The Problem

One of the problems that Stace had to solve to enable the identification of mystical experiences by a scientific method was the problem of meaning. In this chapter I shall deal with the meaning of words/sentences in general and the meaning of mystical words/sentences in particular. Very briefly, the problem can be expressed as follows: We are all capable of constructing and understanding sentences that we have never come across before. It is not sufficient to refer to grammatical rules with whose help we construct the sentences to explain this process. What significance is there in the fact that a sequence of signs has a meaning? What makes one combination of signs/characters meaningful and another not?

The problem of meaning is one that has been discussed throughout the history of philosophy. One solution proposed has been that words stand for ideas in the sender's consciousness, another is that meaning should be analysed in terms of stimulus/response. A later Wittgensteinian may claim that meaning consists in the use of words and sentences in the language. Finally, philosophers have asserted that words refer to, point out, something in "the world". Stace has chosen the last theory. According to this theory, there exists a relationship between linguistic expressions and experiences. In this theory the words stand for properties of the experience, for instance, describe properties of the mystical experience. It is therefore possible to identify a mystical experience by a scientific method.


Material

The material in this problem area is, to say the least, scanty. It is limited to two articles, one by Ronald Burr and the other by Robert Hoffmann, both of whom recommend a theory of meaning that is inspired by the later Wittgensteinian school, applied to mystical language. Neither Burr nor Hoffman, however, have explicitly discussed the problem of identification. Consequently, one of the tasks in this chapter is to explain the implications of accepting Burr's/ Hoffman's theories as far as the main problem is concerned. Acceptance of a theory of use does not logically enable an identification of mystical experiences, and hence precludes the use of a scientific method. No theory exists today that explains the meaning of mystical words/sentences in such a way that identification is logically or scientifically possible. I do not wish to content myself with just stating the fact, however. Even if Stace has not explicitly dealt with the meaning of mystical words/sentences, he implicitly assumes a s.c. referential theory of meaning, a theory that has many supporters. As Stace claims that identification of mystical experiences can be performed scientifically, I believe that it is appropriate to attempt to reconstruct Stace's theory of meaning and to suggest an application to mystical language. Owing to the fact that Stace's view of mystical language altered over the years, I shall present three different applications of the theory.


Analytical Apparatus

To be able to reconstruct Stace's referential theory of meaning and to be able to elucidate the ideas of Burr and Hoffman, I shall use the apparatus of concepts that William P Alston presented in his classic work Philosophy of Language (1964) <1>. 1 should have preferred Alston to be more precise in his presentation of the said theory of meaning by analysing the characteristic properties in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions instead of stating what he calls "basic features". In addition, Alston's characterization of the referential theory is rather uncomplicated. I believe, however, that Alston's apparatus of concepts is sufficiently exact for the purposes of my investigation.

To clarify what Wittgenstein meant by his criticism of private language, I shall also make use of Norman Malcolm's Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1954).

I have taken the liberty of using only those concepts in the above works that are relevant to the discussion of the main problem.

To be able to clarify Stace's view of mystical language, it is necessary to use the concept private language, as Stace's theory of meaning is based on the possibility of constructing such a language. By the term private language, 1 shall mean the following:

I. P has an experience, PEI, at the time t1.
II. PE1 is introspectively distinguishable to P at t1.
III. At t1 P connects PE1 with W, which is a name for PE1
IV. P has an experience, PE2, at t1 + 2
V. PE2 is introspectively distinguishable to P at t1+ 2.
VI. P remembers PE1 at t1 + 3
VII.At t1 + 4 P compares PE2 with the memory of PE1, PE3.
VIII. At t1 + 5 P discovers that PE3 and PE2 are similar to each other.
IX. At t1 + 6 P draws the conclusion that, on the basis of the comparison between PE3 and PE2, it is also correct to designate PE2 as W.
X. In the situation L at t 1 + 7 P utters S, which contains W, which is a name for PE3 and PE2.


Procedure

The presentation of the theory in question will be performed in the same way. After describing, in the form of theses, what characterizes the theory as Alston presented it, I shall outline a suggestion as to the application of the theory to mystical language. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of this application for the problem of identification. The presentation ends with a critical examination of the theory.

After dealing with the two theories of meaning, I shall discuss the results I have reached and their significance with regard to the main problem.

1.1.1 Characteristic Properties of a Referential Theory

(i) The person P utters sentence S, which contains the words W1… Wn.

(ii) The meaning of W consists in either (a) referring to a referent, E, or (b) referring to a relationship between W and E. <2>

The expression "refer" alludes to the fact that W stands for, points out or designates something extralinguistic. The word "Fido" stands, for instance, for the dog Fido in the "world". Meaning here is identical with the referent, i.e. identical with that which is pointed out, and constitutes what Alston calls a "naive" version of the referential theory. A problem with the naive version, according to Alston, is that two words with different meanings cannot point to the same referent. <3> The expressions "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" have different meanings but have the same referent, namely, the planet Venus.

To circumvent this problem Alston presents what he calls a more "sophisticated" version of the theory. In this version, words refer to a relationship between W and E. <4> What this relationship consists in is, however, unclear, says Alston. So much is clear, however, that W is used in S to indicate to the receiver that W is about E. <5>

Proper names, abstract nouns, expressions in which a concrete noun is combined with a definite/indefinite article or a demonstrative pronoun and concrete nouns in the plural are examples of words/expressions that have referents in the more sophisticated version of the referential theory. <6>

(iii) The person Q understands W when Q realises that W is referring to E.

This is an implicative interpretation of Alston's argument and has been included because of its relevance to the discussion of the main problem.

(iv) P and Q are making use of a private language. <7>


1. 1. 2. The Referential Theory of Walter T Stace

With Alston's and my own apparatus of concepts as a point of departure, including my definition of the concept of private language, a reconstruction of Stace's referential theory may appear as follows:

(i) P has PE1 at t1.
(ii) PE1 is introspectively distinguishable to P at t1. <8>
(iii) At ti + 1 P associates PE1 with W, which is a name for PE1,

Stace's central thesis is that meaning is connected with people's experiences. He writes:

“All verbal expressions, whether they consist in single terms or in complete sentences, must if they are to possess cognitive meaning or significance, either refer to some specific but unanalysable experiential datum, or be amenable to a process of analysis the end terms of which will be such experiential data.” <9>

Stace does not accept thesis (iv), however. According to him, a concept first arises when several experiences show the same "structural" properties (see below). That W is not a name for PE1 deviates, it is true, from my way of defining the concept of private language, but this difference does not imply that Stace did not assume the possibility of such a language. W still stands, as we shall see, for something private, namely the structural similarity between experiences.

