likely, as the mystics themselves believe that there is something specific to mystical experiences that makes them ineffable. Finally, Smart's theory is incomplete, as it cannot explain all the mystical utterances about ineffability. Smart's theory has, however, one merit, namely that it points out something that is of fundamental importance ‑ that the word "ineffable" can have different meanings in different linguistic contexts.

Paul Henle claims that the mystical experience is ineffable because the concepts available to the mystic cannot be used to describe a mystical experi ence. If this theory is true, mystical language ought to contain tautologies and paradoxes, which it in fact does, says Henle.

This theory is also problematic. Neither Henle nor anyone else has succee ded in indicating any support for the theory by referring to specific mystical texts. The theory has not succeeded in supplying a satisfactory explanation of the fact that mystics have not tried to form new concepts but describe experiences with the help of the system of concepts that is already available. Nor has the theory explained the occurrence of what appear to be positive words in mystical language. Finally, it is doubtful whether mystical language contains any genuine paradoxes.

The theory of non‑experiential ineffability states that the mystical experience is ineffable if one has not had a mystical experience of one's own. Objections may also be raised against this theory. The mystics do not use claim that other experiences than the mystical ones are ineffable. It is more likely that the problem consists in the fact that there is something specific to the mystical experience that makes people regard it as ineffable. Moreover the theory does not explain why the mystical experience is often ineffable by the mystic himself.

The theory of emotion states that mystical experience is characterized very subtle feelings and that subtle feelings are very difficult to describe. Therefore, the experience is said to be ineffable. Most mystics and researchers of mystical experience do, however, agree that the mystical experience is not or an experience of feeling.

Jerome D Frank suggests that the mystical experience is said to be ineffable because during its course the mystic primarily uses the right half of the brain which is not often used for linguistic activities. The only EEG investigation that has been done in this area (1987), however, show that the mystic does not primarily use the right half of the brain during the mystical experience. The ability to perform linguistic activities can also be trained in the right half of the brain, and this ought to have taken place if the mystic has had mystical experiences for a long period. But the experience is still regarded as ineffable to these mystics.

Richard Gale's suggestion for a solution implies that the mystic chooses no to conceptualize the properties of the mystical experience because he is afraid that the words may become a substitute for the experience itself.

Gale is inconsistent as he claims that mystical sentences function descriptively while at the same time asserting that the mystics do not describe their experiences because they are so valuable.

Prince and Savage maintain that the mystical experience is ineffable because it is preverbal and regressive. They claim support for its being regressive in (a) the fact that the mystic withdraws from the "world" in order to have mystical experiences, (b) neurophysiological investigations of yogis in samadhi showthat they cannot be disturbed by external sensory stimulation, something that also applies to infants in certain situations.

Kvastad has criticized the theory and argues that mystical experiences that belong to the preverbal stage can be described, as the mystic does not remain at this stage permanently. Nor can this theory provide the sole explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability. Prince and Savage's explanation of the cognition and bliss ascribed to the experience in terms of regression is unconvincing. An utterance from a mystic/psychologist also indicates that mystical and regressive experiences are not identical. The theory is also inconsistent in that it proceeds from certain characteristics of the mystical experiences, such as ecstasy, disso lution of the ego and fusion with all, while at the same time claiming that the experience is ineffable. If the experience is ineffable, then Prince and Savage's interpretation of its characteristics in terms of regression cannot be used in support of the theory.

The last theory, that of logical ineffability, is characterized by laying empha sis on the specific nature of the mystical experience. As the mystical experience is characterized by non‑duality while language is dualistic by nature, words cannot describe the mystical experience. The mystical experience cannot be comprehended by the intellect as the subject‑object relationship has been transcended. Thus words cannot stand for properties of an experience, nor can they be used to describe a mystical experience.

But there are difficulties in accepting this theory. It is questionable whether the mystics use the expressions "experience", "ineffable" and "beyond the subject‑object relationship" in the way the theory suggests. Furthermore, when defining the concept of mystical experience, Stace takes as his point of departure the idea that reality has some specific characteristics, a procedure that is difficult to defend.

In the final discussion in Chapter 2, it was made clear that to accept the idea that it is logically possible that mystical sentences to function descriptively one has to assume that the explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability put forward by Stace in his later period is preferable to theories that, for instance, state that the mystical experience is logically ineffable. One of the tasks in this chapter is therefore to determine which theory is preferable, so as to be able to decide whether Stace has shown that it is possible to identify mystical experi ence by a scientific method. An evaluation of Stace's and others explanations of the phenomenon of ineffability means that I, too, can decide whether Stace has shown that it is possible to use a scientific method to identify mystical experiences with regard to the phenomenon of ineffability.

Which theory should we prefer? That question is, unfortunately, not easy to answer. It is quite clear that the theory put forward by Stace in his later period is not probable and cannot constitute a general explanation of the phenome non of ineffability. Nor can the theory of emotion or the theory of non experiential ineffability claim to be complete. As far as the other theories are concerned, there is no reliable support in the form of utterances from mystics, etc. It is therefore difficult to choose among these theories. All of them are problematic. I have not been able to find any decisive argument either for one of them or against all of them except one. My suggestion as to a solution is therefore as follows. The theory of Stace in his later period can certainly not claim to be complete, but it is both logically and actually possible to find mystics who use the expression "ineffable" in the way Stace states. The same may be said of several other theories. It is unlikely that the mystical experience is without content, as Smart claims. But the four meanings of the expression "ineffability" that he recommends are both logically and actually possible. I do not think that any decisive argument has been produced against Henle's theory either. His theory is logically possible. There may be mystics who use the expression "ineffable" in Henle's sense. The theory of non‑experiential ineffability cannot claim to be complete. But in the criticism of the theory only one counter‑example was mentioned. As we have seen, there are mystics who use the expression "ineffable" in the way the theory recommends. The same arguments can be put forward regarding the theory of emotion, Gale's theory, Frank's, Prince and Savage's and Stace's/Jones's theories. Gale is inconsistent, to be sure, in claiming that mystical sentences function descriptively while asserting at the same time that the mystics do not conceptualize their experiences, but Gale's theory on the phenomenon of ineffability is not in itself inconsistent but represents a possible alternative. It is also possible that the mystic is incapable of determining the nature of the experience because it has primarily occurred through his using the right half of his brain or because the experience is preverbal.

It is obvious from the above argument that it is not always fruitful to confront the nine theories with each other. <175> They do not exclude each other logically. All may be adequate provided that they do not claim to be complete. It is possible that a specific mystic uses the word "ineffable" in different ways in different contexts and that different mystics use the same word in different ways. By the word "ineffable" one mystic may be expressing the idea that the mystical experience is conceptually ineffable, another that the receiver must have his own experiences to understand the word, a third expresses the intensity of bliss, etc. That this can be the case is shown by the fact that none of the philosophers presented in this chapter has used the same mystical utterance in support of his theory.

It is my opinion that to be able to decide which of the meanings (one or more) of the expression "ineffable" are used by each mystic it is necessary to analyse the utterances of the mystics in detail. Contrary to most researchers, I believe that by studying texts in this way we can in many cases decide how the mystics use the word "ineffable". The theory of Frank and, to a certain extent, that of Prince and Savage are exceptions, it is true. To be able to determine whether Frank's theory is applicable, we would have to perform EEG examinations of the mystic in question. Here it is not sufficient to analyse the mystic's utterances. If we wish to test Prince and Savage's theory, it would often be necessary to study the mystic more thoroughly than by just analysing his mystical utterances, but the latter may in some cases serve as a guide. < 176> If when analysing a specific linguistic context we see that one of the other theories can be applied to the utterance in question, we can conclude that Frank's and Prince and Savage's theories cannot be applied in this case.