(iv) P has PE2 at tl + 2
(v) PE2 is introspectively distinguishable to P at tl + 2
(vi) P remembers PE1 at tl + 3
(vii) P compares PE2 at tl + 4 with the memory of PEI, PE3
(viii) At tl + 5 P discovers that PE3 and PE2 have the same structure.
(ix) At tl + 6 on the basis of the comparison between PE3 and PE2, P draws the conclusion that the structural identity should be called W.

For Stace each concept is a structure that consists in a system of relationships between an actual experience, on the one hand, and my earlier experiences, on the other. To one person, the concept green, for instance, can be the relationship that exists between an experience in the present of a green book and an earlier experience of something green, for instance, grass. One of the typical relationships is the similarity between both these experiences. <10>

(x) In the situation L at tl + 7 P utters S, which contains W, which is a name for the structural identity between PE3 and PE2.

I shall now introduce Alston's clarification of the nature of a referential theory. The result is as follows:

(xi) The meaning of W consists in referring to identical structural properties for PE3 and PE2. <11>
(xii) Q has at (tl + 7)‑n had PE, whose structural properties are identical with those of PE2
(xiii) Q understands W, which is uttered by P at tl + 71 if W refers to PE

The only thing required in order for Q to understand W, which is about an experience of P, is that Q's experiences should have the same structure as P's experiences. If Q has had an earlier experience, QE, of, for instance, green grass, then Q understands the expression "green", even if Q's experience would perhaps have been called "toothache" by P if P could have experienced what Q had experienced. There is thus a relationship based on similarity between an experience of an object and the concept green in both P's and Q's experiences. The structure of their experiences is the same, but the content in them may differ. Consequently, the content of the experience is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept. <12>

Henceforth I shall call this version of the referential theory Stace's "structural theory".


1. 1. 3. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Language Based on Stace's View in His Early Period

With the help of Alston's, Stace's and my own analytical apparatus, I shall present an implicative interpretation of Stace's earlier view of the meaning of mystical words/sentences.

(j) The mystic M has a mystical experience, ME1, at tl.

Unfortunately, Stace does not give any explicit definition of the concept of mystical experience during his earlier period. <13> I therefore take my own definition, presented in the Introduction, as the point of departure.

(jj) MEI is not introspectively distinguishable to M at ti.

MEI cannot be regarded introspectively, as the relationship between subject and object, which is assumed to function in the normal way in introspection, is suspended.

(jjj) ME1 is retrospectively indistinguishable to M at ti + 1

To be able to connect a mystical experience with a concept, an experience that can be distinguished in some way is required. If this cannot take place introspectively, it can do so retrospectively.

(jv) M has ME2 at tl + 2,
(v) ME2 is extrospectively distinguishable at t1 + 3
(vj) At tl + 4 M compares ME2 with the memory of MEI, ME 3
(vjj) At tl + 5 M discovers that ME2 and ME3 have the same structure.
(vjjj) On the basis of the comparison between ME2 and ME31 M draws the conclusion at tl + 6 that ME2 and ME3 should be called W.
(jx) At tl + 7 in L M utters S, which contains W, which is a name for the structural identity between ME2 and ME3.

Meister Eckhart, the mystic, writes:
In this way the soul enters into the unity of the Holy Trinity but it may become even more blessed by going further, to the barren Godhead, of which the Trinity is a revelation. In this barren Godhead activity has ceased and therefore the soul will be most perfect when it is thrown into the desert of the Godhead, where both activity and forms are no more, so that it is sunk and lost in this desert where its identity is destroyed. . . <14>

Every word in the sentences above would, according to Stace's theory, be a name of the structural identity between an earlier experience and that that is described in the present quotation. It is possible here, bearing in mind how Stace interpreted the expression "unity" in his later period, that "unity" here is a name for two mystical experiences whose structural properties are identical.

(x) The meaning of W consists in referring to the identical structural properties of ME2 and ME3.

The meaning of the mystical word "unity", to link up with the example above, should thus consist in the word's reference to, for instance, the similarity between two or more mystical experiences.

In traditional empiricism, as that of Locke and Hume, for instance, and in logical empiricism, experience is always the same as sensory perception. Stace is against this conception. He is open to the possibility of there being other types of experience, for instance, mystical ones, which can be linked to linguistic expressions:

No doubt mystics do frequently give utterance to combinations of words which must be regarded, on any strict theory of meaning, as not possessing it. But it does not follow that the claim to mystical experience is as such meaningless. Such a view must depend, once more, upon the dogmatic denial that nonsensous experience is possible. But the mere fact that the content of that experience is alleged to be supersensous does not make it meaningless. <15>

(xj) Q has, at (tl + 7)‑n, had QE4 whose structural properties are identical with those of ME2.
(xjj) Q understands W, which is uttered by M at tl + 71 if W refers to QE4.

Applied to the example cited earlier, the word "unity" thus has a meaning for Q if Q, when Q reads W, connects W with the relationship between experience of unity in present time and past time.

Stace's argument has hitherto implied that mystical words/sentences refer to identical structural properties between QE4 and ME2. It seems, however, that Stace cannot be interpreted in that way, as he writes:

... the mystic finds difficulty in making himself intelligible to the masses of men. He can probably communicate his experience ... to the few who are like himself. The same might be said of the artist. < 16>

Here Stace denies that Q did not need to have had a mystical experience. But mystics often use words that are included in non‑mystical language. That Q nevertheless is said not to understand, for instance, the word "unity" when it is used by a mystic means that Stace is either inconsistent or that he had made an exception for mystical experiences. Stace does not, however, mention anything about possible exceptions in his presentation.


1. 1. 4. Implications for the Problem of Identification

It is impossible to know what experience is connected with a concept as far as one person is concerned, because, according to Stace, the content of the experience is irrelevant to the meaning of the concept. The meaning of a concept does not consist in referring to content‑related properties of experiences that are identical/similar to all people but consists in referring to identical structural properties of at least two experiences that have been compared by the sender/receiver. To identify a mystical experience is therefore not logically possible, and therefore not possible using a scientific method, even if the scientist should happen to be a mystic.


1.1.5. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Langu age Based on Stace's View in His Intermediate Period

(j) M has ME at ti.
(jj) ME is not introspectively distinguishable to M at ti

See comments under 1. 1. 3 , point (jj). Stace does not give any explicit defini tion of the concept of mystical experience during the intermediate period, as he thinks that the mystical experience is absolutely ineffable (see below).

(jjj) ME is extrospectively distinguishable to M at ti + 1
(jv) ME cannot be described.

According to Stace, mystics claim that the mystical experience is ineffable. Stace interprets the mystic's talk of ineffability in absolute terms and writes:

The precise meaning of the statement that mystic experience is ineffable is that it is absolutely incapable of being conceptualized. In this meaning of the word, sense‑experi ence is not ineffable at all. It can be quite easily conceptualized, and in consequence named. We have concepts of, and therefore names for, colour experiences, scents, sounds, material things. But mystic experience is claimed to be such that no concepts whatever can be formed of it, and therefore it cannot be expressed in words, either in regard to its content or its structure. <17> (The underlining is Stace's own.)

It is clear from the quotation that Stace has retained his structural theory. <18> It is true that in "Naturalism and Religion", he is uncertain what this theory means <19>, but he has not, either in that work or in any later one, attempted to refute it, nor has he explicitly adopted any other theory. Stace seems therefore to have made an exception for mystical experiences, which cannot, in contrast to other experiences, be conceptualized. Stace's interpretation of the concept of ineffability will be discussed in chapter 3.

(v) M utters S. which contains W, in L at tl + 2

See 1.1.3 point (jx), for an example of a mystical utterance.

(vj) W refers to ME in a symbolic way.

Stace writes:

... what the symbols refer to is the inner subjective experience of the mystic. <W>

But even if W has a referent, it has no meaning:
The symbol does not mean, but evokes, the experience. For a meaning is, in strictness, a concept; whereas here there is no concept. <2l>

The reason why W has no meaning is, of course, that the experience is absolutely ineffable.

The symbol does not mean, but evokes, the experience. For a meaning is, in strictness, a concept; whereas here there is no concept. <2l>

The reason why W has no meaning is, of course, that the experience is absolutely ineffable.

In his typology of theories of meaning, Alston does not take up the possibility that a word could stand for anything in a symbolic sense. As far as I know, no one has attempted to put forward a referential theory in this way. I believe, however, that it would not be logically incompatible with Alston's presentation of the referential theory, even if we have to stretch the concept of reference somewhat.

Both in his early and in his later period, Stace adheres to a referential theory. I have not discovered anything indicating that he was not one during the intermediate period as well. It is inconceivable that Stace would have accepted any of the other types of Alston's theories of meaning. <22>

(vjj) Q understands W, which is uttered by M in S in L, if Q intuitively realizes that W refers symbolically to Qme

For they (the mystics) do not seek by their words to communicate their meaning to us, as when a man says "this is a house" or "that is a tree". They seek to evoke a meaning which is already in us. In this sense mystic or religious language is like poetry or music both of which call up what is within rather than describe what is without. <23>

Stace thinks that all what he calls "sensitive" people are mystics, even if most of them only have a very vague mystical experience. Most people can therefore understand mystical words and sentences, as these evoke something within them, however vague it may be. They understand intuitively what experience W is symbolically referring to. <24>

And this experience, thus symbolized is actually present to the mind in the form of intuition, though not in the form of a conceptualizable representation. <25>


1.1.6. Implications for the Problem of Identification

Mystical words can neither stand for mystical experiences nor structural properties of mystical experiences as mystical words do not have any meaning. For a scientist, even if he is a mystic, it is impossible to identify a mystical experience as the mystical symbols are not translatable to a literally descriptive language. Even if the symbols were translatable, however, identification would be logically impossible, and therefore also impossible using scientific methods, because of the structural theory, something we were made aware of in the previous section. True, all "sensitive" people can recognize the mystical experience intuitively by means of the mystical symbols. But this recognition cannot be translated into a scientific language.


1.1.7. A Suggestion How to Apply the Referential Theory to Mystical Langu age Based on Stace's View in His Later Period

In the later period Stace explains the relationship between mystical experi ence, on the one hand, and the mystic's interpretation on the other. I shall call this theory Stace's "cognition theory" and I shall describe it briefly here as I shall refer to it later. Stace's theory of cognition is an application of his earlier views on the relationship between experience and language. <26>

(j) M has MEI at t1
(jj) MEI is an uninterpreted experience.
This is included in Stace's cognition theory. <27>

(jjj) MEI is introspectively distinguishable to M at t1

In the introduction to the problem of the possible common core of mystical experience, Stace discusses the possibility of introspection. He concludes:

At any rate, we do in some way know introspectively what is going on in our minds, and there is certainly much that we cannot know except by introspection. <28>

Stace has not made any attempt to except mystical experiences from the possibility of introspection. Stace claims, however, that the suspension of the relationship between subject and object is a characteristic feature of what he calls an "introvertive" mystical experience:

It should follow that just as there are in it no distinctions between one object and another there can likewise be no distinction between subject and object. <N>

It is a puzzle to me how it can be possible to introspect an experience that is characterized by the fact that the distinction between subject and object is suspended.