At the end of Chapter 2 I discussed the logical relationship between the view of the semantic functions of mystical sentences, on the one hand, and the view of the phenomenon of ineffability, on the other. I then preliminarily recommended Stace's later theory, which implies that the view of the phenomenon of ineffability should be logically governed by the result that has been reached after studying the semantic functions of mystical sentences. This method presupposes, however, that Stace's solution or, as we have seen, Smart's theory, senses (i) ‑ (iii), are to be preferred to other alternatives. My analysis has led, however, to my being unable to recommend either Stace or Smart's solutions in preference to others. It is logically, and actually, possible that the mystical experience is ineffable in other senses that those that have been suggested by Stace/Smart. But if the expression "ineffable" is used according, for instance, to the theory of conceptual ineffability, this means that Stace is mistaken when he says that mystical sentences function descriptively. Stace's method does not take into account that such a situation can arise, and is therefore in my opinion unfruitful. Organ's method and that of Stace in his intermediate period can result, as we have seen, in our running the risk of not discovering that mystical sentences actually do function descriptively. But Stace's later method is not a better alternative. It can lead us to interpret mystical sentences as functioning descriptively even though they should not be interpreted in that way, as the mystic in question does not use the word "ineffable" in the way that Stace/Smart claim. I would therefore like to suggest a third method, which I believe can solve the problem that has arisen. The view of the phenomenon of ineffability should not be logically governed by the view of the semantic functions of mystical sentences, nor vice‑versa either. Both problems should have the same logical status. I would still like to recommend that an analysis of mystical texts should begin by our trying to determine the actual semantic functions of the mystical sentences. The reason why our analysis should begin in this way is naturally that the mystic can in fact use language in a way that he himself is not aware of, something that would not come to light if we took the mystic's statement concerning his use of language as authoritative. But an analysis of the functions of the sentences is not sufficient to enable us finally to decide whether they function in a specific way. We must also take account of the fact that the mystic explicitly expresses, or implicitly assumes, a specific linguistic theory, for instance, that the mystic experience is ineffable, that mystical sentences have x function, or that mystical words refer to properties of the experience. A theory about the possible descriptive function of mystical sentences should therefore both be in accordance with how the mystical sentences actually function in a specific linguistic context and contain an explanation of the phenomenon of ineffability that is supported in the linguistic context or at least is not contradicted by that context. Only with this type of method can we, in my opinion, claim to have analysed the semantic functions of mystical sentences in an adequate way.

Even though Stace's theories regarding function and ineffability have been shown to be possible alternatives, Stace has not yet shown that the mystics do in fact primarily use the sentences descriptively or use the expression "ineffable" in the way he suggests. He has, however, tried to show this by analysing mystical utterances. With the help of the method recommended here, my next task is to determine whether Stace is right when he asserts that there are mystical sentences that function descriptively and that the word "ineffable" is used in the way he claims by analysing the mystical texts that he cites in support of his theory. On the basis of the result of this analysis, I shall then decide whether Stace has solved the problem of function and ineffability in a way that will enable us to use a scientific method to identify mystical experiences.