(jv) M connects MEI with W, which is a name for ME, at t1 + 1

Stace's referential theory is, as we see, not of the classic type. Even mystical experiences can be connected with linguistic expressions. The thesis (jv) is included in Stace's cognition theory. Interpretation of a mystical experience can take place at two different levels, the first of which Stace names "low‑level interpretation", the other "high‑level interpretation". From now I shall call these types of interpretation "classification interpreta tion" and "doctrinal interpretation". In the former the mystic makes use of what Stace calls "classificatory concepts", such as undifferentiated, distinction less, unity, etc, while the latter includes concepts that go beyond a description of the experience. Examples of the latter are expressions such as "God", "Brahman". <30> In the utterance of Eckhart cited above, Stace interprets the mystical words "unity" and "forms are no more" as expressions of a classification interpretation, while the mystical word "Godhead” belongs to the doctrinal interpretation. <3l>

The difference between the uninterpreted experience and classification interpretation is, according to Stace, logical but not psychological. Even the distinction between both interpretation levels is logical, but can also often be psychological. After the experience is over, the mystic interprets it as a meeting with, for instance, God. <32> Stace has not stated what the words that express doctrinal interpretation refer to, that is, words that do not describe the properties of the mystical experience.

That is as far as the discussion on Stace's cognition theory goes. <33>

(v) M has ME2 at t, + 2
(vj) ME2 is introspectively distinguishable at tl + 2
(vjj) M remembers MEI at tl + 3

The mystical experience is now over.

(vjjj) At tl + 4 M compares ME2 with the memory of ME, ME3.
(jx) M discovers at tl + 5 that ME3 and ME2 are similar to each other.
(x) At tl + 6 M concludes that it is correct to designate ME2 W.
(xj) At tl + 7 in L M utters S, which contains W, which is a name for ME3 and ME2
(xjj) The meaning of W consists in referring to ME3 and/or ME2.

Stace claims that mystical language adequately describes mystical experience. He writes, for example, about mystical paradoxes:

The paradox which he has uttered has correctly described his experience. The language is only paradoxical because the experience is paradoxical. Thus the language correctly mirrors the experience. <34>

Stace has admitted that he has changed his position with regard to the refe rence of mystical words, as compared with his conception of this during the intermediate period. <35>

(xjjj) Q understands W, which is uttered by M in S in L at t1 that W refers to ME3 and/or ME2.


1. 1. 8. Implications for the Problem of Identification

In contrast to those from his earlier and intermediate period, if we accept Stace's theory of meaning from his later period, then it is logically possible, and also possible to use a scientific method, to identify the properties of a mystical experience with regard to the meaning of mystical words/sentences. There are

examples of mystical words that stand for properties of the mystical experience and not, as previously, for the structural identity between experiences or for something in the mystical experience that could not be conceptualized.

The structural theory is not mentioned in Stace's later period, and it is easy to understand why. If Stace had accepted the structural theory, he could not have claimed that identification was possible. However, even though Stace does not mention the structural theory or discuss it, all the signs indicate that he is still a referential theorist. This should be obvious from the above.


1. 1. 9. Criticism of the Referential Theory

Several common objections are:

(a) We cannot find a reference for all words and sentences. What do words such as "if", "are", "and", "or" refer to is a question Alston puts. These words appear to have meaning but lack reference. Referential theorists have defended their point of view by, among other things, claiming that syncategorematic terms such as "and", "if" etc., do not have reference because they do not have any meaning if they are not connected with other words in a sentence. Alston believes however that if we say that “if” has the same meaning as "provided that", then we have said something about the meaning of these words, irrespective of the context. <36> To say that the word "and" represents the conjunctive function and "or" the disjunctive does not help according to Alston. What is a conjunctive function? The only thing we can say is that it is what we claim applies between the fact that it is raining and the fact that the sun is shining in the sentence "It's raining and the sun is shining". We do not know what a conjunctive function is if we do not take into account how we use the word "and", that is to say, we have not found an independent referent for the word "and". <37>

The same arguments, that certain words or phrases have meaning but lack reference, can be put forward about modal auxiliary verbs such as “could”, “should”, and about words such as "society", “neurosis”, “language”, "all", "no", "'with", "often" etc. <38> The same goes for sentences that state something that has not yet occurred. Gilbert Ryle gives the example "the third man to stand on the top of Mt Everest", which in 1957, when Ryle wrote the article from which the example comes, did not refer to any specific person. <39> Other examples are sentences that deny something, <40> or words/ sentences that refer to something that does not exist, for instance. "ghosts", “unicorns” or "the first man to stand on the top of Mr Everest" after Hillary's death. <4l>

(b) The referential theory, according to Alston, is only applicable to words that are used in a proposition. Language has, however, other functions as well, such as expressing feelings or asking questions. Words such as "oh", "hurray", express feelings, but do not refer to feelings. These words have meaning, nevertheless. Otherwise they would not be used. Alston therefore claims that meaning consists in referring to something cannot apply generally. <42>

(c) To understand W's meaning by realizing what W refers to presupposes that you already know W's meaning. This is the problem of so‑called ostensive definitions, which aim, to put it briefly, at the following. When P points to an object, for example, a horse, and utters the word "horse", Q cannot know that the expression "horse" stands exclusively for the concept of horse and not, for instance, the concept of four‑footed animal. For Q to realize that the expres sion in question stands for the concept of horse, Q must already know the meaning of the expression. <43>

(d) The referential theory presumes the existence of a private language, but it is impossible to construct a language of this kind. This is, above all, a criticism levelled by the later Wittgenstein. As I shall deal with this question in the following section, I shall not comment on it further here.

(e) I have examined the cognition theories of Stace and others in detail in an earlier study, with reference to their application to mystical experiences <44>, so that 1 shall content myself here with providing a short summary of the criticism of what I have called Stace's "reductionist" theory of cognition. A more detailed examination would take us too far from the main problem.

Criticism of Stace's cognition theory has focussed on two areas: first, criti cism of the logical possibility of uninterpreted experiences, second, criticism of the possibility of distinguishing between classification and doctrinal interpreta tion. As my problem concerns the question of identification, I shall limit myself to summing up the criticism concerning the second area.