Notes

1. See Berdie 1979, p 36, Garside 1972, pp 96‑98, Kellenberger 1979 and Stace 1960a, pp 281. 284, 295‑306.
2. R T Blackwood has discussed whether there is any logical relationship between the ineffability of the mystical experience and so called 'negative theology'. The mystical word “ineffable” would in this case imply that every proposition about the mystical experience is false. As Blackwood dismisses such an interpretation of the phenomenon of ineffability I have chosen not to deal with Blackwood's ideas. (See Blackwood 1963, pp 203‑205) Also I have chosen no to discuss the ideas of Lawrence J Hatab. Hatab's thoughts presuppose a theory of meaning in terms of use and not, as I do, a referential theory. See Hatab 1982.
3. B K Matilal, it is true, asserts that William James is a representative of such a theory. But as we shall see, James is a representative of the theory of non‑experiential ineffability. See Matilal 1975, p 220.
4. Stace 1960a, p 297
5. Stace 1960a, pp 297‑298
6. According to Walter Norman Pahnke, Evelyn Underhill and D T Suzuki implicitly adopt thesis (iii). But Underhill says nothing about the mystical experience being ineffable because the content is characterized by paradoxicality. See Underhill 1911, pp 331‑332 which in Pahnke 1964, pp 71‑73 is given as evidence.
7. This idea is in accordance with his reductionistic theory of cognition, a theory which I have given an account of earlier. The idea that the 'pure' experience is impossible to distinguish psychologically, which Stace asserts earlier in the same work does not appear to be of any concern to Stace a hundred pages later. See Stace 1960a, p 31.
8. Stace 1960a, pp 304‑306
9. Stace 1960a, p 267. During the early period Stace already has the same opinion about the relationship between the truth of a sentence and the meaning of it. See Stace 1944, p 236,
10. Stace 1960a, p 253.
11. Ibid
12. Stace 1960a, p 65
13. Quoted in Stace 1960a, p 63. Stace took this quotation from Otto 1932, p 61. Otto for his part collected the quotation from Keiffer 1924. However, Otto has not given any exact reference to a page. Therefore I cannot check it and examine its linguistic context.
14. Stace 1960a, pp 264‑265
15. Stace 1960a, p 305
16. Stace 1960a, pp 305‑306
17. Berdie 1979, p 61. As will be seen in chapter four, the Upanishads have several authors. To find utterances about ineffability in one upanishad and paradoxical utterances in another therefore does not provide any support for Stace's theory. However it is not clear whether this is what Berdie actually means.
18. Berdie 1979, pp 65, 68‑69
19. Weiffer 1924, p 106. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 68.
20. Kelley 1977, p 101. Referred to in Berdie 1979, p 68.
21. Kvastad 1980, pp 149‑150. See also Almond 1982, pp 189‑190, chapter 4, note 6. Almond refers to Schürmann 1978, pp 114‑121. I will discuss paradoxes in Eckhart's works in 4.2.2.
22. Berdie 1979, pp 72‑74
23. Berdie 1979, p 73
24. Smart 1963, p 187 and Smart 1962, p 22. See also Almond 1982, pp 76‑78. Almond finds the origin of Stace's interpretation in his naturalistic presupposition. See Almond 1982, p 78. According to Berdie, Stace does not deal with paradoxes that occur in the extrovertive mystical experience. Berdie accuses Stace of not being complete (Berdie 1979, p 17). However, Berdie is wrong. Stace explicitly includes the extrovertive mystical experience too when dealing with mystical paradoxes. See Stace 1960a, pp 253,302. Berdie also argues that Stace has not sufficiently distinguished between paradoxes in introvertive and extrovertive mystical experiences. According to Berdie's interpretation of Stace, there seems to be no difference between paradoxes in the extrovertive and the introvertive mystical experiences, although the latter, unlike the former, includes the cognition of both time and space (Berdie 1979, p 23). However, Stace has explicitly made such a distinction. The so called 'pantheistic' paradox is one example of a paradox only to be found in the extrovertive mystical experience (Stace 1960a, p 253). When Berdie asserts that “Stace's failure to explore this issue in more detail is a serious shortcoming of his work”, he is wrong (Berdie 1979, p 23).
25. According to Philip C Almond, who refers to Suzuki 1907, pp 243‑276 (Almond 1982, p 189, note 6). However, in this chapter Suzuki does not assert that the paradox has been solved. On the contrary, he states that it has not been solved. See Suzuki 1907, p 266.
26. See Lossky 1957, pp 74, 86‑87 and Almond 1982, p 76
27. Blakney 1941, p 62. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 100
28. Berdie 1979, p 92
29. Cloud of Unknowing 1973, p 113. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 170, note 15. Henson also thinks that the mystics themselves do not consider their mystical experiences to be paradoxical (Henson 1972, pp 98,101).
30. According to R T Blackwood there exist several mystical traditions which make use of a logic which does not include the law of the excluded middle. Blackwood mentions the Syadvada tradition within Jainism (Blackwood 1963, pp 207‑208).
31. Corbenic 1978, pp 313‑314
32. Suzuki 1957, p 56. Quoted in Stace 1960a, p 269 and in Corbenic 1978, p 314.
33. Corbenic 1978, p 314
34. Corbenic 1978, p 296
35. Corbenic 1978, pp 381‑382
36. Corbenic 1978, pp 286‑287,292
37. Corbenic 1978, pp 363‑365
38. Corbenic 1978, p 286
39. Stace 1960a, pp 260‑262
40. According to B K Matilal, Stace's arguments are circular. Stace has defined 'logical rules' as rules which are applicable only to a world with at least two items. As the mystical experience is not characterized by multiplicity, logical rules are not applicable to the mystical experience. According to Matilal this is the same as stating that logic is logic and a mystical experience is a mystical experience because logic is logic and a mystical experience is a mystical experience. However, where the circularity should be in this I fail to understand. Does Matilal imply that the rules of logic are applicable to a world containing only one item? If this is the case, I cannot see how. See Matilal 1975, pp 239‑240.
41. In Wainwright 1970, p 150 Wainwright expresses himself more carefully. He writes that the mystic 'at most' has access to a reality that lies behind our world. But Stace cannot accept Wainwright's position in this matter, irrespective of how he expresses it. Stace thinks that the mystic encounters a reality that completely transcends our world during the mystical experience. However, much criticism has been directed against Stace's view. Furthermore, we cannot settle the question concerning the epistemological status of mystical experiences before we have settled whether this experience can be identified, as Stace's epistemological ideas are based on his theory that most mystical experiences have similar properties.
42. Monism is the theory that claims that all that is real is the undifferentiated Unity. See Wainwright 1981, p 150 and ‑Stace 1960a, pp 237‑240.
43. Wainwright 1981, pp 150‑151
44. Wainwright 1981, pp 151‑152
45. Wainwright 1981, pp 152‑153
46. Stace 1960a, pp 273‑274. Quoted in Wainwright 1981, p 188, note 22
47. Wainwright 1981, p 188, note 22
48. Stace 1960a, p 274
49. Wainwright 1981, p 154 and pp 187‑188, note 20
50. Kennick 1962, p 389
51. Carloye 1980, p 5. H D Lewis has also criticazed Stace's views on what constitutes a meaningful sentence. Lewis claims that it is the connective 'and' which make a sentence meaningless as it contains propositions that contradict each other. See Lewis 1965, p 209.
52. See also Staal 1975, p 37.
53. Carloye 1980, p 5
54. Matilal 1975, p 240
55. Moore 1978, p 103
56. Moore 1978, pp 106‑107
57. Charles W Morris agrees with Stace that the mystical experience is paradoxical in nature but for other reasons. However, as Morris has adopted a behavioural theory of meaning while my discussions are based on a referential theory, I have chosen not to deal with Morris theory See Morris 1957, and in this study, Chapter 1, note 1.
58. Streng 1978, p 159. See also Watkins 1920, pp 30‑31.
59. Kvastad has adopted those four theories which try to explain mystical paradoxes and which are dismissed by Stace. However, Kvastad has not shown that the arguments against these theories put forward by Stace are untenable. See Kvastad 1980, pp 149‑150.