The criticism then is based on the fact that it is very difficult to distinguish between classification and doctrinal interpretation because

I. Mankind's psychological constitution is such that experiences are affected by the conceptions that the person in question has. We do not experience reality by photographically reproducing objects and situations. An element of inter pretation is an integral part of the experience. We experience things and persons through a filter that is determined by the conceptions we have, the concepts that language supplies, the goals we have set up, etc. The mystic, by reading religious and, especially, mystical writings, participation in rites, prayers, etc., has built up a framework that affects the mystical experiences. In other words, the mystic does not, as Stace claims, experience undifferentiated unity that are later interpreted in a doctrinal fashion as "God", for example. The Christian mystic experiences God, the Hindu experiences Brahman, etc. It is therefore difficult to maintain any differentiation between classification and doctrinal interpretation. <45>

II. A study of how the mystic uses the concepts that are found in descriptions of mystical experiences shows that the concepts vary so much in different traditions that the mystical experiences cannot possibly be identical. In chapter 4 we shall see examples of this. The Jewish mystic's experience of Jahve is not the same an experience of undifferentiated unity, as Stace claims. It is therefore difficult to defend a distinction between classification and doctrinal interpretation. <46>

III. In certain cases, descriptions of mystical experiences cannot be made intelligible if we do not suppose that the concepts that, according to Stace, belong to doctrinal interpretation really belong to classification interpretation, that is, are a description of an experience. When Ruysbroeck, the Dutch mystic, writes that he experience a difference between himself and God in the mystical experience (see chapter 4), it is difficult to claim that Ruysbroeck did not experience God. Consequently, the mystical expression "God" should not be part of a doctrinal interpretation but a part of a classification one. <47>

As the main problem concerns the possibility of identifying a mystical experience by a scientific method, I have limited criticism of the referential theory only to that version of the theory that belongs to Stace's later period. As we have seen, a referential theory is beset with many problems. Stace has neither explicitly applied the theory to mystical language nor put forward any argument in support of it. In addition, as already mentioned, there is an alternative theory that has been applied to mystical language. This is the theory of use, which 1 shall deal with next.

This theory of meaning is primarily based on the later ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein as exemplified in 'Blue Book" (1933‑1934), “Brown Book” (1934‑1935) and in "Philosophische Untersuchungen" (1953). The last work was published posthumously. Blue Book and Brown Book consist of notes for lectures dictated to the students at Cambridge. He did not formulate his view of language systematically in his later period. Many different interpretations of Wittgenstein's theory have therefore been suggested. That of William P Alston is one.

As previously mentioned, Alston has not discussed Wittgenstein's criticism of the idea of a private language. I shall therefore also make use of Norman Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas in this respect. <48>

1. 2. 1. Characteristic Properties of a Theory of Use

(1) P performs a locutionary act, LA, in that P utters S1. <49>

Uttering a sentence is called by Alston performing a '1ocutionary act".

(ii) P can perform a perlocutionary act, PA, by performing LA. <50>

An utterance of S1 that brings about a specific result is a perlocutionary act. Some examples of result can be that P irritates Q, encourages Q, frightens Q. Examples of verbs that, according to Alston, express perlocutionary acts are "persuade", "encourage", "make X do", "amuse". "inspire". A perlocutionary act can be performed without being preceded by a locutionary act. P, for example, by looking round the table can get Q to pass him the salt. <5l>

(iii) P can perform an illocutionary act, 1A, by performing LA. <52>

Alston believes that, for example, the following verbs or verbal phrases express illocutionary acts: “ask”, "report", "predict". <53> Some examples of illocutionary acts are to ask somebody about something, report something to somebody, predict something.

In contrast to a perlocutionary act, an illocutionary act must be preceded by a locutionary act, that is, P must utter S1 to be able to report, promise, etc. or, alternatively, use a sentence substitute, for instance, wave with flags in accordance with definite rules.

An illocutionary act can cause a perlocutionary one to be performed, but not vice‑versa. P cannot get Q to understand that the battery is dead to be able to report that the battery is dead. If P gets Q to understand that the battery is dead, this may be the result if P, for example, having reported this to Q. <54>

(iv) P performs 1A if and only if P realizes that S, is used according to certain rules, R, that require the conditions Cl ... C,, to be fulfilled.<55>

Alston exemplifies as follows:

In order that S can be said to have asked H to open a door, S must utter an appropriate sentence, s, and recognize that the following rules govern his utterance:

s is not to be uttered in that sort of context unless the following conditions hold:

1. There is a particular door that is singled out by something in the context.
2. That door is not already open.
3. It is possible for H to open that door.
4. S has some interest in getting H to open that door. <56>

The conditions do not necessarily have to be actually fulfilled. P need not even believe that they are fulfilled, only P realizes that the utterance of S1 is governed by rules that demand that certain conditions are upheld. <57> As should be clear from the above, the rules here are not grammatical, moral rules, etc., but semantic rules, that is, rules that control the use of words. <58>

(v) The meaning of S1 consists in P realizing what potential 1A P can perform or not perform by uttering S1.

Alston means that it is not necessary to be able to determine what this potential is theoretically. To know what is meant by S1 is in practice to know how to use S1 correctly, that is according to R. <59>

(vi) The person Q understands S, when Q realizes what 1A P is performing through S1.

Thesis (vi) is not mentioned explicitly by Alston, but is an implicative interpretation. The thesis has been included here because of its relevance to the discussion of the possibility of identifying a mystical experience by a scientific method.


1.2.2. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Private Language

(i) P knows that P uses W/S correctly only if there are rules that can help P to decide. <60>

(ii) P has no R for the correct use of W/S if W stands for a name of a property of the experiences PE1 and PE2. <6l>

P believes perhaps that W stands for a property of PE1 and PE2 as P at t1 remembers PE1 which P thinks is similar to PE2. But W is used quite arbitrarily. P cannot know whether he remembers incorrectly or not as he cannot test his memory of PE1 against any other memory. P would then end up in a circle, of course. There is no independent authority with whose help P can decide whether the memory should be called "correct" or not. P cannot know of he is following R or if he only believes that he is doing so. <62> Wittgenstein's conclusion is that we cannot make use of the concept of correct memory in a private language, as this concept is unintelligible. We need external criteria to be able to decide whether or not W is used correctly by P. Semantic rules presuppose something that is universally available. <63>

(iii) P learns the meaning of W/S by connecting W/S with special situations.