60. Kvastad 1980, p 151
61. Kvastad 1980, p 154. See also Galloway 1970 p 152, Horne 1978, p 122 and Suzuki 1927, p 266.
62. Kvastad 1980, p 148
63. I have chosen not to give an account of the kind of argument that demands a closer analysis of utterances of specific mystics. See Almond 1982, pp 78‑79, Corbenic 1978, pp 237‑249, 295 302, Trethowan 1971, p 233 and Wainwright 1981, pp 1~8‑149. For a discussion of mystic paradoxes which does not explicitly mention Stace's theory, see Guerry 1978, pp 11 ‑12, Jones 1979, pp 264‑268 and Kvastad 1980, pp 138‑140,151‑152.
64. Matilal 1975, p 227
65. Mackenna 1969, p 399. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 96.
66. Mackenna 1969, p 411. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 96.
67. Blakney 1941, p 81. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 96.
68. Peers 1962, p 42. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 96.
69. Robertson 1962, p 181
70. Smart has not explicitly tried to define the concept of mystical experience but he has indicated several properties that often characterizes this experience. These are that the experience is characterized by ineffable bliss, by being beyond the world, by non‑ duality, by emptiness, by a meeting of something of a personal nature, by being beyond sensory perception, by being void of thought, by being beyond the relationship between subject and object, by being imageless, by being attained after a long period of meditation and, finally, by giving rise to a new world‑view. As typical mystics Smart mentions Saint John of the Cross, Johannes Tauler, Meister Eckhart, al‑Halliij, Sankara, Buddha, Bodhidarma, Jakob Boehme, Lao‑Tsu and sufis/yogis. Smart excludes experiences of the prophets and bhakti experiences from the class of mystical experiences. Smart here mentions the following examples: Martin Luther, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Muhammed, Ramanuja, Nichiren, Jean Calvin and John Wesley (Smart 1965, p 75, Smart 1966, p 107, Smart 1967, p 133, Smart 1971, pp 55‑56, Smart 1976, p 39. Smart 1981, p 109. Smart 1984, p 21).
71. Smart 1971, s 70. See also Smart 1956, pp 599‑600, Smart 1968, p 137, Smart 1972b, pp 28‑29 and Smart 1983, pp 120‑121,124. See also Mehta 1978, p 68.
72. Smart 1971, pp 70‑71
73. Chapter 1 of Teresa's El Castillo Interior. Smart doesn't say whether he has translated the Spanish text himself or not. Smart also refers to Samyutta Nik, iv, p 268. Here the ecstasy is spoken of as animitta, i e free from mental images (Smart 1971, p 70).
74. Smart 1971, p 71. See also Smart 1972b, p 29 and Smart 1983, pp 118‑121,123.
75. Smart 1978, p 18. See also Bernhart 1977, pp 77‑78 and Kaufmann 1958, p 227.
76. Smart 1978, p 19
77. See also chapter 1, note 1
78. Kessler&Prigge 1982, pp 44‑48
79. Eckhart's sermon number 22. Kessler&Prigge refer to the translation in Stace 1960b, p 156, which is taken from Blakney 1941, pp 200‑201 and quoted in Kessler & Prigge 1982, p 48.
80. Bharati 1976, p 48. Quoted in Kessler&Prigge 1982, p 48.
81. Kessler&Prigge 1982, p 51
82. Wainwright 1981, p 121. See also Horne 1978, pp 128‑135.
83. Suzuki 1927, p 229
84. See Norrman 1982, pp 19‑60 for criticism of the reductionistic theory of cognition.
85. Kessler&Prigge 1982, p 48
86. Smart 1971, pp 67‑70
87. Brown 1903. p 20
88. Walter Kaufmann has questioned whether mystics usually claim that there is something specific about the ineffability of the mystical experience (Kaufmann 1958, p 229). However, in the utterances I have analysed in chapter four I have found support for my assertion (see 2.3 and 4.2.4).
89. As mentioned earlier also Galen Pletcher is of the same opinion as Henle. See Pletcher 1973, pp 205‑206. Also Stanislav Grof and Charles T Tart seem to be open for this kind of reasoning. See Grof 1976, p 203 and Tart 1975 , p 224.
90. Henle 1949, pp 416‑418
91. Henle 1949, p 418
92. Henle 1949, p 417
93. Henle 1949, pp 418‑419
94. Henle 1949, p 419
95. Henle 1949, pp 419‑420
96. Henle 1949, p 419