To know how the meaning of W/S is generated, we must, according to Wittgenstein, analyse how a person learns his language. A child learns the word "pain" when an adult utters sentences containing the word "pain" when the child has a pain. Learning thus takes place in specific situations and the word "pain" becomes linked to these types of situation. The meaning of the word "pain" is thus logically dependent on the natural expressions that exist in behaviour when pain is experienced. In this way, a child learns a new type of behaviour in relation to pain. Instead of crying, it expresses pain by means of the word "pain", which is an expression of pain, not a description of it. All words for experiences are used in the same way. Consequently, the words do not in themselves refer to the experiences. <64>

So far I have only discussed Wittgenstein's view of the relationship between the user's experience and the words in his language. For my main problem, however, it is just as important to clarify how the theory of use regards the relationship between the user's words/sentences and the receiver's interpretation of these words/sentences, in respect of the possibility of obtaining knowledge of the sender's experiences. Wittgenstein's view of this question, is, according to Malcolm's interpretation, as follows:

(iv) The criteria for Q to be able to understand that P has PE1 is that P behaves in a specific way and/or utters S, which is an expression for PE1

The propositions that describe the criteria for P experiencing pain do not logically imply the proposition "P has a pain". The criteria apply only in specific situations. These do not apply, for instance, if P is rehearsing a play in which he has to pretend that he has a pain, or if P has been hypnotized so as to make him behave as if he has a pain without actually having one, etc. The expression for pain is thus only one criterion of pain in specific situations. <65>

Malcolm admits that it is difficult to accept that it does not logically follow from the proposition about P's behaviour that P has a pain. To form a conjunction consisting in, first, the proposition about P's behaviour, second, a negation of all propositions that describe situations other than the one in question would not help, in other words. This is not because the number of situations would be innumerable, but indefinite. Our semantic rules then are very vague. We can always find other circumstances that could alter the meaning of the sentences. <66> Malcolm thinks that this is perhaps the kind of reasoning that lies behind Wittgenstein's views on pain behaviour.

The problem is now the following. If the proposition about P's behaviour and a description of the circumstances do not logically imply that P has a pain, how can we then know that P has a pain? Wittgenstein answers that we can be just as certain that a person has a specific experience as we are of facts. Malcolm thinks that Wittgenstein is vague on this point, but he believes that Wittgenstein means the following: In real life, in contrast to in theory, there are situations when we are certain that someone has, for instance, a pain. We simply do not doubt it. Naturally, one can, theoretically, find other circumstances that would alter the interpretation of P's behaviour. But in real life we do not continue to ponder over P's behaviour when we are certain but try to assist the person in question. If anyone were to doubt all the time that an expression of pain was genuine, it means that he has not used any criterion for pain. <67>

The criterion of whether P has, for instance, a pain or not is first and foremost P's behaviour and the circumstances in which P expresses pain and then P's words, whether they agree with the behaviour and the circumstances. When we use the sentence "P has a pain", this does not mean that we imagine that P's pain lies behind P's pain behaviour. Wittgenstein makes use of ideas that remind us of Alston's concept of perlocutionary act. The one who sees P's behaviour, who sees under what circumstances P is behaving as he does, who hears P's words, reacts by trying to help P, or at least by sympathizing with P. <68>

Finally, a few words about Wittgenstein's concept of language game, which I take up here because of its relevance to the discussion of the main problem. Unfortunately, Malcolm has not explained what Wittgenstein means by this concept. According to Vincent Brümmer, a language game is the social activity that a group of people participates in when using language as a means of communication and which determines the actual illocutionary acts. <69> The expression "queen" is used, for example, quite differently in the language games of chess, bridge and in politics.

(v) P cannot‑have a private language.


1.2.3. A Suggestion for Applying the Theory of Use to Mystical Language

When applying the theory of use, I shall employ the analytical apparatus of Alston, Malcolm, Burr and Hoffman, as well as my own. Even if Hoffman's takes the ontological object that mystics claim to acquire knowledge of as his point of departure, while Burr discusses the mystical experience without distinguishing between experience and ontological object, it is my opinion that in principle they put forward the same arguments. As my aim is not to give a complete account of the theories of Burr and Hoffmann, but to discuss the possibility of identifying a mystical experience, I shall only refer to the aspects of their theories that are relevant to my problem.

(vjjj) The criteria for Q to understand that S expresses that M has had MEI is that M has a specific type of behaviour and/or utters S, which is an expression for MEI,

Robert Burr admits that when we attempt to find criteria for M having had ME1 by investigating the behaviour of the mystic, it is not so easy as when we talk of, for example, pain behaviour. If a person has mystical experiences, this seldom takes place during the period when he is learning to speak. As an adult he already commands words for inner experiences. Perhaps we can find indications of his having had a mystical experience, for instance, a great feeling of relief or peace. In Burr's view, ethical consequences are another area in which criteria may perhaps be found. <72>

(jx) M cannot have a private language.
(x) The meaning of S1 consists in M realizing what potential 1A M can perform or not perform by uttering S1.
(xj) Q understands S1 when Q realizes what 1A M is performing through SP


1.2.4. Implications for the Problem of Identification

A mystic is unable to describe properties of a mystical experience as there are no rules for the correct use of the words when this applies to the description of private experiences. Even if every person that belongs to the same language game as the mystic can know what a mystical experience is, this knowledge cannot be described, even within that language game. It does not help, therefore, that the researcher is a mystic. If we accept the theory of use, it is not logically possible, and therefore not possible using a scientific method, to identify a mystical experience.


1.2.5. Criticism of the Theory of Use

Here are some of the usual objections:

(a) To connect a word with an experience of something of a private nature is no different from connecting a word with an experience of an object that is available to all. A.J. Ayer, who presented this criticism, takes as his point of departure Wittgenstein's example of a train timetable. P can find out if the memory of an earlier perception of a special part of a train timetable is correct by testing his memory against the train timetable, which then functions as an independent authority that is available to all. But, Ayer claims, when P tests his memory of the perception, it is tested against yet another perception. P has to trust that he has, for instance, reasonably good eyesight and that he can read the figures correctly. Every rule according to which P is to decide whether P is using W/S correctly must, in other words, be tested against some form of sensory experience. It is also on the basis of P's sensory perception that P can decide whether Q is using W/S in the same way as P does. If P, concludes Ayer, connects an experience of an object that is available to all with a linguistic expression, there is no reason to believe that P would not be able to connect an experience of something of a private nature with a linguistic expression. <U>

(b) It is not impossible for Q to understand W/S even if Q cannot perceive what W/S is referring to. We seem to be capable of determining properties of experiences that we ourselves have never had, Ayer claims. A mother can draw the conclusion that her child has a pain by the fact, for example, that the baby is crying and/or by discovering what she assumes to be the cause of the pain. The mother can therefore teach the child how to name experiences of pain. In the same way, that is through the actions people exhibit, we also decide that these people have certain types of experiences of objects that are available to all. There is no essential difference between decisions concerning private and public experiences. It is true that the conclusion from behaviour to experience is not logical, but even here there is, in principle, no difference between experiences of a private nature and those of objects available to all. <74>

(c) It is not logically necessary that anyone other than P should understand W/S that are used by P to describe experiences for W/S to have a meaning. If Robinson Crusoe, to use Ayer's classic example, was left alone on his island without having learnt any language, he would perhaps have discovered a language with which to describe experiences of a private nature. Ayer repudiates the idea that language can only be developed in connection with society. The reason is that someone at some point in time must have started using linguistic expressions. Even if this took place in a social situation, it is nevertheless logically possible that, at the beginning, words could have been uttered by a single person who had developed signs for his private experiences. It is difficult to claim, says Ayer, that a language could only have been developed by Friday arriving on the island. Even if Crusoe could not teach Friday the signs for his private experiences, it does not follow that Crusoe could not use words for his own purposes, that is, the words have had meaning all the same. <75> The fact that Crusoe did not have any other way of determining his experiences than by means of his memory does not imply that he could not determine his experiences or that it would be meaningless to say that he could not decide whether his memory was correct or not. <76>

(d) The theory has not accounted for the meaning of words. Alston himself has admitted this. <77>

One of the problems that Stace has to solve in order to enable the identification of mystical experiences by a scientific method is to put forward and supply arguments in favour of a theory of meaning that considers the relationship between, on the one hand, mystical words/sentences and, on the other, mystical experiences, in such a way that we are able to determine properties of the mystical experiences from mystical words/sentences. In addition, such a theory has to be shown to be the one we should prefer among a series of rival theories.

An explicitly formulated theory of this sort does not exist today. But it is my opinion that Stace in his later period has such a theory of meaning as his point of departure. As my investigation is based on the only theory today that is positive to the possibility of identifying a mystical experience, the theory of Walter T. Stace, I have chosen to reconstruct that type of theory of meaning that Stace implicitly accepted. Stace's referential theory from his later period, applied to mystical language, means that the mystic regards the mystical experience introspectively and connects it with words that are names for properties of the experience in question. After the experience is over the mystic can make intellectual additions, for instance, by saying that he experienced unity with God. Thus the word “God” does not refer to the mystical experience, but, as mystical words can stand for properties of the mystical experience, it is logically possible, and even possible with a scientific method, to identify properties of mystical experiences with regard to the meaning of mystical words/sentences.

The referential theory is, however, beset with great difficulties. We cannot find a referent for all the available words/sentences in the language. The theory applies only to propositions. There are many other ways, however, of using language than uttering propositions. To understand the meaning of a word by realizing what the word refers to presupposes that you already know the meaning of the word. In addition, the theory presumes the existence of a private language, which is impossible to construct according to the later Wittgenstein. Stace's cognition theory, which is a part of his referential theory, also presents great difficulties. Psychological observations and studies of mystical texts have shown that it is very difficult to distinguish between classification and doctrinal interpretation.

An alternative theory for explaining the meaning of mystical sentences is the theory of use. This means, briefly, that mystical sentences may be used in a number of different ways, for instance, by promising or claiming that the way of the mystic leads to God. The intention when uttering a mystical sentence is to bring about a certain effect in the receiver, for example, to inspire or guide a novice on the mystical way. The mystic utters a mystical sentence in accordance with semantic rules requiring the fulfilment of certain conditions. The meaning of a mystical sentence consists in the mystic realizing what he can achieve by uttering the sentence under the specific conditions, that is, when he knows how he can use the sentence in question.

According to the theory of use, the mystic cannot use the language for describing a mystical experience. The reason is that inner "private" experiences cannot represent the ultimate authority that is required to be able to decide whether the word/sentence is used correctly. To be able to check that a sentence is used correctly, authorities available to all are required, for example, the behaviour of the sender and the circumstances under which the sentence is uttered. Words can not describe properties of mystical experiences. Adoption of the theory of use therefore logically excludes the possibility of identifying a mystical experience, and therefore also of identifying it using a scientific method. However, the theory of use is not free from objections. Aver thinks that there is no difference between connecting a word with an experience of something "private" and connecting a word with an experience of an object available to the public. Neither is it impossible for the receiver to understand a word/sentence even if he cannot perceive what the word/sentence is referring to. In addition, it is not logically necessary that anyone other than the sender should understand a sentence that is used to describe a "private" experience for a sentence to have meaning. Alston also admits that the theory cannot explain the meaning of words.

The theory of use does not allow that it is logically possible to identify a mystical experience. As this theory is the only one so far that has been explicitly applied to mystical language, I am forced to conclude that there is no theory in existence today that explains the meaning of mystical words/sentences in such a way that mystical experiences can be identified by a scientific method.

Another problem that Stace has to solve before a mystical experience can be identified scientifically is that of function. Stace has to show that mystical sentences function descriptively, that is, are used to describe properties of mystical experiences, something that Stace's version of the referential theory takes for granted. Stace has tried to show this. An investigation of the possible descriptive function of mystical sentences is the theme of the next chapter.