97. Arthur E Murphy argues that we cannot use the word 'proposition' about something what cannot be formulated in a language. Murphy has therefore suggested the expression 'candidate for a proposition', and Henle has accepted this modification. A candidate for a proposition is a potential proposition which, if there were concepts available, would state properties about X (Henle 1949, p 422).
98. Henle 1949, pp 420‑421
99. Ennead V1,chapter 9, section 10. Pletcher has taken the quotation from Stace 1960b, p 1 Stace has for his part taken the quotation from the awkward translation in Inge 1918, vol 11 140. Quoted in Pletcher 1973, p 209.
100. Pletcher 1973, p 209
101. Huxley 1977, p 20. Quoted in Pletcher 1973, p 210.
102. Pletcher 1973, p 210
103. Hopkins 1980, p 111. Quoted in Berdie 1979, p 164, note 13. Berdie has not quoted Hopkins entirely correctly.
104. Henle 1949, pp 421‑422
105. Jones 1979, p 265
106. Jones 1979, p 266
107. James 1979, p 367, Ducasse 1962, p 325, Brightman 1946, p 168. See also Gale 1970, p 31 Kellenberger 1979, pp 308‑309, Stace 1952a, pp 35‑36 and Stace 1960a, p 283.
108. See chapter 1, note 1
109. Stace 1960a, pp 283‑284. See also Stace 1952a, pp 36‑39.
110. Stace 1960a, p 284
111. Brown 1903, p 20. Quoted in Stace 1960a, p 91, 284.
112. Peers 1957a, vol II, p 131
113. Stace 1960a, pp 281‑282
114. Stace 1960a, p 282
115. Stace 1960a, p 54 and in part in Stace 1960a, p 282. Stace has taken this quotation from 0 1976, p.92, but has not transcribed it fully correctly. Otto for his part refers to translations Weiffer, Büttner and Lehmann. A more detailed reference is missing.
116. Stace 1960a, p 282
117. Matilal 1975, pp 221,223
118. Stace 1960a, pp 282‑283
119. Matilal 1975, p 227
120. Frank 1975, p 39
121. See Gazzaniga 1974, pp 90‑97 and Bogen 1974, pp 107‑108
122. See e g Ornstein 1977, pp 20‑21.
123. Westcott 1977
124. Gazzaniga 1974, p 95
125. Ornstein 1977, p 21
126. Gale 1970, p 305
127. Gale 1970, p 302
128. Gale 1970, p 305
129. Prince & Savage 1972, p 127
130. Prince & Savage 1972, pp 115,128
131. Prince & Savage 1972, pp 127‑128.
132. Prince & Savage 1972, p 128. See also Deikman 1974, p 76 and Deikman 1981, p 257.
133. Scott 1954, pp 43‑44. Quoted in Prince & Savage 1972, p 128.
134. Prince & Savage 1972, pp 128‑129
135. Prince & Savage 1972, pp 129‑131
136. Prince & Savage 1972, pp 123,131
137. Prince & Savage 1972, p 122
138. Kvastad 1980, 81
139. Kvastad 1980, pp 81‑82
140. Kvastad 1980, p 82
141. Kvastad 1980, p 83‑84
142. Kvastad 1980, pp 84‑85
143. Fenwick 1977, pp 115‑116
144. Pinard 1966, p 13. Quoted in Kvastad 1980, p 85.
145. Kvastad 1980, p 85
146. Russell Wood Galloway also has the same opinion on this matter. See Galloway 1970, pp 147148.
147. Stace 1952a, pp 40,75‑77
148. Stace 1952c, p 27
149. Jones 1979, p 257
150. Stace 1952a, pp 21‑23,40‑41. See also Stace 1949‑1950, pp 37‑38.
151. Jones 1979, pp 257,259
152. Maitri upanishad, VI 7. Quoted in Jones 1979, p 257. Here Jones uses the translation by Radhakrishnan (Radhakrishnan 1953, p 821).
153. Stace 1952a, p 40
154. Stace 1952a, pp 39‑40
155. Stace 1952a, p 33
156. Stace 1952c, p 27. See also Stace 1949‑1950, p 25.
157. Stace 1952a, p 39. See also Stace 1949‑1950, p 25.
158. Jones 1979, pp 257‑258,260
159. Jones 1979, pp 258‑259
160. Ibid
161. Jones 1979, pp 259‑261
162. Stace 1952a, p 39
163. Stace 1960a, p 294
164. Stace 1960a, pp 290‑291,294. See also Yandell 1975, pp 172‑173.
165. Stace 1952a, pp 70‑71
166. Gale 1970, pp 303‑304
167. Gale 1970, p 304
168. Ibid
169. Gale. 1970, pp 303
170. Gale 1970, pp 302‑303
171. Gale 1970, p 304. Stace's assertion concerning the common core of mystical experiences is to be found in Stace 1949‑1950, p 24 and in Stace 1955, pp 10‑11.
172. Kaufmann 1958, p 227. See also Jones 1909, p 76.
173. See also Appleby 1980, pp 149‑154
174. Koestenbaum 1958, p 341
175. That there could be several reasons for claiming that the mystical experience is ineffable has also been pointed out by B K Matilal (Matilal 1975, p 221).
176. Kvastad has suggested that Prince & Savage's theory could be tested by means of hypnotism. The mystic could be hypnotized to reexperience their lives as infants and afterwards be encouraged to compare these experiences with the mystical ones (Kvastad 1980, p 84)