1. Alston's typology of theories of meaning also includes what he calls the "behavioural" and "ideational" theories. The reason for not discussing these theories is that so far no‑one has applied them to mystical language. But it is easy to see that neither of them makes it possible to identify a mystical experience. The behavioural theory analyses the meaning of a sentence in terms of a specific response to or disposition to specific behaviour on the part of the receiver, brought about by the sentence under specific conditions (see Alston 1964, pp 28‑31 and Alston 1972, pp 235‑237) Therefore, this theory does not state any relationship between words and the private experiences of the sender. The ideational theory of meaning states that a meaning of a sentence consists in realizing what ideas the sender has in mind when uttering the sentence. Every word stands for a specific idea and ideas are derived from sense perception (see Alston 1964, pp 22‑25 and Alston 1972, pp 235,237). As the mystical experience does not include sense perception, the ideational theory of meaning would not be applicable to mystical language. But even if some mystical experience included sense perception, as Stace asserts, the theory would not permit the identification of a mystical experience. The reason is that scientists who study mystical experiences or results of research on mystical experiences must themselves be mystics in order to understand mystical texts/scientific reports. This requirement is difficult to defend.
2. Alston 1964, pp 12‑13 and Alston 1972, p 234.
3. Alston 1964, pp 12‑13.
4. Alston 1964, p 14. I suppose Alston is referring to Russell's theory of meaning here. Se Russell 1921, p 191.
5. Alston 1964, pp 15‑16.
6. Alston 1964, p 16.
7. Alston 1964, p 65.
8. Stace 1935, p 427.
9. Stace 1958, p 468. See also p 472, Stace 1935, p 426 and Stace 1940, p 10, 22
10. Stace 1935, pp 433‑434.
11. I have not given an account of Stace's views on the meaning of sentences, because Stace argue that the meaning of sentences is determined by the meaning of the separate words and therefore subordinate to the latter. See Stace 1944, p 234.
12. Stace 1935, p 434.
13. Stace only argues that in the mystical experience the mystic directly cognizes (parts of) God's consciousness (Stace 1940, p 249, 252). Consequently, Stace does not use his theory of cognition in the same way in the earlier and later period. In his later period Stace does not state that the mystic experiences God. When the mystic uses terms for God, these do not refer to mystical experience but should be regarded as intellectual comments.
14. Blakney 1941, pp 200‑201. Quoted in Stace 1960a, p 98.
15. Stace 1935, pp 430‑431. See Also Stace 1940, p 19.
16. Stace 1935, p 431.
17. Stace 1949‑1950, p 25.
18. See also Stace 1952c, p 27.
19. Stace 1949‑1950, p 25.
20. Stace 1949‑1950, p 36.
21. Stace 1952a, p 91.
22. See 1. 2. 1. and note 1.
23. Stace 1952a, p 86.
24. Stace 1952b. p 245.
25. Stace 1952a, pp 65‑66.
26. Stace argues that what he calls the "introvertive" mystical experience has the following characteristic properties: 1. The Unitary Consciousness, The One, The Void, pure conscious ness, 2. Nonspatial, nontemporal, 3. Sense of objectivity or reality, 4. Blessedness, peace etc., 5. Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine, 6. Paradoxicality, 7. Alleged by the mystics to be ineffable, (Stace 1960a, pp 131‑132). Stace's definition of "extrovertive" mystical experience is identical to the above except for 1‑2. The first quality is also unity, but is experienced by means of sense perception. Point 2 consists in the mystic experiencing the unity as something alive in every object (Stace 1960a, p 131. See also Stace 1960b, pp 12‑23 and Stace 1967b, p 21, 25‑26)
27. Stace 1960a. p 31. Stace's theory of cognition applied to sense perception is already to b found in his earlier period. See Stace 1940, p 159.
28. Stace 1960a, p 60.
29. Stace 1960a, p 111.
30. Stace 1960a, p 37.
31. Ibid.
32. Stace 1960a, p 31, 37.
33. Christine Overall has shown how the concept of "the given", which Stace makes use of in his earlier period, is used when he develops his theory of cognition in his later period. See Overall 1980, p 47‑55.
34. Stace 1960a, p 305. Mystical paradoxes will be discussed in Chapter 3.
35. Stace 1960a, p 293.
36. Alston 1964, p 14.
37. Alston 1964, p 18. See also Hospers 1978, p 20 and Ryle 1957, p 245.
38. Alston 1964, p 17, 67. See also Brümmer 1982, p 44, Ryle 1957, p 245, Black 1968, p 152 and Brody 1973, p 12.
39. Ryle 1957, pp 244‑245.
40. Brody 1973, pp 12‑13.
41. Black 1968, p 152, Brody 1973, p 12, Hospers 1978, pp 20‑21 and Ryle 1957, p 245.
42. Alston 1964, p 16. See also Brümmer 1982, pp 45‑46 and Hospers 1978, p 20.
43. Hospers 1978, p 21.
44. Norrman 1982. ‑
45. See Katz 1978 and Garside 1972.
46. See Katz 1978 and Fakhry 1971.
47. See Pike 1965 and Owen 1971, who both, it is true, attack Smart's theory. But the logical structure of Stace's theory is the same as Smart's. See Norrman 1982, pp 16‑19 and Corbenic 1978, p 117.
48. The reason why Alston has not dealt with Wittgenstein's criticism of the private language could be that he has not found Wittgenstein's arguments convincing. See Alston 1980, p 140.
49. Alston 1964, pp 34‑35. The terms "locutionary", "perlocutionary" and "illocutionary" are not Wittgenstein's.
50. Ibid.
51. Alston 1964, pp 35‑36.
52. Alston 1964, p 35.
53. Ibid.
54. Alston 1964, p 36.
55. Alston 1964, pp 42‑43.
56. Alston 1964, p 42.
57. Alston 1964, pp 42‑43.
58. Alston 1964, p 44
59. Alston 1964, p 39.
60. Malcolm 1963, pp 98‑99.
61. Malcolm 1963, pp 99‑101, 104.
62. Malcolm 1963, pp 99‑101.
63. Malcolm 1963, pp 103‑104.
64. Malcolm 1963, p 107.
65. Malcolm 1963, pp 113‑114.
66. Malcolm 1963, pp 114‑115.
67. Malcolm 1963, pp 116‑117.
68. Malcolm 1963, pp 117‑119.
69. Brümmer 1982, p 13.
70. Neither Burr nor Hoffmann has explicitly tried to define the concept of mystical
experience.
71. Hoffman 1960, pp 68‑69.
72. Burr 1976, pp 284‑286.
73. Ayer & Rhees 1954, pp 68.
74. Ayer & Rhees 1954, pp 72‑74.
75. Ayer & Rhees 1954, pp 70‑72.
76. Ayer 6 Rhees 1954, pp 71‑72. See also Tanburn 1963, pp 89‑90.
77. Alston 1964, pp 38‑39.